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This thesis proposes an original understanding of deindustrialisation which 
it defines as a double-sided phenomenon that involves both industrial 
modernisation and contraction and as a process that is actively shaped by 
the state. The thesis’ central argument is that deindustrialisation can be 
understood as a form of industrial statecraft whereby state managers 
endorse a selective disengagement from certain manufacturing activities in 
order to rationalise the country’s industry and enhance its overall 
commercial performance. Drawing from an Open Marxist perspective this 
thesis contends that states, as the political form of capitalist social relations, 
are an integral instant of the process of capital valorisation and as a result 
are constrained by the necessity to guarantee the conditions for profitable 
accumulation within their borders and the national economy’s competitive 
insertion within the global market. To substantiate these claims, this thesis 
offers empirical evidence from the French national archives which traces 
the process of industrial policy-making between 1974 and 1984 towards 
three sectors: textiles & clothing, steel and automobiles. In France, faced 
with a global crisis of overaccumulation that domestically translated into a 
growing trade deficit, the consecutive governments of the decade under 
examination sought to selectively devalue the superfluous industrial capital 
that impeded the competitiveness of domestic industry on the world stage. 
In each of these sectors, government officials were faced with a policy 
quandary as the planned closures and ensuing unemployment that 
accompanied selective disengagement threatened to ignite widespread 
labour contestation. Thus, selective disengagement was carried out through 
diverse strategies that involved to different degrees the politicisation and/or 
depoliticisation of industrial policy. Such strategies sought to palliate the 
consequences of deindustrialisation and/or transfer the responsibilities over 
industrial adjustment to non-state spheres in order to ensure the conformity 







THE SPECTRE OF DEINDUSTRIALISATION 
Since the 1970s the productive structures of advanced capitalist countries 
have been significantly transformed. Manufacturing industry has come to 
occupy an ever-decreasing share of both employment and GDP to the 
benefit of the service and financial sectors. The process of 
deindustrialisation has at the same time been said to be accompanied by 
an ostensible retrenchment of state interventionism in industrial matters. 
Indeed, it is often argued that neoliberal turn that swept policy-making in the 
1980s led to the ‘retreat from industrial policy’ (Coates 2015: 52) as states 
progressively abstained from the formulation of activist industrial policies as 
in the past (Bianchi and Labory 2006: 16; Cowling and Tomlinson 2011: 
834). The former centrality of the manufacturing sector for economic 
development was replaced by the perception that immaterial and 
knowledge-intensive activities were now the main engine of growth of a 
modern economy (World Bank 1998). Since the 1980s it seemed as though 
advanced capitalist countries gradually acquiesced to the 
deindustrialisation of their economies and states relinquished their former 
key role in spurring industrial development. 
However, deindustrialisation looms over developed countries as a constant 
political and economic threat. Growing concerns over the surge of cheap 
imports from the developing world, the fear over the outsourcing of 
production processes, the persistent pauperisation of former iconic 
industrial basins and the constant questioning of the capacity of a financial 
or service-based economy to sustain long-term growth and employment are 
but a few manifestations of the distress experienced by modern 
deindustrialised economies. Thus, after decades of laissez-faire policies the 
recent economic turmoil following the 2008 financial crisis ‘has brought 




of the Atlantic, voices are stressing the importance of the manufacturing 
sector for long-term growth and employment pressing governments to re-
embrace industrial policy as an antidote to stagnation (Tregenna 2011; 
Beffa 2012; Tomlinson and Cowling 2013; National Economic Council 2016; 
Blachier 2017). Recent political developments have also testified its rising 
importance for advanced economies including France’s commitment since 
2015 to create a ‘New Industrial France’ by supporting the development of 
9 high technology sectors (Ministère de l’Economie, 2016), the UK’s 
consecutive governments’ pledge to since 2008 undertake a more engaged 
stance towards industrial policy (Berry 2016) and more recently Trump’s 
election on a platform of reindustrialising America (Fukuyama 2016). 
Deindustrialisation has been the subject of intense debates particularly in 
France with an array of public figures and economists raising the alarm over 
the country’s decreasing industrial competitiveness and urging the 
government to urgently step in and redress industrial decline (Beffa 2012; 
Colletis 2012; Levet 2012; Giraud and Weil 2013; Cohen and Buigues 2014; 
Artus 2016). The anxiety over industrial decline has been a long-winded 
concern in the French political landscape and a leitmotiv adopted across the 
country’s political spectrum. In 2012 the electoral campaign saw the 
confrontation of Sarkozy’s ‘Made in France’ initiative directing efforts on 
encouraging the production of goods on French soil and Hollande’s law to 
set to limit plants’ closures by forcing firms to find a buyer before shutting 
down any industrial site. The 2017 electoral confrontation was equally 
typified by the prominence of the deindustrialisation theme as the state-led 
re-industrialisation of France figured as a policy priority of such diverse 
candidates as Le Pen and Mélenchon. Ultimately, the current Macron 
presidency proposed to resume the aforementioned ‘Nouvelle France 
Industrielle’ program previously launched by Macron himself as Minister of 
the Economy. Equally, stemming the tide of deindustrialisation and 
bolstering domestic industrial capacities is increasingly gaining a privileged 




2011). One could argue with Cohen and Buigues (2014: 2) that 
deindustrialisation certainly constitutes a ‘French obsession’. 
At an academic level the creeping resurgence of industrial policy into 
everyday politics has been accompanied by what might be termed the 
‘Manufacturing Renaissance/New Industrial Policy binomial’ (Mosconi, 
2015: 193). Indeed, there has recently been a notable upsurge in debates 
focusing on the merits of stimulating the manufacturing sector to achieve 
economic growth and employment objectives and on the desirability of 
industrial policy in modern capitalist economies (Rodrik 2009; Naudé 2010; 
Aghion et al. 2011; Stollinger et al. 2013; Aiginger 2014). Underpinning the 
rise of the calls for a new industrial policy was to a great extent the 2008 
financial crash as it arguably questioned the sustainability of the neoliberal 
model of growth resting on the unfettered operations of free markets and 
the retrenchment of the state’s interventionist capacities (Coates 2015: 56). 
Moreover, the crisis challenged the economic ‘hegemony of finance’ and 
ignited aspirations to re-anchor economic growth in the so to speak real 
economy and in the productive potential of the industrial sector (Aiginger 
2014: 4; Mosconi 2015: 1; Bullman et al. 2016: 182). To reinvigorate 
economic growth and remedy industrial decline, the contemporary literature 
on industrial policy argues that the latter should be systematically pursued 
and inscribed into a government’s core policy priorities (Rodrik 2008; Naudé 
2010: 23; Aghion et al. 2011: 8).  In this vein, the calls for a ‘new industrial 
policy’ recognize the decisiveness of the state in mobilising the financial and 
material resources necessary to regenerate the economy’s industrial 
development (Bianchi and Labory 2006: 24; Cohen 2006: 101-102; Beffa 
2012; Levet et al. 2012; Mazzucato 2013). In essence, public authorities are 
increasingly being called to reverse the past decades’ trend towards 
deindustrialisation and enact a process of ‘re-industrialisation’ (Levinson 
2012; Levet 2012; Pitelis 2014; Westkämper 2014). 
Overall, the current developments in industrial policy theory and practice put 




Clearly any attempt to fathom the state’s capacity to reverse the 
deindustrialisation tide necessitates an exploration of the relation between 
statecraft strategies and industrial development and an examination of the 
state’s historical role within the process of deindustrialisation. Therefore, it 
is of the utmost importance to ask what makes the state and its industrial 
policies capable of reversing deindustrialisation if it was unable to prevent it 
in the past. 
Indeed, if the state is currently considered as a key vehicle of 
reindustrialisation and industrial rejuvenation then it is necessary to explain 
why it allowed large segments of industry to disappear in the first place. How 
complicit were in fact nationally crafted industrial policies in the decline of 
certain industries? Similarly, this question resonates particularly in the 
French case: Why, despite the crucial role held by state-sponsored 
strategies in spurring post-war industrial development (Green 1986: 111; 
Dormois 1999: 75; Clift 2013: 110), was the French state unable to deploy 
its rich pallet of industrial policy tools to reverse deindustrialisation? To shed 
light to these issues, this thesis proposes to delve back into the origins of 
this phenomenon and analyse the influence exercised upon it by the state 
and its industrial policy-making strategies. By examining the French 
experience of deindustrialisation between 1974 and 1984, the thesis seeks 
to examine the extent and ways through which the state participated in the 
deindustrialisation phenomenon. Understanding the historical role of the 
state within the process of industrial contraction can provide valuable 
insights regarding the capabilities and limitations of state-led industrial 
policies in spurring manufacturing growth. In fact, as the rest of the thesis 
demonstrates the state wasn't unable to prevent deindustrialisation but in 
fact facilitated it. 
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
By delving into the relation between the French state and deindustrialisation 
during 1974-1984 this thesis seeks to intervene in contemporary debates 




deindustrialisation as a state-endorsed strategy of selective disengagement 
from specific manufacturing activities that takes place within and across 
sectors. Equally, the thesis seeks to inform debates within International 
Political Economy (IPE) on the nature of the relation between states and 
markets by arguing that the latter should not be understood as externally 
related institutions or even antagonistic social spheres but as institutional 
forms assumed by capitalist social relations and necessary moments in the 
process of capital valorisation. 
REDEFINING DEINDUSTRIALISATION 
The topic of deindustrialisation has been the subject of various sociological, 
historical and urban studies which aim to evaluate and measure the effects 
of deindustrialisation on various regions and sociological groups. Often 
these approaches’ analysis is confined to appreciating the ways through 
which distinct communities have resisted or responded to 
deindustrialisation and on how they have been socially, economically or 
even psychologically transformed following the erosion of their industrial 
capacities and the disappearance of traditional blue-collar jobs (see inter 
alia Milkman 1997; Wilson 1997; Dublin and Licht 2005; Walkerdine and 
Jimenez 2012; Sugrue 2014). In fact, this literature tends to present an 
historical iteration of the ‘body count’ of deindustrialisation (Cowie and 
Heathcott 2003: 5) whereby the object of research becomes ‘the number of 
job losses, shifts in the rates of unemployment, changes in employment 
within the various sectors of the economy and the spatial distribution of 
industry and its loss’ (Strangleman and and Rhodes 2014: 413). As noted 
by Koistinen (2013: 1) the relation of deindustrialisation to policy-making is 
quasi-absent from such discussions. What lacks from the existing 
sociological or historical analyses is thus a political economy approach to 
deindustrialisation.  
To provide such a perspective this thesis will draw from the insights of the 
economic literature on deindustrialisation. While the latter’s understanding 




of the causes of deindustrialisation establish a clearer, though limited, link 
between the state and deindustrialisation than in the aforementioned 
sociological accounts. The aim of a political economy analysis is thus to 
bridge the methodological gap and disciplinary boundaries that 
characterises contemporary perspectives on deindustrialisation and show 
the complementarity of the political, economic and social aspects of 
deindustrialisaiton. 
To a great extent, research on deindustrialisation has been captured by the 
discipline of economics. In general, the existing literature has often been 
classified between those analyses that consider factors proper to the 
domestic economy as the primary determinants of deindustrialisation and 
those that attribute the latter to changes in the global economy (Iversen and 
Cusack 2000: 339-340; Kang and Lee 2011). Thus, the debates on 
deindustrialisation have largely been centred around identifying the extent 
to which shrinking manufacturing employment in the North can be mainly 
accounted by the demand- and supply-side mechanisms of the domestic 
market such as productivity growth and shifts in consumption norms 
(Baumol et al. 1985, 1989; Krugman and Lawrence 1994; Rowthron and 
Ramaswamy 1997,1998; Rowthorn and Coutts 2004) or whether at the root 
of this process are external factors relating to increasing economic 
internationalisation such as FDI growth and outsourcing of production 
(Frank and Freeman 1978; Harrison and Bluestone 1982; Beenstock 1984) 
or trade with developing countries (Sachs and Schatz 1994; Wood 1994; 
Saeger 1997; Kucera and Milberg 2003). In short, the mainstream literature 
on deindustrialisation has largely been dominated by the endeavour to 
quantify the statistical weight of different economic processes and variables 
on manufacturing employment.  
At the same time the attempt to grasp deindustrialisation in quantitative 
terms has given rise to two distinct political appreciations of this 
phenomenon. One ‘optimist’ appreciation, which this thesis terms as the 




Ramaswamy 1999), views it as a natural mechanism of a free-market 
economy that reveals the growing productivity of industry which 
progressively renders industrial labour redundant. Equally, 
deindustrialisation manifests the natural adaptation of developed 
economies to global market conditions which allows them to occupy the 
higher-end segments of the manufacturing chain within the International 
Division of Labour (IDL). It thus follows that for such an approach the role 
of the state is not to prevent or reverse deindustrialisation but to allow the 
smooth transition of the domestic economy to new market-imposed 
conditions.  
On the other hand, the more ‘pessimistic’ approach defines 
deindustrialisation as an instance of economic decline that indicates the 
national economy’s worsening manufacturing performance in the world 
market (Bluestone and Harrisson 1982; Cohen and Zysman 1987). This 
approach, termed here as ‘industriocratic’ given its understanding of 
manufacturing as the economy’s engine of growth (Kaldor 1966), sees the 
state as having ‘fallen out of love for its industry’ (Blanchet 2014: 170) as 
industrial decline is linked to the state’s lack of ambitious industrial 
strategies fostering the industrial rejuvenation of the domestic economy 
(Cohen 1989). 
The thesis’ aim is to intervene in this debate not by providing support for 
one or the other interpretations of deindustrialisation but by arguing that 
deindustrialisation can constitute both a downturn in industrial performance 
as well as an instance of growing productivity. Rather than a one-sided 
process of economic progress or a downhill trajectory of decline, 
deindustrialisation constitutes a contradictory process which involves both 
sides of the coin. The contradictory and double-sided nature of 
deindustrialisation is illustrated by the fact that French manufacturing 
employment, from 1980 to 2007, right before the financial crisis, had lost 
36% of its workforce (Demmou 2010). In addition, the growth of 




since 1970 (Rignols 2016: 3) contributing to the country’s continuously 
negative balance of trade. Even further, Louis Gallois’ (2012) report to the 
Prime Minister raised the alarm about the country’s declining industrial 
competitiveness as France’s share of manufacturing value added to GDP 
was one of the lowest in the Euro Area (15th out of 17). These observations 
suggest that the country’s manufacturing performance has been on a steady 
path of decline. Yet, at the same time since the 1970s French industrial 
production has not ceased to grow! In 2014 manufacturing value-added was 
8.6 times higher than in 1970 (Rignols 2016: 1). Based on this observation 
one could hardly speak of deindustrialisation as the constantly augmenting 
volume of value added suggests dramatic improvements in the productivity 
of domestic industry. France’s industrial history since the 1970s has not 
been one of industrial decline as it is often suggested, but has contradictorily 
been a tale of both economic progress and regress. 
Another issue with the existing literature is that by viewing 
deindustrialisation solely in statistical/economic terms, it understands the 
role of the state within this process solely in functional terms. For the 
naturalists the role of the state is limited to its capacity to provide the 
adequate framework for easing the economy’s transition to a 
deindustrialised economy or for the industriocrats in its capacity to prevent 
or rectify industrial decline using appropriate and ambitious industrial 
policies. The state appears at the downstream or upstream moments of 
deindustrialisation while its role within the process itself is obfuscated. 
Therefore, a political economy analysis of deindustrialisation requires to 
consider both the double-sided character of this process as well as the role 
of the state in mediating it.  
To do so, this thesis proposes a fresh definition of deindustrialisation by 
arguing that the latter can be understood as a state-endorsed strategy of 
selective disengagement from specific manufacturing activities across and 
within industrial sectors. As an industrial policy, selective disengagement 




production units that inhibit effective competition in world markets and by 
concurrently fostering the development of the commercially most promising 
ones. It follows that selective disengagement consists of a dual process 
involving the promotion of modernisation and the management of industrial 
decline. Thus, the definition of deindustrialisation as an industrial strategy 
of selective disengagement remedies the shortcomings of the existing 
literature firstly by acknowledging that rather than a solely economic 
process, deindustrialisation is a political/statecraft practice that takes place 
in and through the state by way of the latter’s industrial policies and 
secondly, by conceptualising it as a phenomenon that involves both the 
strategic strengthening of certain industrial activities as well as the 
weakening of others. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR IPE 
In their endeavour to refine the understanding of deindustrialisation, the 
thesis’ findings also aim at reinforcing the claims of Open Marxism (OM) 
that view the state and the market as institutional forms of appearance of 
the underlying capitalist social relations as opposed to autonomous and 
distinct domains of social activity (Clarke 1988; Bonefeld 1992; Holloway 
1994). It has been often argued that mainstream debates both within and 
outside international political economy proper, have arbitrarily 
conceptualised the relationship between the state and the market as one 
between two independent social realms each operating according to their 
own mechanisms and logics (Block and Evans 2005: 506; Watson 2005: 
19-20). For such views the global economy is thus understood as an arena 
of struggle in which governments and markets strive to dominate and 
discipline one another (Clift 2014: 32).   
Such ontological assumptions are clearly illustrated in IPE studies of the 
evolution of the global economy in the era following the dismantlement of 
Bretton Woods, the post-war economic order based on a system of fixed 
exchange rates. Bretton Woods was predicated upon the principles of 




principles in the international realm and state interventionism in the 
domestic economy (Ruggie 1982). Mainstream perspectives in IPE often 
associate the breakup of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 with the world 
markets’ increasing capacity to exercise authority in the global economy. 
Indeed, the switch from a system of fixed to floating exchange rates, the 
deregulation of financial markets and the overall rise in the velocity and 
mobility of global capital have said to pose significant limitations on the 
spectrum of policy tools available to national policy-makers (Kurzer 1993; 
Moses 1994; Ruggie, 1994; Strange 1994, 1996; Held 1995; Rhodes 1996). 
While other perspectives within IPE, including neo-polanyian and 
constructivist ones, have criticised  the dichotomous understanding of states 
and markets for failing to see the mutual dependency and complementarity 
that underpins their relation (Underhill 2000; Block and Evans 2005; Watson 
2005; Krippner 2007; Clift 2014), the OM endeavour not only rejects it but 
also grounds the apparent separation of states and markets in the capitalist 
form of social relations (Bonefeld 1992).   
Indeed, as Wood (1981, 2002) argues the separation of society into a 
political and economic sphere is a distinct particularity of capitalist class 
relations that has its origins in the separation of the mass of society from 
the means of subsistence. The appropriation of the labouring class’ product 
does not occur with coercive political means, as was the case in feudal 
societies, but by workers’ participation in capitalist exchange and the sale 
of their labour power, while political domination becomes the exclusive 
realm of the state (Wood 1981). As such the state upholds the order of the 
market by reproducing the legal framework that guarantees the formally free 
and contractual exchange of commodities while at the same time reinstating 
the separation of labour from the means of production (Bonefeld 1992: 116; 
Holloway 1996a: 121). States and markets are institutionally differentiated 
forms of the same underlying social relation. 
Deciphering the social constitution of capitalist institutions is essential for 




one of the core questions of IPE’s research agenda (Underhill 2000: 801). 
Capitalist social relations acquire a particular historical character since 
power is not ascribed to any particular institution or class of individuals. 
Instead these relations ‘produce an alien social power standing above them, 
produce their mutual interaction as a process and power independent of 
them’ (Marx 1973: 197). This alien force dominating individuals is expressed 
in the unceasing compulsion to accumulate value. Value refers to the form 
that wealth acquires in capitalist society which is measured by the social 
productivity of labour and is materially expressed in the form of money (Marx 
1973: 250-270). Value is thus realised within the process of market 
exchange whereby productive producers are rewarded with profits and less 
competitive ones are penalised with financially ruinous sales. Within the 
confines of the world market, the acquisition of capitalist wealth depends on 
the capacity of distinct national territories and individual capitals to 
constantly raise their productivity levels and profitably sell in a context of 
cutthroat competition.  
At the same time the incessant drive to increase productive capacities 
encounters the finite limits of the market raising the risk of liquidation for 
less competitive individual capitals and the unemployment of their 
corresponding labour forces. Overaccumulation and the growing prospects 
of ruinous sales are translated into a state crisis that is experienced in the 
form of financial downgrading, trade deficits, capital flight or even a in the 
form of a legitimation crisis spurred by the discontented segments of civil 
society. Surmounting the crisis looming over the state requires the re-
establishment of the conditions for the effective accumulation of capitalist 
wealth and profitable performance in international exchange. Thus, the 
locus of power does not lie within the market or the state. Rather, power is 
in a sense exercised upon both economic agents and policy-makers by the 
impersonal and invisible dictate of capitalist exchange to accumulate value. 
Although, capital accumulation is sustained ‘in and through’ the actions of 




the same time appears as an externally-imposed imperative as the agents’ 
own reproduction depends on their capacity to secure their share of wealth 
within the antagonistic conditions of the global market (Bonefeld 2014: 102, 
153). 
Such analysis has important ramifications for analysing the governing 
dilemmas that underpin policy-making. States are not inherently geared 
towards functionally adapting policy-making to the requirements of 
international markets as is often implicitly purported within IPE (Holloway 
1996a: 120; Bonefeld 2000: 32). Similarly to the dichotomous understanding 
of state-market relations, certain contributions to IPE have argued that the 
process of economic globalisation has brought about a transformation and 
redefinition of state policy-making capacities (Cerny 1994; Vogel 1996; 
Majone 1997). This is evident in the arguments surrounding the emergence 
of the ‘competition state’ according to which globalisation has entailed a 
restructuring of state capacities away from interventionist, welfare-
enhancing policies and towards market-enabling measures aimed at 
strengthening international competitiveness (Cerny 1995; Evans and Cerny 
2003; Cerny et al 2005). Although such ‘transformationalist’ accounts 
accord a central role to the state in facilitating globalisation processes, the 
state simultaneously sheds its previously held interventionist powers (Cerny 
1997: 269) as policy-making becomes increasingly subject to ‘external 
forces’ (Amin 1997: 129). 
Instead, for OM, it is not external pressures that drive policy-making but the 
state’s intrinsic burden to reproduce domestic class relations in a manner 
compatible with capitalist development (Clarke 1988: 136; Burnham and 
Elger 2001: 249). To reproduce themselves, states must guarantee their 
territory’s competitive presence within the international market and also 
endeavour to insure their political survival and legitimacy by channelling the 
democratic and material aspirations of labour within the confines of 
profitable accumulation. Economic policy in general and industrial policy in 




government’s autonomous volitions but by the necessity to neutralise the 
social tensions that disrupt domestically operating capital’s capacity to 
profitably accumulate in a globally competitive system of exchange. 
Sustaining accumulation is not simply a market-imposed constraint, but the 
condition of the state’s reproduction as a form of capitalist relations. In their 
pursuit of economic growth state managers themselves put limits on the 
policies that they are willing to deploy. 
The conceptualisation of nation-states as essential moments in capital’s 
relentless efforts to appropriate a share of globally produced wealth is key 
for understanding the political economy of deindustrialisation. Indeed, in 
response to the overaccumulation tendencies of capital, the state is called 
to channel efforts to the promotion of the capital that is most able to redress 
the country’s performance in the international scene and allow the profitable 
resumption of accumulation. At the same time, the restoration of 
competitiveness requires the withdrawal of support for declining activities 
as their conservation constitutes an important drain on state resources and 
can neither sustainably guarantee competitiveness nor employment. This 
process is accompanied by the contestation of disadvantaged groups which 
can pressure the state to compromise its industrial policy preferences. Thus, 
the state is called to devise strategies to attenuate or circumvent the 
escalation of social tensions without disrupting industrial restructuring.  
In concrete policy terms such governing dilemmas can translate into 
different degrees of politicisation and/or depoliticisation of industrial policy-
making (Burnham 2011). Governments might attempt to quell social 
tensions by overtly assuming the political responsibility over certain 
palliative industrial measures that soften the socially painful adjustment to 
deindustrialisation. Alternatively, they might attempt to strengthen their 
autonomy from civil society’s pressures and ‘place at one remove the 
political character of decision-making’ by for instance formally delegating 
certain aspects of industrial policy-making to institutional bodies lying 




formulation of policy (Burnham 2001). Equally, depoliticisation can be 
pursued by strengthening supranational bodies such as the European 
Commission whose legal pressures can offer an external impetus to 
implement unpopular policy reforms. Thus the state can endorse the 
process of deindustrialisation using various (de)politicising strategies to 
selectively channel policy efforts to the promotion of key activities and 
facilitate the decline of uncompetitive ones.  
Through this analytical lens, deindustrialisation is not portrayed as a market-
led process occurring independently of the state but, is understood as a 
phenomenon endorsed and managed by the state itself. This is aptly 
captured by for instance the case of the Textiles and Clothing industry 
(T&C). As Heron (2012: 4) explains, within the IPE literature, the migration 
of the great bulk of this industry from developed economies to developing 
ones has often been portrayed as the natural concomitant of the structural 
emergence of an International Division of Labour in which T&C production 
constitutes the ‘natural’ comparative advantage of areas rich in cheap 
labour. However, as Chapter 4 demonstrates, the deindustrialisation of this 
industry in the case of France was facilitated by state managers as a great 
share of this industry had ceased being competitive in global markets and 
productive in terms of capitalist wealth. Part of this industry obstructed the 
country’s effective competition in global markets and as a result the 
consecutive governments during the 1970s and 1980s endorsed its 
liquidation in order to foster their policy efforts in supporting the sector’s 
fewer but more competitive units through for instance the allocation of public 
resources to high-technology T&C clusters. Such an analysis confirms the 
understanding of states and markets as co-constitutive forms of capitalist 
social relations which render the reproduction of the state depended on the 
realisation of capitalist wealth in the market and vice versa. Indeed, 
deindustrialisation is not a phenomenon pertaining solely to the market 




to eliminate obsolete and uncompetitive manufacturing units and improve 
its competitiveness within the global market. 
CASE STUDIES AND METHODOLOGY 
In order to substantiate the aforementioned theoretical contentions this 
thesis will undertake a detailed empirical investigation of the French state’s 
role in the deindustrialisation of three politically and economically crucial 
sectors, namely the Textiles & Clothing, Steel and Automobile industries. It 
will do so through an archival investigation of the records of the consecutive 
governments in office during the 1974- 1984 period. 
TEXTILES & CLOTHING, STEEL, AUTOMOBILES 
The contemporary anxiety over deindustrialisation reigning in French 
politics is in itself an incentive to study the modalities through which 
deindustrialisation unfolded in this country. At the same time the historical 
inquiry of the French state’s management of deindustrialisation is 
underscored by another rationale which directly addresses the thesis’ 
puzzle. Indeed, the industrial development of France is intrinsically and 
historically associated with the constant supervision and control of the state 
(Woronoff 1998: Ch. 1). The French state’s philosophy during the country’s 
post-war development, and until the mid-1980s, was characterised by what 
Cohen (1989, 1992, 2007) has termed ‘high-Tech Colbertism’. Through the 
control exercised on the financial system, the formulation of sectoral plans 
and the launch of grand technological programs, high-tech Colbertism 
allowed the French state to play a fundamental role in the development of 
the country’s industrial capacities. The failure of such an industrially active 
and interventionist state to prevent deindustrialisation then entails important 
theoretical consequences for the contemporary claims that the state 
constitutes the adequate vehicle to reverse this process. Such insights 
could not have been extrapolated from the study of countries’ less familiar 




The chronological framework set by this thesis spans from 1974 to 1984. 
Arguably this decade constituted the first wave of deindustrialisation to hit 
France and is rich in dramatic cases of industrial decline (Cohen 1989; 
Woronoff 1998: 623; Lamard and Stoskopf 2009; Thibault 2012: 58;). In 
order to capture the significance of the state’s management of 
deindustrialisation during this decade this thesis examines three different 
sectors all illustrating the ways through which state managers endorsed a 
strategy of selective disengagement. These are the T&C, Steel and 
Automobiles Industries. The basis of selection of the case studies does not 
rest on arbitrary criteria but stem from a threefold set of criteria which take 
into account the socio-regional importance, the technical characteristics and 
commercial performance of each industry. 
Firstly, in terms of social importance all sectors had a considerable impact 
on domestic employment structures. T&C and Automobiles absorbed a 
considerable share of France’s manufacturing employment since they 
occupied 11.6% and 7.5% of industrial workers accordingly. Steel’s 
industrial employment share on the other hand stood at around 1.8%. While 
the steel industry itself was less populous, it was traditionally implanted in 
North and North Eastern regional departments of France thereby acquiring 
a crucial role in the economic and social development of provincial regions. 
The T&C industry also constituted a crucial employment bastion for such 
provincial areas as Lorraine or Nord-Pas-de-Calais, while the automobile 
industry concentrated a great share of its plants in the ile-de-France Area 
around Paris. 
Secondly, in terms of their technical characteristics each industry belonged 
to a different category of sectors as each featured significant divergence in 
their structures and market outlets. For the Fresque Historique du Systeme 
Productif Français, an analysis of the French production apparatus 
elaborated in 1975 by the INSEE, the French National Institute of Statistical 
and Economic Analysis, each sector belonged to one of three grand 




industries, steel was classified in intermediary industries while automobiles 
were catalogued in equipment industries (INSEE 1975a: 14). More 
precisely, T&C belonged to a family of industries with low capital intensity, 
heavy dependency on manual labour, low levels of industrial concentration 
and whose products were majoritarily destined for mass consumption. On 
the other, hand steel figured among the heavily capital intensive and highly 
concentrated industries. Its products were primarily utilised as the 
processing material of other industries as opposed to mass consumed. 
Finally, the automobile industry produced both intermediary and mass 
consumption goods while it was both dependent on an abundant labour-
force and sophisticated machinery.  
Thirdly, the sectors diverged in terms of the commercial performance since 
the onset of the first oil shock in 1973. While the balance of trade for T&C 
was traditionally in surplus during the post-war period, as of 1973 T&C trade 
became deificitary both with regards to France’s advanced commercial 
partners as well as with developing countries. As such in T&C, France held 
a comparative disadvantage both in relation to low-wage areas as well as 
more advanced economies. In Steel, France found itself in an intermediate 
position as the sector’s balance of trade witnessed a degradation of its 
commercial performance mostly with regards to its European Economic 
Community partners as it managed to maintain an overall surplus thanks to 
its relatively greater aptitude to capture non-OECD markets. The situation 
was different in automobiles as this industry constituted one of France’s truly 
comparative advantages with its domestic producers (Peugeot and Renault) 
consistently featuring in the world’s ten greatest automobile producers even 
during the crisis.  As such the crisis manifested itself mostly as an increasing 
pressure on the country’s ability to maintain its world leading positions in 
automobiles. 
Overall, bringing together these sectors allows the empirical section of the 
thesis to acquire a fuller image of France’s industry as each sector 




these divergences, it follows that the industrial policies pursued by the state 
in each sector confronted different domestic as well as world market 
pressures while the peculiar structural characteristics of each sector 
required different modernising strategies. By examining the state’s 
management of these sectors’ crises this thesis aims to illustrate the wider 
rationale behind the French state’s implementation of a selective 
disengagement strategy in the manufacturing sector during this period of 
intense deindustrialisation. 
ARCHIVES 
In order to advance a robust claim regarding the motivations behind French 
state manager’s implementation of a selective disengagement strategy in 
the aforementioned sectors, this thesis will be based on an investigation of 
the consecutive governments’ archives from the 1974-1984 period. 
Arguably, any attempt to provide an evidenced understanding of historical 
events from the perspective of political/social sciences can greatly benefit 
from the use of the same methodologies used by historians such as archival 
analysis (Hill 1993: 4; Vitalis 2006: 5). While the consultation of secondary 
sources such as published government papers and reports or tertiary 
sources such as newspapers, academic journal articles or biographies and 
memoirs of key actors can provide a useful way to contextualise specific 
political events, they can hardly on their own cover the whole spectrum of 
knowledge surrounding them especially with regards to the details of the 
policy-making process. Instead, the dissemination of primary resources 
such as the internal notes circulated within a specific institution, permits a 
deeper investigation of the state of mind and operative logic of key state 
actors which cannot be easily captured solely through the recourse to official 
publications or the secondary literature. As Burnham, et al. (2004: 200) 
note, archival research gives ‘researchers the opportunity to make good 
gaps in knowledge and information that will inevitably arise from the analysis 




With regards to the study of policy-making, archival research constitutes a 
particularly pertinent methodology since there might often be a discordance 
between the public proclamations of political parties or elected politicians 
and the actual content of their policies. In other words, discourse and the 
policy-making process might not always coincide. The intentions of policy-
makers are not sufficient to determine the form and outcome of specific 
policies elaborated within the state (Lowe 1997: 242) Indeed, the state 
apparatus is not only composed of elected parties and politicians but also 
of appointed expert civil servants whose judgements can alter the initial 
intentions of the elected personnel (Jobert and Muller 1987: 157). Archival 
research thus allows to investigate the role of the entourage of elected 
officials who operate in the shadow as it were, but whose role is crucial in 
informing and shaping the policy-making process. As Lowe (1997: 242) 
notes ‘it is at this level that policy is implemented and therefore it is in these 
records that decisions by the 'core executive' are explicitly acknowledged, 
discussed, and refined’. As such, the methodology adopted in this thesis 
allows us to delve into the centre of the policy-making process and examine 
as ‘from within’ the issues, pressures and motivations underpinning the 
formulation of specific industrial policies.  
More precisely, the thesis proposes an incursion into the archives of the 
Ministry of Industry and the Prime Minister’s cabinet which can be found in 
the French National Archives’ repository located in Pierrefitte-sur-Seine. 
Under French law, archives pertaining to industrial and commercial matters 
are released to the public twenty-five years after the issue of the document. 
The primary documents found in the Archives Nationales included memos, 
reports, internal correspondence, strategy plans, detailed records on the 
financial situation of each industry and notes from inter-ministerial meetings. 
The latter are of particular importance as in the French political system inter-
ministerial committees, which are presided by the Prime Minister or 
members of its cabinet and attended by members of the concerned 




government agencies over policy-making is found (Jober and Muller, 1987: 
212).  
It should be noted that the archives investigated were not solely produced 
by civil servants working within the MoI as they also contained 
correspondence between other relevant Ministries such as the Ministry of 
Labour or the Ministry of the Economy and Finances as well as other 
governmental institutions (e.g. the DATAR, the Plan Committee, the 
Economic and Social Council). Trade union or business documents and 
correspondences were also present in the material investigated. The rich 
material contained in the MoI’s archives allows the thesis’ empirical 
investigation to appreciate the position of other members of the 
governments examined regarding certain industrial strategies as well as the 
influence and pressures exercised upon policy-makers by various segments 
of civil society. Such an exercise strengthens the thesis’ endeavour to 
provide a detailed analysis of the policy-making process and the motivations 
behind the consecutive governments’ attempt to manage the country’s 
deindustrialisation. 
CHAPTER STRUCTURE 
Chapter One provides a literature review that critically engages with the 
mainstream theories and accounts explaining the mechanisms of 
deindustrialisation. In order to do so it undertakes two important tasks. 
Firstly, it examines the genesis of the idea of a deindustrialised economy by 
delving into the works of post-industrial theorists who since the 1930s had 
been prophesying the inevitable advent of a post-industrial society. Post-
industrial theory argues that the increasing wealth generated by the 
industrial sector tendentially liberates labour from industrial work which is 
then absorbed by the growing service sector. However, this linear 
conception of economic growth neglects the crisis-ridden nature of capitalist 
development and fails to explain how periods of massive wealth creation 
can be succeeded by periods of wealth destruction as in the 1970s when 




with the modern accounts of deindustrialisation which it divides in two 
camps: the naturalist approach which sees deindustrialisation as the natural 
outcome of the increasing productivity of industry and its adaptation to the 
new international division of labour and the industriocratic approach which 
defines deindustrialisation as a form of economic decline. While the insights 
of these approaches have their merits, both accounts fail to acknowledge 
their mutual inclusiveness and adequately conceptualise the role of the 
state in coordinating the process of deindustrialisation. Pointing to the 
limitations of this debate, the chapter argues that deindustrialisation is both 
a process of industrial decline and a sign of strong manufacturing 
performance that the state is called to coordinate. 
Chapter Two firstly offers a critique of existing critical and Marxian 
approaches to industrial transformation (i.e. Regulation Theory, New New 
International Division of Labour, and Cognitive Capitalism). It is argued that 
these approaches fail to tie together capital accumulation, state policy and 
class struggle in a theoretically consistent manner. In contrast, this chapter 
defends the Open Marxist argument that the state is the political form of 
capitalist social relations and of their crisis-ridden development. As such the 
state is called to manage the reproduction of capital accumulation and offset 
its latent overproduction tendencies. This conceptualisation of the state 
allows the chapter to define deindustrialisation as a strategy of selective 
disengagement from specific manufacturing activities pursued in response 
to the overaccumulation tendencies of global capital. Selective 
disengagement takes the form of a devaluation of the uncompetitive and 
superfluous industrial capital that cannot be profitably inserted within 
capital’s valorisation cycle and inhibits the competitive insertion of the 
domestic economy into the world market. Thus, this chapter argues that 
deindustrialisation is a process managed and facilitated by the state. At the 
same time, given the regional and employment consequences of such a 
strategy, policy-makers often have recourse to discursive and policy 




operating in sectors threatened with decline. The urgency to bypass 
domestic pressures and rationalise industry, can lead to the depoliticisation 
of aspects of industrial policymaking in order to facilitate selective 
disengagement. In this respect, delegation of industrial policy-making 
repsonsibilities to supranational bodies such as the European Commission 
can further entrench the industrial restructuring strategies of national 
governments and give rise to a process of transnational depoliticisation. 
Chapter Three examines the ways in which capital’s global 
overaccumulation tendencies manifested themselves in France in the 
1970s. It analyses the historical trajectory of post-war industrial 
development in France and argues that the roots of the crisis in which 
industry found itself in the wake of the first oil shock can be traced back to 
the inflationary pattern of growth adopted by the French economy during the 
period of the so-called ‘Trentes Glorieuses’. More precisely, it is argued that 
the tensions between industry’s modernisation needs and the difficulties in 
managing labour’s redistributive interests gave a birth to an inflationary 
economy which inhibited the optimal modernisation of manufacturing. 
Instead, its competitiveness was enhanced ‘artificially’ through the 
inflationary redistribution of wealth towards heavy industry, currency 
devaluations and cheap credit. At the same time the growing difficulties to 
manage labour relations led to the institutionalisation of labour dissent 
following the May 1968 revolt through new labour legislation which further 
boosted cost-push inflation. As a result, the progressive opening-up of the 
French economy revealed its competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis OECD 
economies and its weaker ability to withstand the overaccumulation crisis of 
the 1970s which domestically translated into a growing trade deficit in 
industrial goods, the indebtedness of industry and a growing inability to pay 
the country’s energy bill. The vulnerable competitive position in which 
France found itself and the existence of a plethora of uncompetitive capitals 




strategy of selective disengagement while the growing power of labour after 
1968 presaged the difficulties posed to the legitimation of such a strategy. 
Chapter Four, Five and Six consist of the thesis’ case studies and examines 
the modalities through which the strategy of selective disengagement 
unfolded in the textiles and clothing, the steel and automobile industries 
accordingly. Each chapter sketches the post-war development of each 
sector until their crises in the 1970s before examining the forms of crisis 
management adopted during Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s centre-right and 
Mitterand’s socialist presidency between 1974 and 1984. It is shown that in 
all sectors the government endorsed a process of targeted 
deindustrialisation aiming at eliminating obsolete industrial units in order to 
focus production around the commercially most viable ones. As examined 
in Chapter Four between 1974 and 1979 the T&C sector benefitted from 
very limited state assistance since the government’s aim was to eliminate 
the uncompetitive firms by depriving them of the necessary funds to 
modernise and to foster production only around certain key units. After this 
5-year period Barre’s government politicised policy towards T&C by 
inscribing it within the CODIS scheme, a program of industrial aids granted 
to industries considered as strategic. However, despite the rhetoric 
surrounding the program, only a few firms were eligible for public assistance 
as public loans were selectively channelled to certain technologically 
developed segments of the industry. Similarly, under Mitterrand, the state 
initially deployed a politicised management of the sector’s crisis. It 
implemented a comparatively open and undiscriminating system of 
subsidisation until 1983 before adopting a more austere strategy consisting 
of eliminating uncompetitive firms by way of exposure to international 
competition with the state restricting itself to a selective export promotion of 
performant T&C firms. 
The situation was different in the steel industry as Chapter Five shows. 
Despite the close ties between the steel industry and the state during the 




prompted the consecutive governments to depoliticise industrial policy 
towards the sector. In 1978 after rescuing the sector’s two main firms from 
bankruptcy the government decided to delegate the formal responsibility for 
the devaluation of obsolete units to the firms’ shareholders and resigned 
itself to financially compensating laid off workers. However, the plan proved 
insufficient to harness opposition to the devaluation plan in light of the 1978-
1979 Longwy riots. As a result, both Barre’s government and later the 
socialist governments consistently pursued the further depoliticisation of 
steel policy by advocating the handing over of steel restructuring to the 
European Commission (EC). By securing the implementation of a 
European-wide plan to cut down excess production capacities across 
member states, the French state was striving to achieve the unbridled 
realisation of its selective disengagement plans. Equally, it sought to shield 
itself from domestic repercussions by delegating the formal responsibilities 
over rationalisation measures to the supranational authority of the EC. 
Similarly, in Chapter Six it is shown that French officials never assumed 
overt political responsibility for the strategy of selective disengagement but 
nevertheless retained arms-length control of this process. To increase the 
competitiveness of French cars, the state encouraged the selective 
disengagement of car production from its traditional location in the Parisian 
area and its transfer to smaller and more automated units in Northern and 
Eastern provinces by giving Peugeot and Renault financial incentives to 
undertake new investments in these areas. Until 1981, the government 
discursively justified the phenomenon as a result of market forces and 
legitimated its role within this process by framing its regional development 
premiums to constructors as a national solidarity effort to create jobs in the 
provinces. After the socialists’ election, the continuation of this strategy was 
however complicated by two factors. Firstly, Peugeot’s threat to decelerate 
its investment rate in contrast to the government’s wishes and secondly, the 
mobilisation of Parisian car workers whose strikes threatened the disruption 




government opted to push for a rule-based car policy by commissioning an 
expert group to neutrally outline the measures necessary to maintain French 
cars’ competitiveness in the international market. The expertise and 
ostensible objectiveness of the commission’s proposal constituted the 
discursive framework through which the state disciplined both workers and 
constructors and enforced its preference for a targeted disinvestment of 








APPROACHES TO DEINDUSTRIALISATION: 




Almost 70 years have passed since Fourastié (1949) announced that the 
great hope of the 20th century lay in the new civilisational era that 
awaited mankind at the historical endpoint of industrial society. According 
to him, the technical progress yielded by industrial modernisation would 
transfer the bulk of the workforce into the tertiary sector and ultimately 
liberate labour from strenuous industrial work and allow the development of 
its intellectual faculties. However, a glance at the heated debates that have 
taken place over the future of manufacturing since the 1970s and the 
contemporary resurgence of interest in industrial policy across the 
developed world (see Introduction) shows that the shrinking size of 
manufacturing has been accompanied by uncertainty over the economic 
future of deindustrialised countries rather than by the hope initially 
envisioned by Fourastié.  This uncertainty stems from the existing 
disagreement between an optimistic stance that welcomes the (de-
)industrial reconfiguration of economic activities in the West and a more 
sceptical one which is apprehensive of its injurious economic effects (Hatem 
2004; Daniel and Pico 2012: 51; Rowthorn and Coutts 2013: 4-5). Moreover, 
central to past and contemporary debates regarding the future of 
manufacturing  is the capacity of the state to halt manufacturing decline 




relinquishing its industrial policy autonomy and acquiescing to the reality of 
a deindustrialised economy. 
This industrial anxiety resonates and is reproduced within the existing 
literature on the subject as it is divided between approaches that view 
deindustrialisation as a positive and natural process of economic 
development and others that see it as a major sign of economic decline. 
This chapter identifies three main approaches to understanding 
deindustrialisation: the post-industrial prophecy (Fischer 1933; Clark 1940; 
Fourastié 1949; Bell 1973), the naturalist (Krugman 1996: 3; Lawrence 
1983b; Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1997) and the industriocratic strand 
(Bluestone and Harrisson 1982; Cohen and Zysman 1987; Cohen and 
Buigues 2014). For the first one, which was initially developed in the 1930s, 
the emergence of a deindustrialised society is a political project aiming at 
remedying the social ills characterising pre-World War II industrial 
capitalism. While this theory portrays the advent of deindustrialisation as a 
natural concomitant of the economic maturation of advanced capitalist 
societies which tendentially shift the bulk of their productive resources 
towards the service sector, it becomes clear that the state has a great role 
in directing the movement of economic activity from the industrial to the 
service sector. At the same time, its understanding of industrial 
development as a linear process of technical progress rendered it unable to 
presage the crisis-ridden unfolding of deindustrialisation in the 1970s and 
1980s. While the claims of post-industrial theory, are not sufficient to explain 
the deindustrialisation of advanced economies, its insights are important in 
understanding the fundamental role of state policy in managing the inter-
sectoral allocation of resources within the domestic economy.  
Since the 1970s the debate over the root causes of deindustrialisation has 
been dominated by the naturalist and industriocratic approaches. For 
naturalists deindustrialisation constitutes a structural and inevitable 
phenomenon experienced by all developed economies. Unlike post-




but, as a natural market phenomenon. Deindustrialisation stems from the 
increasing productivity of the industrial sector and its adjustment to the new 
conditionss of the international division of labour by shifting its resources 
towards high-technology and capital-intensive industries. Within this 
context, the state cannot reverse deindustrialisation but only functionally 
adapt its policies to the demands of a service-based economy through for 
example appropriate human capital formation policies. In contrast, 
industriocratic approaches view manufacturing as the engine of growth of 
the national economy and thus understand deindustrialisation as a process 
of economic decline which involves the erosion of domestic manufacturing 
capacities and the deterioration of a country’s international competitiveness. 
Core to the industriocratic contentions is that the deindustrialisation 
phenomenon is associated with the state’s failure to halt the course of 
industrial decline by implementing strategic industrial policies.  
Both approaches lopsidedly focus either on the economically progressive 
traits of deindustrialisation or on its regressive character. However, as it will 
be argued deindustrialisation constitutes a double-edged phenomenon 
which involves both the modernisation and erosion of domestic industrial 
capacities. In addition, while in essence both approaches ultimately see 
deindustrialisation as a process whereby winning and losing sectors are 
culled, they fail to account for the crucial role of the state and its industrial 
policy priorities in actively determining this selection process. Indeed, while 
for both approaches the state is functionally important in either adapting the 
domestic economy to its deindustrialised setting or preventing industrial 
decline altogether, the state is absent within the deindustrialisation process 
itself which ends up occurring behind its back.  
THE POST-INDUSTRIAL ‘PROPHECY’ 
This section examines the birth of the idea of a transition to a service-based 
or post-industrial society. The first works tackling the future 
deindustrialisation of industrial nations and their immanent transition to a 




arguments still figure as prominent explanations in contemporary debates 
over the causes of this phenomenon. Therefore, it is important to critically 
scrutinise the claims of post-industrial theorists in order to examine whether 
or not the deindustrialisation of advanced nations is indeed a structurally 
inevitable industrial evolution which could have plausibly been predicted 
already in the 1930s. 
FROM THE INDUSTRIAL TO THE SERVICE ECONOMY 
Within the broader context of the Great Depression which generated a long-
lasting unprecedented economic shock and unleashed previously 
accumulated social tensions that threatened the very foundations of 
capitalism's reproduction (Holloway 1996), there was an ambient sentiment 
that advanced economies were witnessing a ‘crisis of progress’ (see Kumar 
1978; Castoriadis 1985). However, Clark (1940) and Fisher (1935) 
contented that progress was not a defunct idea since the conditions for its 
realisation were materialising in the growing economic importance of the 
service sector. In Clark's words: ‘The most important concomitant of 
economic progress’ is ‘the movement of labour from agriculture to 
manufacture and from manufacture to commerce and services’ (Clark 1940: 
176). In the aftermath the World War II which necessitated an exhausting 
mobilisation of forces for the national reconstruction effort, Fourastié (1949) 
saw ‘the great hope of the twentieth century’ in the conditions made possible 
by technical progress for the transition to a ‘tertiary civilisation’. The 
uncertain historical context and these authors’ optimism regarding the 
possibilities of a transition to a service dominated society is of crucial 
importance for understanding post-industrialism since it underpins their 
one-sided and crisis-free understanding of capitalist production.  
The theoretical foundation of the possible transition of advanced societies 
from an industrial phase to an age dominated by service sector activities is 
grounded in Fisher's (1939) and Clark's (1940) original -and later confirmed 
by Fourastié- tripartite periodisation of economic history. According to it, 




by shifting the mass of their productive resources from the agricultural, 
manufacturing and service sector respectively. Economic history thus 
begins with the emergence of sluggish traditional societies whose 
subsistence is reliant on agricultural production and where scopes for 
productivity and output increases are limited by the relatively low 
accumulation of technical knowledge (Fisher 1933: 380; Fisher 1935: 8; 
Fourastié 1949: 41). The progress in scientific discoveries and production 
methods permitted the supersession of the agricultural phase by modern 
industrial societies who, having satisfied their basic social needs for food 
consumption, shifted the great bulk of their productive forces towards more 
sophisticated manufactured goods (Fisher 1935: 9; Fourastié 1949: 88-90). 
Finally, the maturation of industrial societies paves the way for an ultimate 
and final transition towards a tertiary society where economic progress 
enables the growth of more luxurious consumption and the concentration of 
economic resources around the production of services. The three-sector 
model of growth, supported a linear view of economic evolution and refuted 
the doubts cast upon evolutionary understandings of historical change 
during the so-called ‘crisis of progress’ (Kumar 1978: 167-170).  
Both demand- and supply side-explanations have been put forward by 
service sector economists to account for the gradual progression of 
societies to the tertiary stage. On the demand side, a modern reformulation 
of Engel's law is advanced to explain the shrinking size of the manufacturing 
sector. According to Engel's statistical observation of European households' 
consumer habits in 1857, as incomes increased the share of food in income 
expenditures tended to lessen. The reorientation of demand towards more 
sophisticated manufactured products rendered obsolete further 
employment and investment in the primary sector and consequently set the 
basis for the economy’s first transition from primary to secondary production 
(Fisher 1935: 9). Similarly, the reformulation of Engel's law within an 
advanced industrial setting purported that increases in real incomes led to 




which satisfy ‘higher’ needs such as entertainment, education or health 
(Fisher 1934: 164-165; Bell 1973: 128). The law implies that demand for 
manufactures is thus deemed to relatively saturate in light of the changes in 
consumer preferences which naturally accompany rising incomes 
(Fourastié 1949: 88-92).   
In the Conditions of Economic Progress, Clark provided ample statistical 
data from across the (developed and developing) world to empirically 
support for the modern reformulation of Engel's law. He showed that a high 
average of income per capita was regularly associated with a high 
proportion of employment engaged in the tertiary sector while the opposite 
held true for countries with a low average of income per capita (Clark 1940: 
7-12). This demand-side explanation emphasises the role of income 
elasticities of demand in determining the sectoral composition of the 
economy. Indeed, the relatively low income elasticity of demand for 
manufactures implies that increasing incomes do not translate themselves 
into a proportionate increase in the demand for these goods, in contrast to 
demand for service products. The crucial role of productivity increases and 
technological developments is not neglected by such an approach given 
that the capacity to increase the rate of production of industrial goods is 
necessary in order to achieve a state of saturation of demand for 
manufactures. However, it is the a priori changing patterns of demand 
themselves that leads the adaptation and reorientation of production and 
employment around services. (Fisher 1933: 381-382; Fourastié 1949: 92-
94). 
The demand-side explanation put forward by Fisher and his successors 
came under the critical scrutiny of later service-sector economists who 
refuted the claim that changing expenditure patterns and income elasticities 
of demand were the primary cause of employment shifts towards the service 
sector (Stigler 1956; Kuznets 1957; Fuchs 1965, 1980; Singelmann 1978; 
Katouzian 1980). Instead, emphasis was laid upon the supply-side 




Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth, divided the economy into 
technologically progressive and stagnant activities, broadly represented by 
the manufacturing and service sectors respectively, and stressed the role of 
productivity differentials between the two activities in propelling the sectoral 
shift of employment towards services.  
Similarly, Fuchs argues that Engel's law is more appropriate for 
understanding the industrial transition of societies but remains of little 
conceptual utility for understanding their latter transition towards their 
tertiary stage given that, empirically speaking, the differences in income 
elasticities of demand for manufactures and services are too small to 
account for the whole sectoral shift of employment (Fuchs 1968: 3, 41-45). 
Instead, he finds support for Baumol's ‘productivity differential’ argument 
stating that the faster growth of output per worker in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors and the relatively slow growth in the service sector has 
been the major reason for the constantly increasing share of employment of 
the latter (Fuchs 1968: 4). The supply-side explanation thus stresses the 
inherent tendency of the manufacturing sector to generate higher 
productivity increases given its propensity towards mechanisation. Indeed, 
industrial labour, unlike service labour, is just one among various inputs of 
production and can naturally be replaced by technological innovations 
(Baumol 1967: 416). In this case, rather than a saturation of demand, it is a 
saturation of demand for manufacturing labour that explains the growth of 
the service sector. 
Today, the works of Fisher, Clark, Fourastié, Fuchs and Baumol and their 
arguments centred on the ‘growing affluence of consumers’ and 
‘unbalanced productivity growth’ are considered as the pioneering steps 
towards an understanding of the economic mechanisms behind the post-
1970s deindustrialisation of developed countries (Kollmeyer 2009). 
However, a more detailed reading of these authors reveals that the 
emergence of a post-industrial/deindustrialised economy is not merely the 




of the state to coordinate this transition and allow the effective transfer of 
resources from industry to services. 
THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AS A STATE PROJECT 
Initially, Fisher and Clark's novel conceptualisation of services as a key 
economic sector was politically directed against the ‘updated physiocratic’ 
perception of their contemporaries who, in the vein of Adam Smith, viewed 
services as a parasitic and unproductive sector, and considered material 
production as the only source of wealth (Fisher 1935: 63; Clark 1984: 69). 
Instead, post-industrialists regarded the tertiary sector as a reasonable 
outlet for investment and ultimately as an unemployment cushion absorbing 
labour made redundant by overinvestment in the primary and secondary 
sectors (Fisher 1939b: 30, 35-36; Clark 1949: 114). During the Depression 
era, the idea stimulating commonly assumed unproductive labour to combat 
the emerging mass unemployment phenomenon was already being implicit 
in economic policy-making (Delaunay and Gadrey 1992: 75-76). Hence 
Clark's recommendation for public investment in tertiary activities as a way 
to recover from the Depression (Clark 1933: 330-332) and Fisher's (1939: 
34) support for the unemployment relief policies of Roosevelt's new deal 
that went in the same direction. The expansion of the service sector was not 
viewed simply as an automatic market evolution but as a state-backed 
process aiming to dampen rising unemployment.  
Furthermore, the liberating effects of ‘machine-made’ abundance (Faunce 
1968: 72) made possible by increasingly automated industry was a hallmark 
theme of post-industrial theory (Riesman 1958; Faunce 1968; Lasch 1972). 
Indeed, the demand- and supply-side mechanisms behind tertiarisation, 
were not merely economic in character but instead, entailed a qualitative 
transformation of life (Bell 1973: 127): tertiary society brings about the 
transition to a new genre de vie (life genre) (Fourastié 1949: 269-271). For 
instance, the change of direction in consumer's expenditures is not simply 
portrayed as an objective economic development but as a fundamental shift 




things, goods and intangible or personal services, pictures and music, 
science and philosophy, and literature, facilities for education and travel and 
amusement, the things, in fact, upon which real civilisation depends’ (Fisher 
1935: 9). Increasing incomes work in conjunction with productivity gains to 
achieve a stage in human civilisation whereby, having satisfied basic needs 
for food and manufactures, the emanation of abundance surmounts the 
problems of distribution that were inherent in the management of economic 
resources during the industrial era (Fisher 1935: 7; Fourastié 1949: 218).  
Similarly, the sectoral shift of employment is not considered as a mere 
reflection of the changing occupational structure of society but a 
transformation of the nature of work itself. At the heart of the post-industrial 
view of progress lies the idea of a progressive liberation of labour from the 
misfortunes of industrial work. Indeed, Clark (1940: 1) defines economic 
progress as the increase in the leisure time available to society and the 
decrease in the efforts necessary to produce an ever-increasing output of 
goods and services. As manufacturing employment shares shrink, workers 
are progressively liberated from strenuous and servile industrial and their 
intellectual capacities are freed (Fourastié 1949: 277-280). This tendency is 
materialised in the tremendous increase in white-collar jobs in the post-
World War II era and the growing importance of knowledge workers. Such 
developments in occupational structures encourage workers to engage in 
more creative and fulfilling activities. The alienation of labour associated 
with assembly-line work ostensibly withers away as the boundaries between 
work per se and leisure become blurred (Fuchs 1965: 360). The expansion 
of the service sector entails thus a humanisation of work given that the prime 
material with which service workers interact is the human himself/herself 
rather than the impersonal and alienating machine of the industrial plant 
(Bell 1973: 163).  
Despite the seemingly structural and natural emergence of such social 
advances, servicisation does not come about on its own according to post-




(1934: 150) observed a reluctance from investors to direct their capital in 
tertiary production given the lower returns yielded. Thus, ‘the ordinary 
machinery of capital provision requires somewhat violent adaptation’ 
(Fisher 1934: 164) to provide the community with the services for which 
material progress has now paved the way. As in the case of ‘unproductive 
labour’ stimulation, this ‘violent adaptation’, which requires the 
subordination of private firm strategies to wider social objectives, is carried 
out through non-market channels such as state planning and the public 
provision of social services (Bell 1973: 167-198). The servicisation evoked 
by post-industrialists is in a way a description of welfare state services as 
they developed between the 1930s and the 1960s in the developed world. 
Bell's description of the post-industrial society clearly illustrates the tight 
association between the service economy and the welfare state: 
A post-industrial society...is increasingly a communal society 
wherein public mechanisms rather than the market become the 
allocators of goods, and public choice, rather than individual 
demand, becomes the arbiter of services...The demand for higher 
education and better health necessarily expands greatly the role of 
government as funder and setter of standards. The needs for 
amenities, the cry for a better quality of life, brings government into 
the arena of environment, recreation, and culture (Bell, 1973: 159). 
Thus, post-industrial theory’s contentions are influenced and distorted by 
the observable reality of Keynesian capitalism and the debates surrounding 
its reproduction. Post-industrial theory, rather than prophesying the future 
of developed countries, restricts itself to the depiction of the Keynesian era's 
social trends and projects them into the future as an ideal model of social 
organisation that can be boundlessly replicated (Kumar 1978: 191). The 
object of theorisation of post-industrial thought is not the autonomous 
economic movement leading societies from their agricultural to their tertiary 
age but a historically particular kind of state-led reallocation of economic 




forces that underpinned the rise of the Keynesian welfare state (Holloway 
1996).  
Ultimately, the prism adopted by post-industrial theorists is limited by its own 
historical environment. In sum, post-industrial theory is a normative project 
and a discourse of political transformation (Brick 1992: 349) which is rooted 
in the principles of Keynesian-like economic management and the 
institutions that supported it since the 1930s. As a political project the 
deindustrialisation of economies requires the intervention of the state in 
order to expand tertiary production and enhance social welfare. 
LIMITS OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL PROPHECY 
For post-industrialists, the tertiary age is the embodiment of the true nature 
of economic progress and abolishes the sources of class conflict embedded 
in industrial society. Indeed, post-industrial society is one said to resolve 
once and for all the ‘labour issue’ (Bell 1973: 160-164) as it remedies the 
issues raised by the struggles of the labour movement regarding the 
growing ‘poverty amidst plenty’, alienation at work or the length of working 
time. In this vein, the contradictions and crises of industrial society are just 
transient conditions towards the final adaptation of society to its true, 
socially progressive, potential (Fourastié 1949: 93-94). If the persistence of 
the material conditions that gave birth to Marxism constitute it as the 
unsurpassable ‘philosophy of our time’ (Sartre, 1960: 29), post-industrialism 
negates the continuous relevance of these conditions and most importantly 
the condition of proletarian immiseration since the teriary age brings about 
a significant improvement in the material circumstances of labour (Ferkiss 
1979: 91-92). Indeed, in a service-based society the ‘economic’ ceases 
being the gear of social reproduction and is replaced by knowledge as 
society’s primary productive resource thereby eliminating economic class 
conflicts (Bell 1973: 212-265). As a consequence, labour-capital 
antagonism is eradicated along with the traditional working class (Fourastié 
1949,1965; Nisbet 1958; Touraine 1971; Bell 1973; Clark and Lipset 1991; 




At the same, the negation of the antagonisms associated with industrial 
capitalism reveals the idealistic nature of post-industrial theory and its 
theoretical limitations. Its normative character lies in the fact that ‘it only 
describes the need for a change’ towards a new social order in which class 
conflict, poverty, strenuous labour and unemployment are eliminated but at 
the same time disregards the capitalist dynamics that inhibit such a 
transition (Postone 1999: 12). In fact, the contradiction-free picturing of 
capitalist society is the source of the post-industrial prophecy’s inability to 
explain the deindustrialisation phenomenon since the 1970s. Capitalist 
production is examined only in its technical dimension and its capacity to 
increase material wealth through productivity growth while disregarding the 
contradictory social form that production assumes in capitalist society which 
is centred on the accumulation of value and profit as opposed to material 
wealth (Postone 1993: 299). It is thus unable to explain how periods of 
growth and increased prosperity can be superseded by periods of 
liquidation of productive capacities on an expanded scale (Marx and Engels 
1976: 490). As such the widely documented plant closures, failures of major 
industrial groups, the ensuing unemployment and consequent 
pauperisation of mono-industrial regions that swept advanced capitalist 
economies (see for the US case Bluestone and Harrison 1982; see Martin 
and Rowthorn 1986 for the case of Britain; see Cohen 1989; Lamard and 
Stoskopf 2009 for the French case) do not fit within the scheme advanced 
by post-industrialists. The contrast between post-industrial theory and the 
empirical reality of deindustrialisation suggests that industrial development 
should not be understood as a linear movement but as a crisis-ridden 
process which reflects both the growing productive potential as well as the 
economic destitution that accompanies capitalism’s restless development 
(Postone 1993: 35).  
In addition, post-industrial structures do not spread evenly within countries 
as this process is often accompanied by an ‘inter-regional polarisation’ 




unemployment and unskilled workforces within the same national territory 
(Lipietz 1980). While, Lyon or Paris could broadly correspond to the post-
industrial city described by Bell and his predecessors, the Hauts-de-France 
and the Grand Est which experience higher than the national average levels 
of unskilled industrial and service sector workers unemployment could not. 
As Ferkiss (1979: 79) argues ‘pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial’ 
regions can exist side-by-side within the same nation state. In other words, 
deindustrialisation rather than a one-sided phenomenon revealing the 
increasing productivity of the manufacturing sector, can simultaneously 
constitute a sign of strong industrial performance as well as a sign of 
industrial decline. 
While post-industrial theory’s prophecy fails to account for the crisis-ridden 
and uneven way in which deindustrialisation unfolded in advanced capitalist 
economies during the 1970s and 1980s, its vision of post-industrial society 
as a state project raises crucial insights as to the organisation and 
distribution of productive resources within capitalism. Indeed, the reading 
proposed here suggests that for post-industrial theory the allocation of 
resources among different sectoral and economic activities does not 
ultimately occur automatically by the supply or demand side mechanisms of 
the market. Instead, the allocation of productive resources is organised in 
line with developments in social relations and the political form of 
management of capitalist production. According to this reading, it turns out 
that the state plays a crucial role in the inter-sectoral flow of productive 
resources.  
Building on this insight the rest of the thesis will indeed demonstrate the 
crucial involvement of the state in channelling and withdrawing resources 
from different industrial sectors and in this vein endorsing a targeted 
process of deindustrialisation. However, in contrast to post-industrial 
theorists this ‘deindustrialisation’ strategy was not adopted as a way to 
enhance welfare but to remedy a capitalist crisis of overproduction by 




sectors and facilitating the decline of others. Before, however, the remainder 
of this chapter will examine the more recent debates on deindustrialisation 
and examine the role held by the state in these approaches. 
NATURALISTS VS INDUSTRIOCRATS 
Since the 1970s various attempts have been made to locate the causes of 
deindustrialisation in advanced capitalist economies. Such endeavours 
have been characterised by their propensity to identify positive correlations 
between specific variables and the shrinking size of manufacturing 
employment in the West. For instance, Rowthorn and Coutts (2004, 2013) 
in their summary of the literature put forward five mechanisms explaining 
the deindustrialisation phenomenon. These are: the domestic outsourcing 
of activities to service providers by manufacturing firms, the decline in the 
relative prices of manufactures due to increasing productivity and cheaper 
imports from the developing world, the increasing productivity of 
manufacturing relative to the service sector and the former’s decreasing 
need for labour, international trade and falling investment rates in industry.  
Notwithstanding the usefulness of a quantitative determination of 
deindustrialisation’s causes, such an approach leaves little room to analyse 
the social, political and institutional context which permitted such processes 
to become operational and indeed contribute to the hollowing out of 
manufacturing activities. Nevertheless, behind the repeated and contrasting 
attempts to econometrically locate the primary sources of this phenomenon, 
within the literature one is able to discern two main political interpretations 
of deindustrialisation. To schematise them, we hereby propose an original 
classification of the contemporary literature which we divide into two main 
camps: the naturalist and the industriocratic approach. On the one hand, 
the naturalist approach contends that deindustrialisation is a natural, 
market-led, phenomenon stemming from the workings of the supply and 
demand side mechanisms of the market. On the other, the industriocratic 
approach, just like physiocratic thought considered agricultural activities as 




as the main engine of growth of a national economy and thus any 
deterioration of its position is seen as an economically damaging 
phenomenon. To use Rowthorn and Wells’ (1987) terminology the former 
approach view deindustrialisation as a ‘positive’ process whereas the latter 
views it as a ‘negative’ one. This classification of the French and global 
literature ought not to be understood as an identification of two coherent and 
all-encompassing theoretical frameworks but rather as a categorisation that 
stresses the two main methodological approaches used to understand 
deindustrialisation and the role of the state in this process. 
THE NATURALIST APPROACH 
The point of departure of the naturalist approach is that deindustrialisation 
can be adequately explained by the in-built supply and demand side 
dynamics of the market (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1998: 22). As 
manufacturing achieves higher productivity levels its labour need is reduced 
and as a result workers are absorbed by tertiary activities (Demmou 2010: 
8; Landier and Thesmar 2013: 32-33). On the demand-side, changing 
patterns of consumption also help explain the relative demise of 
manufacturing. Productivity-led decreases in manufactures’ prices as well 
as the general improvement in the population’s living standards have 
permitted a transformation of demand patterns that is marked by their shift 
towards more luxurious service products and a relative saturation of needs 
for traditional manufactures (Fontagné and Lorenzi 2005: 43; Demmou 
2010: 14; Landier and Thesmar, 2013: 21; CEPII 2014: 1). According to this 
explanation, the declining trajectory of industrial employment since the 
1970s is in its greatest part explained by technical progress and the 
mutation of demand at the domestic level (Daudin and Levasseur 2005: 
157; Fontagné and Lorenzi 2005: 43; Debande, 2006: 74). For instance, 
Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1998) found that on average over 80% of 
deindustrialisation in advanced industrial countries can be attributed to a 
combination of domestic factors such as changes in consumer expenditures 




manufacturing sector. As such, the popular association of globalisation and 
deindustrialisation is refuted by the observed propensity of all developed 
economies to naturally deindustrialise (Gazaniol 2012: 5, 34-35).  
Additionally, there are other domestic factors that inflate manufacturing 
employment losses such as the recourse to domestic outsourcing and the 
reliance of manufacturing firms on temporary employment (Daudin and 
Levasseur 2005: 139; Demmou 2010: 9). Bhagwati (1984) refers to the 
former as the ‘splintering effect’ whereby due to increased economies of 
scale and technical evolutions, the production of certain services becomes 
autonomised from the production of physical goods. More precisely, 
activities previously performed in-house by manufacturing firms, ranging 
from marketing and conception to logistics and catering, have increasingly 
been outsourced to specialist service providers (Beeson and Bryan 1986: 
2; DATAR 2004: 8). Similarly, manufacturing firms have since the mid-
1990s tendentially increased their share of personnel employed through 
temping agencies, meaning that jobs actually performed within a 
manufacturing setting are actually classified under the service sector 
(Daudin and Levasseur 2005: 139). These developments have in fact led to 
a statistical transfer of industry’s contribution to GDP and total national 
employment to the service sector (Le Blanc 2005: 9). 
The naturalist approach does not overlook the contribution of external 
factors on deindustrialisation, such as competition from developing 
countries. Their interpretation suggests however that the latter ought to be 
understood as reinforcing the deindustrialising tendencies that are already 
present at home (Fontagne and Lorenzi 2005: 33). As the national economy 
opens up to international trade, price-led competitive pressures only 
accentuate the efforts of domestic industrialists to modernise and increase 
their productivity gains. Trade openness does not deviate the national 
industry’s course from its pre-existing tendency towards higher productivity 
and lower prices but further stimulates it. Ultimately, foreign trade bears only 




consumer and efficiency gains that in any way deindustrialisation brings 
about domestically (Fontagné and Lorenzi 2005: 14; Rowthorn and 
Ramaswamy 2008: 22). 
At the same time, in accordance with neoclassical trade theory, efficiency-
seeking leads to a specialisation of domestic industry towards the highest 
value-added segments of the manufacturing chain of production whose 
capital-intensive nature further decreases the need for industrial labour 
(Fontagné and Lorenzi 2005: 44-46). Domestic industry’s conversion to 
technologically- and skill-demanding activities further incentivises the 
increasing productivity of the sector as it is the development of the most 
efficient sectors within manufacturing that is prioritised by the international 
division of labour. As it is argued, the demise of a particular sector (e.g. 
textiles) is not always ‘bad news’ (Daudin and Levasseur 2005: 157). In fact, 
within the IDL developed economies tend to naturally retain the 'factory-less' 
stages of manufacturing production (sales, marketing, design) that 
nevertheless absorb the lion's share of value added (Baldwin 2017).  
Once deindustrialisation is understood as a natural market-driven 
phenomenon, it becomes possible to contest the notion of 
deindustrialisation itself (Lawrence 1984: Ch.3). Often, naturalist 
approaches replace the term ‘deindustrialisation’ by less alarmingly 
sounding characterisations such as ‘industrial mutation’ or ‘economic 
transformation’ in order to more aptly capture the transformation of the 
advanced nations’ economic landscape (Cheshire 1995: 1048; DATAR 
2004: 16-17; Roustan 2004: 11-23; Nesta 2010: 300). Given that 
improvements in productivity and declining prices have only led to a relative 
demise of industry’s employment and GDP contributions, deindustrialisation 
could be seen as a mere ‘optical illusion’ which in fact is owed to a vigorous 
industrial performance (Roustan 2004: p.47; Fontagné and Lorenzi 2005: 
21; Chatillon 2011: 51).  For naturalists then, rather than a real distressing 
economic phenomenon that justifies a generalised anxiety over the future, 




dogma that encourages the adoption of regressive protectionist and 
interventionist policies (Lawrence 1983b; McKenzie 1990; Krugman 1996: 
3). 
Undoubtedly, the deindustrialisation of advanced economies has not been 
as smooth as depicted in the naturalist scheme, with the pauperisation of 
old industrial basins in the Nord in France, the American Rust Belt or 
Northern England paving the way for more alarmist discourses on industrial 
decline. However, as Roustan puts it for the French case, from a naturalist 
lens, domestic distortions accompanying deindustrialisation stem from the 
inner deficiencies of French society itself (Roustan 2004: 15). More 
precisely, regional and social dislocations betray the failure of public policy 
to follow and adapt to the modernising movement of this industrial mutation. 
Macroeconomic policy choices or labor market regulations have a far wider 
impact on the domestic state of employment than economic globalisation 
according to this view (Fontagné and Lorenzi 2005: 19).  
Regional pockets of unemployment could, for instance, be understood as 
manifestations of the failure of current labour training procedures or of 
inflexibilities within the labour market that prevent the formation of a labour 
force adapted to the transformed needs of the industrial sector such as the 
higher demand for skilled labour (Roustan 2004: 9; Fontagné and Lorenzi 
2005: 19). With regards to the British case, Crafts (1996) argues that much 
of the social costs that accompanied deindustrialisation in the 1970s and 
1980s owed to the relatively low attention paid by governments to the 
importance of human capital formation. Thus, the smooth adjustment of a 
country to its new productive structure depends on the capacity of public 
authorities to remove the rigidities existing within its labour market 
institutions and help the adaptation of workers to the demands for a well-
trained labour force rather than obstruct the ongoing industrial transition and 
employment mutations (Beeson and Bran 1986: 6; Eisner 1990; McKenzie 




In sum, the naturalist perspective suggests that the shrinking size of the 
manufacturing sector is a natural and benign phenomenon that manifests 
its healthy overall performance (Debande 2006: 79). On the other hand, the 
adverse social effects that have accompanied it are state-led as they 
manifest the failure of macroeconomic policies to adapt to new market 
requirements. Political authorities cannot halt the deindustrialising tendency 
of the domestic economy but their capacity to deploy a set of policies 
capable of adjusting social structures to a mutated industrial setting is of 
crucial importance. 
THE INDUSTRIOCRATIC APPROACH 
The foundational assumption of the industriocratic approach is that, as 
Palma (2014: 21) sums it up, growth is sector-specific. In other words, 
industry is the fundamental source of a nation’s wealth (Le Tellier and 
Torres 1993: 11). It is the peculiar properties of the manufacturing sector 
that permit it to become a national economy’s engine of growth on whose 
performance the health of remaining economic activities rely (Singh 1977: 
123; Dertouzos et al.1989: 40; Thirlwall 2002: 51; Smil 2011: 22; Andreoni 
and Gregory 2013: 29). As contended by Artus and Virard (2011: 19) 
manufacturing is a ‘structuring’ activity that stirs innovation and fuels 
commerce. Manufacturing is not a mere auxiliary activity which can be 
disposed off by national economies but instead, constitutes the backbone 
of the economy itself and the lifeblood of its productive base (Colletis 2012: 
13). 
The view of manufacturing as an engine of growth finds support in Kaldor's 
(1966,1967) laws which are based on three propositions: firstly, that the 
aggregate rate of growth of GDP depends on the rate of growth in the 
manufacturing sector, secondly, due to the static as well as dynamic 
increasing returns to scale of manufacturing, there is in this sector a causal 
relationship between the growth of manufacturing output and the growth of 
productivity- this is also known as Verdoorn's Law-, finally, the growth of 




growth of this sector at the expense of employment growth in the non-
manufacturing sector. In short, the manufacturing sector is characterised by 
its endogenous growth-inducing properties which in contrast to services can 
provide for the long-term growth, full employment and high wages of the 
domestic economy.  
Not only industry is inherently more productive than services (McCausland 
and Theodossiou, 2012) but also the rise of sophisticated tertiary activities, 
such as R&D or designing, is organically dependent on it as the latter form 
the downstream and upstream segments of the manufacturing process itself 
(Cohen and Zysman 1987: 19-27; Bazen and Thirlwall 1989: 9; Kitson and 
Michie 1996: 198; Colletis 2012: 16-17; Cohen and Buigues 2014: 56). 
Thus, the rise of a post-industrial or service-based economy is considered 
as a misleading concept which disregards the irreplaceable role of industry 
in the domestic economy (Cohen and Zysman, 1987; Pisano and Shih 2012: 
43; Smil, 2013: 1). Instead, in their definition, deindustrialisation constitutes 
a crisis-signalling evolution. The interpretation of deindustrialisation as 
decline is succinctly summarised by Johnson (2002: 7) who argues that the 
term refers to ‘the decline of modern, factory industry and generally in 
relation to the limits in the West of mass production as competition from 
elsewhere and plant relocation overwhelmed superannuated, high-wage 
industries and specific sites’. 
In this vein, the magnitude of this crisis becomes manifest in a country’s 
comparative performance within the international market (Jacquemin 1979: 
995). In contrast to the naturalist approach which views global competition 
as a factor that positively reinforces domestically ongoing industrial 
mutations, industriocrats maintain that the international performance in 
world markets is the tell-tale sign of the industrial sector’s crisis (Singh 1977: 
134; Levet 1989: 3-6; Mishel 1989;  Artus and Virard 2011: 19-20). For 
instance, Cohen and Buigues (2014: 30,35) while admitting that there is a 
statistical trickery at play that conceals industry’s actual economic 




conduct in manufactures trade unassailably betrays its weak industrial 
performance vis-à-vis its trading partners. Similarly, another argument 
raised against the naturalist contention that the decline of industry is only 
relative, rests on the fact that while productivity and output measured in 
absolute terms might still grow in a deindustrialised economy, official 
measurements often overlook that these are accounted for by the increasing 
share of imported inputs into the production process as opposed to an 
authentic improvement of domestic manufacturing firms’ performance 
(Perelman 2002: 173; Atkinson, et al. 2012: 32). Overall, for industriocrats 
declining market shares in manufacturing products, growing deficits in a 
country’s trade balance and the falling contribution of exports in goods to 
GDP are considered as the prime indicators of deindustrialisation.   
The opening up of the economy and the emergence of industrial competitors 
from the developing world do not necessarily translate into an ordered and 
harmonious process of trade specialisation among the participating 
countries as the neoclassical model would have it (Singh 1977: 133; Le 
Franc 1983: 88, 92; Artus and Virard 2011: 77-79). The fragmentation and 
geographical relocation of the manufacturing process towards late 
industrialisers dismantles the coherence of the domestic productive base as 
this process simultaneously eliminates all the high-skilled tertiary activities 
associated with manufacturing and disturbs domestic supplier-purchaser 
relations (Colletis 2012: 17; Cohen and Buigues 2014: 55). Ultimately, the 
distribution of manufacturing activities across the world is not determined by 
the impersonal workings of the international division of labour but by the 
confrontation of different nationally defined industrial strategies on the world 
market. Indeed, the competitive success of certain countries at the expense 
of other advanced deindustrialised economies is attributed to their states’ 
adherence to coherent long-term industrial strategies (Cowling and Sugden 
1993; Kitson and Michie 1996). 
In contrast to the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy, 




the workforce from one sector to another but, more fundamentally a loss of 
mastering of certain manufacturing activities which ultimately end up being 
performed elsewhere (Cohen and Zysman 1987: 7). At the same time, this 
transfer of competences encourages developing countries to mimic the 
know-how and technological practices of developed economies threatening 
to displace the industrial/technological edge held by the latter (Cohen and 
Zysman 1987: 7; Giraud and Weil 2013: 106; Cohen and Buigues 2014: 56). 
It is often argued that this phenomenon has been exacerbated by increased 
capital mobility which led to the demise of industrial firm’s territorial identity 
and allowed Multinational Corporations to pursue delocalisation strategies 
that stand opposed to the economic interests of the domestic community 
(Bluestone and Harrison, 1982: 17-23; Cowling and Sugden 1999: 363; 
Colletis 2012: 47; Smil 2013: 223). 
Industriocratic views are ultimately sceptical of the capacity of a 
preponderantly service-based economy to sustain the economic tissue of, 
for instance France or the US, given the limited capacity of the service 
sector to compensate for its commercial deficit in manufactures and energy 
(Le Franc 1983: 27; Artus and Virard 2011: 79; Pisano and Shih 2012: 5; 
Giraud and Weil 2013: 51; Smil 2013: 182). Given the comparatively weak 
export-vocation of services (Cohen and Buigues 2014: 43; Giraud and Weil, 
2013: 52, 92-94; Atkinson et al. 2012: 66), the accumulated commercial 
deficits of industry yield important consequences on a country’s national 
debt (Legarda and Blazquez 2013: 2). For instance, the ‘structural deficit’ 
which has characterised the French trade balance since the early 2000s 
manifests according to industriocrats the credit-sustained consumption of 
goods of French society which if reproduced indefinitely could have grave 
repercussions on the sustainability of its public debt (Artus and Virard 2011: 
80-81; Giraud and Weil 2013: 48-49; Cohen and Buigues 2014: 49-54). 
Thus, deindustrialisation induces a chain reaction whose negative effects 
extend well beyond industrial commerce and into the wider economy 




Explanations over the precise roots of industrial decline and suggestions for 
its eventual overcoming might differ among industriocratic authors, but 
nevertheless one can notice a recurrent stress of states’ failure to redress 
their industrial bases in the face of the growing competitive pressures 
accompanying globalisation (Newton and Porter 1988: 198; Kitson and 
Michie 1996, 2014; Perelman 2002: 4). The state’s failure to halt 
deindustrialisation is attributed to the lack of an overarching long-term 
industrial strategy guiding industrial and macroeconomic policy (Cowling 
and Sugden 1993).  
For instance, certain commentators have pointed out that US governments 
have attempted to remedy the decline of certain industries by providing 
them with subsidised financial assistance and protection from imports rather 
than encouraging their competitive adjustment to the new dimensions of 
international competition (Thurow 1980: 5; Cohen and Zysman 1987: 255). 
In the British case, it is often argued that under the influence of the City of 
London’s financial interests, the successive British governments since the 
mid-1960s demonstrated an excessive preoccupation over stabilising the 
balance of payments and defending the value of the pound which 
marginalised industry’s interests to the benefit of finance (Nairn 1979; 
Coates 1983). Especially during Thatcher’s monetarist experiment, British 
authorities are said to have demonstrated a ‘contempt for production’ as the 
pursuit of high exchange and interest rates deprived industry of the funds 
necessary to expand and decreased demand for domestic manufactures 
(Pollard 1981; Kaldor 1983).  
Within the French industriocratic tradition, the failure of the state to boost 
the competitive potential of domestic industry has also been frequently 
emphasised. Indeed, it is often stressed that with the onset of France’s 
industrial crisis in the mid-1970s industrial policy was compromised by 
policymakers’ concern to mitigate social contestation and avoid the 
necessary drastic restructuring required to strengthen the competitiveness 




Characteristically, Cohen (1989) in his masterful L’Etat Brancardier (The 
Stretcher-Bearer State) argues that from 1974 to 1984 the state restricted 
itself to a socio-political management of industrial decline. French 
governments sought to prevent the escalation of conflict by spreading in 
time the redundancies or plant closures of firms experiencing economic 
difficulties without treating the deep deficiencies of French industry.  
Ultimately, it is observed that with the end of the Trentes Glorieuses, the 
state progressively relinquished its industrial ambition and the strategic role 
it had in spurring industrial development (Thibault 2008: 62-70; Colletis 
2012: 90). The abandonment of a strategic industrial policy was followed by 
a discordance between the macroeconomic policies endorsed by 
governments since the 1970s and the contemporary prerequisites for a 
developed economy’s competitive industrial base- as is the shift from price-
competitiveness to quality-based competition (Colletis 2012: 88; Cohen and 
Buigues 2014: 340). Contemporary French industrial policy is marked by its 
reluctance to redeploy the industrial sector’s strengths by promoting the 
execution of grand industrial programs (Cohen 2007: 225). For 
industriocrats, deindustrialisation is thus associated with the failure of the 
state to redress industrial decline. The state is often seen as either overly 
neglecting the needs of manufacturing or applying the wrong remedies. 
Either way, the state plays a significant role in industrial degradation by 
failing to deploy the adequate macroeconomic and industrial policies and 
thus pursue coherent economic priorities that are conductive to economic 
growth. 
To summarise, for the industriocratic tradition deindustrialisation is a 
metonym for industrial decline. It is an economically unsettling but reversible 
condition that manifests the dismantlement of a country’s productive base. 
In this vein, the state has the potential to engage in a more active industrial 
policy which could potentially propel a reindustrialisation of the country and 
reverse the deindustrialisation trend. 




Undoubtedly, the disagreements between naturalist and industriocratic 
approaches stems to a great extent from a definitional mismatch in their 
respective understandings of deindustrialisation. Indeed, the existing 
literature is divided along definitional lines as different degrees of 
importance are given to deindustrialisation depending on whether the main 
indicators of this phenomenon are falling world trade shares, growing trade 
deficits, absolute or relative declines in employment/output and 
contributions to GDP (Cairncross 1979; Lever 1991: 983-984; Bazen and 
Thirlwall 1992: 2-6; Tregenna 2016: 98-99). 
Nevertheless the review of the literature reveals that for both approaches 
deindustrialisation consists of a process of selection of the industries that 
will persist in an era of increasingly globalised industrial competition. From 
the naturalist point of view this selectivity operates automatically through the 
concurrent effects of domestic market-led developments and the 
materialisation of the trade specialisation thesis. In other words, an 
automatic rationalisation process is at play whereby old unproductive 
industrial activities are freshly replaced by more modern and efficient ones. 
In contrast, from an industriocratic perspective this selection process 
operates in a more unpredictable manner and depends upon the 
competency of different nations to formulate industrial strategies capable of 
surmounting international competition.  It is the outcome of the competitive 
struggle between the various nationally formulated industrial strategies that 
determines the distribution of industrial activities across the world.  
However, as this thesis contends both approaches overlook the extent to 
which industrial or macroeconomic policy can actively participate in 
designing this selection process and encourage deindustrialisation in a 
strategic manner (Hudson 1986a, 1986b; Martin 1986:284-285). Indeed, 
these views convey that deindustrialisation has been determined by 
evolutions that have escaped the state’s control. In the naturalist 
perspective, the state can only play a supporting role whereby 




landscape (e.g. through adopting the appropriate labour training systems) 
or a distorting one (e.g. by maintain labour market rigidities) that disturbs 
the natural occurrence of deindustrialisation. In the industriocratic view the 
state is conspicuous by its absence and has failed to prevent industrial 
decline. It follows that the deindustrialising trajectory of France has been 
traced heteronomously as the political sphere passively complied with the 
country’s industrial decline or at best failed to adequately address it. While 
for both naturalists and industriocrats state policies are functionally essential 
in facilitating or preventing industrial shrinkage, the state appears only at 
the downstream and upstream phases of deindustrialisation and remains 
absent throughout the process itself. Clearly, a more consistent examination 
of the role of the state in determining deindustrialisation is required in order 
to shed light to the ways through which industrial policy can guide and mould 
the economy’s disengagement from certain manufacturing activities. 
Furthermore, in this thesis’ view, the competing theses are neither 
inherently incorrect nor mutually exclusive. In fact, positive and negative 
deindustrialisation or productivity-led deindustrialisation and 
deindustrialisation resulting from declining performance can in fact coexist 
within a national territory and contribute simultaneously to 
deindustrialisation (Alderson 1999: 706). Deindustrialisation simultaneously 
involves a process of ‘moving up’ the technological ladder as well as 
‘moving out’ of certain manufacturing activities and both contribute to 
manufacturing hollowing out (Lever 1991: 984). As mentioned earlier, 
deindustrialisation can simultaneously be indicative of an enhanced 
manufacturing performance as well as of a deterioration of certain 
manufacturing activities. The thesis’ claim however, is that state incentives 
can play a crucial role in strategically promoting these two forms of 
deindustrialisation across and within sectors.    
For instance, the naturalist observation that increasing productivity and the 
decreasing income elasticity for manufactures contribute to decreasing 




championed by economists since at least the 1930s as it has been alluded 
to above. However, this statement runs the risk of constituting a mere 
statistical observation of correlations between different economic processes 
(Fuchs 1980: 1; Cohen and Buigues 2014: 35) as opposed to a theoretically-
grounded analysis of deindustrialisation. There is a circularity in the 
naturalist exposition whereby ‘demand is explained by supply and supply by 
demand’ (Bonefeld 2014: 57). The institutional and socio-political context 
which allows these market mechanisms to operate is effectively neglected. 
More precisely, a productivity-led decrease of industrial labour presupposes 
the investing capacity of firms to undertake such a technological leap. Yet, 
this is precisely what a great part of the French industrial sector was lacking 
from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, during the most intense period of 
deindustrialisation. In fact, the general slowdown in the rate of return 
brought a downward pressure in the self-financing capacity of firms and a 
consequent drop in investment (OECD 1984: 46-49). During this investment 
drought, state-led initiatives of a varying nature (e.g. regional premiums, 
nationalisations, subsidised loans, tax breaks, rescue packages, sectoral 
plans) played a crucial role in allowing firms to liberate the necessary funds 
to introduce labour-saving technologies.  
On the industriocratic side, certain authors are right to point out that at times 
industrial competitiveness concerns have been sidestepped to the benefit 
of more socially oriented issues. Indeed, at the end of the trentes glorieuses 
the French state was characterised by its inclination to bailout lame ducks 
so as to avert the escalation of unemployment and social conflict instead of 
encouraging the necessary and socially painful restructuring of sectors (Clift 
2003: 176; Hau 2009: 35;  Levy 2013: 340). However, mitigating the social 
repercussions of drastic restructuring measures is only one side of the coin 
of the pressures faced by governmental authorities when devising industrial 
strategies. At the same time, increasing internationalisation forces 
governments to endorse rationalisation measures in order to refurbish 




127) describes the twofold nature of pressures exercised upon state 
managers in the following way:  
The first pressure is created by increased international competition 
both in traditional industrial goods and in high-technology products. 
Increased competition makes it imperative that the nation's industrial 
plant be modernized, and such modernization will entail the 
elimination of manufacturing jobs in older industrial sectors. The 
second pressure is to respond to the needs of industrial workers 
displaced by imports and modernization, as well as the millions of 
others in the economy who are unemployed or underemployed. 
In a roundtable organised by Journees d’Histoire Industrielle on the 1974-
1984 deindustrialisation of France, two important actors of the time’s 
industrial policy-making illustrate well the public authorities’ conflicting 
pursuit of both social appeasement and industrial rationalisation. Guitton, 
director of the CIASI1 from 1978 to 1980, emphasised that during the 1970s’ 
industrial policy was conditioned by policymakers’ permanent fear of a new 
social upheaval reminiscent of May 1968. On the other hand, Chevènement, 
Minister of Industry between 1982 and 1983, puts the stress on the growing 
pressures of global competition to undertake a rationalisation effort which 
dissuaded policy-makers from repeating the patterns of industrial 
intervention described by Guitton (Lamard and Stoskopf 2009: 92-99). In 
short, social appeasement and the pursuit of economic competitiveness are 
two inescapable constraints that industrial policy makers must deal with.  
By virtue of its aforementioned double-sided character, deindustrialisation 
involves at the same time a public management of the social suffering 
accompanying industrial decline as well as a state-enabled promotion of 
modernisation. As our empirical section demonstrates the French state 
became both a ‘stretcher-bearer’ (Cohen 1989) trying to allay the social 
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costs of deindustrialisation (Levy 2000: 322; Clift 2016: 518) as well as a 
surgeon seeking to remove the stale elements from France’s industrial body 
via deindustrialisation. The state, juggling with both domestic social 
pressures and international competitiveness ones, can play a crucial role in 
orienting the ‘shifting out’ and ‘shifting into’ certain selected manufacturing 
activities and areas (Cohen 1982). 
Overall, a political economy analysis of deindustrialisation must take 
seriously the role of the state as a key actor in the deindustrialisation 
process. Indeed, the concerns over international competitiveness and the 
reproduction of the domestic social order can play a detrimental role in 
shaping the state’s industrial preferences and promote positive and 
negative deindustrialisation across and within various sectors and regions. 
As the rest of the thesis will demonstrate, deindustrialisation should not be 
viewed merely as a description or a trend of the domestic economy but as 
an industrial policy option in its own right. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a review of three existing approaches to 
deindustrialisation. Within this literature three key strands were identified 
including the post-industrial prophecy as well as the more recent naturalist 
and industriocratic approaches. The post-industrial prophecy characterises 
a category of authors that emerged in the 1930s and who argued that 
deindustrialisation, or the emergence of a service-based economy, was the 
natural outcome of economic progress’ forward march. At the same time it 
was argued that for these theorists, deindustrialisation was not merely the 
outcome of a predetermined historical development but a political project 
requiring a state-endorsed flow of productive resources from the industrial 
to the service sector. While this prophecy failed to presage the crisis-ridden 
and uneven pattern of deindustrialisation experienced by advanced 
economies since the 1970s, its emphasis on the role of the state in guiding 
intra-sectoral resource shifts is a crucial as it sheds light on the political 




Since the 1970s questions over deindustrialisation and its causes were 
monopolised by the debates between what this chapter has termed the 
naturalist and industriocratic approaches. While the former understands 
deindustrialisation as a structural and benign phenomenon characteristic of 
all developed economies, the latter interprets deindustrialisation as 
evidence of a radical erosion of a nation’s productive apparatus.  
These approaches suffer from two main limitations. Firstly, their lopsided 
focus on either the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ facet of deindustrialisation 
prevents them from appreciating their mutual inclusiveness. Indeed, as it 
was repeatedly argued, deindustrialisation entails both the contraction of 
certain industrial capacities as well as the development and modernisation 
of others. In addition, despite the emphasis posed by both approaches on 
the role of the state either in adapting domestic social structures to the 
deindustrialisation movement or in counteracting industrial decline, the role 
of industrial policy in promoting deindustrialisation in a strategic manner is 
left untouched. Indeed, for naturalists the domestic configuration of 
industrial activities is determined by the free play of domestic and 
international market forces whereas for industriocrats the state has 
relinquished its strategic industrial role and failed to prevent industrial 
decline by creating an environment conductive to higher manufacturing 
competitiveness. In both cases deindustrialisation has been seemingly 
traced by exogenous dynamics and the capacity of state managers to shape 
this process through industrial policy relegated to a secondary role. 
The next chapter will endeavour to forge new ways of understanding 
deindustrialisation by providing a conceptual framework which considers 
the double-sided nature of deindustrialisation, as both industrial contraction 
and modernisation, and takes into account the role of the state, as an 
integral moment of capital valorisation, in strategically promoting both 







DEINDUSTRIALISATION AND THE STATE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter identified the key issues surrounding the mainstream 
debates on deindustrialisation and the limits of the naturalist and 
industriocratic approaches in conceptualising the state’s role within the 
deindustrialisation process. It was argued that both approaches overlooked 
the double-sided nature of deindustrialisation as both a sign of economic 
progress and regress and greatly downplayed the extent to which 
deindustrialisation can constitute an industrial policy-preference of state 
managers. Instead, based on the intuition of post-industrial authors 
identified in the previous chapter, this chapter will make the case that the 
state can play a great role in managing the allocation of productive 
resources across sectors and in so doing contribute to the 
deindustrialisation of the economy. More precisely, it will be argued that 
deindustrialisation can effectively be conceived as a state-sponsored 
strategy of selective disengagement from specific manufacturing activities 
aiming to remedy a crisis of overaccumulation. Selective disengagement 
takes the form of a targeted devaluation of the uncompetitive and 
superfluous industrial capital that inhibits the competitive insertion of the 
domestic economy into the world market. This original conceptualisation of 
deindustrialisation allows to remedy the shortcomings of existing debates. 
Firstly, by acknowledging that industrial decline and rejuvenation are the 
two sides of deindustrialisation as increased industrial competitiveness 
necessitates the elimination of non-performing manufacturing capacities. 




phenomenon is a statecraft practice that materialises in and through the 
state’s industrial policies. 
In the first half, this chapter will critically scrutinise certain key Critical and 
Marxian approaches to industrial transformation whose conceptual lenses 
can be used to analyse the deindustrialisation of advanced capitalist 
economies. The examined approaches are: the Regulation Theory (RT), the 
New New International Division of Labour (NNIDL) and the Cognitive 
Capitalism (CC) approach. For the first, deindustrialisation can be 
understood as a defining feature of the advanced economies’ transition from 
a Fordist towards a post-Fordist regime of accumulation. The second 
approach, while not focusing exclusively on the industrial structures of 
advanced economies, argue that current International division of labour 
reflects the changing conditions of global accumulation. According to the 
NNIDL it is the uneven evolution of capital accumulation that determines the 
industrial specialisation of different national territories while state authorities 
are unable to influence or reverse their country's position within the 
International Division of Labour. Finally, for CC proponents contemporary 
capitalism has witnessed a transition towards a knowledge-based regime of 
accumulation whereby cognitive resources have become the main source 
of wealth as opposed to industrial labour. As such disinvestment from 
industrial activities and the growth of immaterial forms of production reflect 
capital’s capture of these new sources of profitability.  
However, it will be argued that these approaches do not provide a 
satisfactory scheme for understanding industrial transformations and the 
role of the state in such processes. RT provides an empirically rich 
description of modern capitalism which however remains at a descriptive 
level since changes in state behaviour and accumulation patterns are 
understood as the result of contingent empirical developments rather than 
as epiphenomenal manifestations of the underlying labour-capital relations. 
The NNIDL on the other hand conflates the abstract capital imperatives to 




undertaken by policymakers in order to ensure the continuous valorisation 
of capital. As a result, NNIDL produces a determinist framework for 
understanding industrial change which fails to grasp the motivations 
underpinning the formulation of economic and industrial policy. Conversely, 
CC sees capitalist accumulation patterns and wealth as being determined 
by the concrete character of labour expenditure rather than on the social 
form assumed by the latter which in fact allows capital wealth to expand on 
the basis of abstract labour expenditure which is devoid of any concrete 
characteristics. As such recent changes in developed countries’ industrial 
structures are arbitrarily attributed to the emergence of a non-industrial form 
of wealth rather than to the logical unfolding of capital accumulation’s 
tendencies which permit industrial capital to valorise itself on the basis of an 
ever-shrinking workforce. 
Alternatively, the second half of this chapter sketches the foundations of an 
Open Marxist (OM) framework that brings together Marx’s value theory, 
class struggle and state policy in a theoretically consistent manner. It first 
outlines OM’s understanding of capitalist society’s institutions (e.g. the state, 
the market) as rigidified forms taken by the antagonistic labour-capital 
relation. Even further, capitalist social relations take on a fetish-character 
which is experienced by both market and state actors as an alien economic 
compulsion to reproduce and accumulate capitalist wealth (i.e. value). It will 
be argued that this alien compulsion is at the same time the source of 
capitalism’s recurrent overaccumulation crises. Such crises beget the 
devaluation of uncompetitive and superfluous capital which in the 1970s and 
1980s took the form of the massive liquidation of industrial assets. Lastly, 
the section explains that the process of liquidation is mediated by the state 
which undertakes the task of formulating a strategy of selective 
disengagement in order to concentrate devaluation in the commercially 
least crucial industrial activities. At the same time, given the labour market 
crisis that follows this process, state managers are prone to devise 




threatened industries. Such statecraft strategies might involve to different 
degrees the politicisation and/or depoliticisation of aspects of industrial 
policy as the state attempts to palliate the consequences of 
deindustrialisation and/or ostensibly transfer the responsibility over 
industrial adjustment to non-state spheres. 
CRITICAL AND MARXIST APPROACHES TO DEINDUSTRIALISATION 
This section provides an overview of certain critical and Marxist-inspired 
approaches to industrial transformation. It does not aim to provide an 
exhaustive review of the critical literature on the topic but instead it aims at 
presenting the main categorical lenses that have been used to understand 
the wider framework of capitalism’s industrial restructuring since the end of 
the post-war boom. These categorical lenses are: the regime of 
accumulation/modes of reguation typology advanced by the RT, the 
cognitive stage attained by capitalism according to CC proponents and the 
international division of labour as typified by the NNIDL. The section will 
focus its review on the implications of the RT, CC and the NNIDL approach 
for the study of the deindustrialisation process and industrial policy-making.2 
THE REGULATION THEORY 
Although the Regulation school is not a homogeneous body of literature and 
can be divided into various distinct strands (Jessop 1988, 1990; 
Mavroudeas 2012: 7), its proponents nevertheless hold in common the 
contention that the 1970s and 1980s can be conceptualised as a period of 
deep structural changes in the prevailing Fordist form of capital 
accumulation. The crisis of the 1970s put a strain on the institutional 
arrangement sustaining Fordism and paved the way for a new growth 
regime. This section will draw more heavily on the French strand of RT and 
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Jessop’s conceptualisation of the post-Fordist state and model of 
accumulation. 
The RT's periodisation method contends that distinct cycles of capitalist 
production appear when accumulation regimes meet their appropriate 
modes of regulation at a specific historical juncture to form a cohesive 
developmental model. More specifically, the regime of accumulation refers 
to a historical era within capitalism in which a steady articulation of both the 
production process and demand trends can be observed over time, 
concurring in the formation of a relatively stable economic historical bloc 
that defers the crisis-prone tendencies of capital accumulation (Lipietz 1987: 
32; Boyer 1990: 35-36). On the other hand, the mode of regulation consists 
of a definite configuration of the network of social institutions, such as the 
state or the monetary system, that enforces the principles of a particular 
regime on social actors (Lipietz 1987: p.33). The cohabitation of a regime of 
accumulation and a mode of regulation enters into a structural crisis as soon 
as the possibilities to rejuvenate the conditions for profitability within this 
regime are exhausted (Boyer and Saillard 2002: 43). As a result, the 
growing inability of established institutional practices to maintain the 
prospects for vigorous economic growth, leaves the door open to potential 
successor modes of development. 
After a prolonged structural crisis that started with the Great Depression and 
a series of class and political conflicts, the post-war years witnessed the 
emergence of the Fordist mode of development. Its distinct quality lied in 
the radical altering of labour’s consumption norms, which took the form of 
mass consumption and constituted a steady outlet for the outputs of 
consumer industries. Thanks to the emergence of mass consumption, 
Fordism was able to rely on the complementary development of the main 
departments of production: capital equipment industries furnished the 
necessary means of production for the growing needs of consumer goods 




increase in effective demand (Aglietta 1979: 161; Mazier et al. 1984: 66-69; 
Boyer 1987b: 56; Lipietz 1987: 36-37).  
The changes at the production level were accompanied by the rise of the 
Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) which undertook the task of balancing out 
demand and supply by sustaining mass consumption and guaranteeing full 
employment (Jessop 1996: 167-168). Indeed, the newfound stability 
between production and consumption patterns was guaranteed by a 
‘monopolistic’ or ‘administered’ mode of regulation whose institutional 
mechanisms supported a regular rise of wages while reducing their 
vulnerability to the destabilising effects of market fluctuations (Mazier et al. 
1984: 29). The evolutions in macroeconomic policies and industrial relations, 
including the increasing socialisation of wage costs through welfare state 
expenditures, the imposition of minimum wages, the indexation of wages to 
prices or the spread of collective bargaining practices permitted consumer 
demand to keep the pace with the productivity gains of industry (Benassy et 
al. 1979: 402-403). These developments formed the basis of the virtuous 
cycle of growth of Fordismallowing for a harmonious symbiosis between 
rising incomes and profits. 
Deindustrialisation in advanced economies took place within the context of 
the structural crisis of the Fordist growth model and the transition towards a 
new economic regime (Coriat and Petit 1991). The constant push to 
revolutionise the production process by introducing new machinery incurred 
increases the cost of investment which were not matched by productivity 
gains and subsequently led to a steep fall in profitability (Mazier et al. 1984: 
110-111; Lipietz 1987: 41-44; Vidal 2002: 335). Additionally, the erosion of 
profitability was underpinned by workers' struggles over the distribution of 
the social product which, strengthened by the predominant institutional 
mechanisms of the KWS, accentuated the growth of the wage share at the 
expense of profits (Bertrand 1983: 341; Boyer and Mistral 1978: 132, 136-




The dismantling of the Fordist compromise was sealed by the shift of 
national economies towards an outward-orientated strategy aimed at 
bypassing the limits encountered within the domestic market. The 
progressive internationalisation of the market reversed the tendency of 
Fordist economies to structure their demand and supply complexes within 
the perimeters of the domestic market, as the generalisation of competitive 
pressures coming from abroad transformed wage growth from an asset 
guaranteeing the absorption of domestic output to a burden inhibiting the 
competitiveness of firms at the international level (Bertrand 1983: 340; 
Bertrand et al. 1982: 267; Mazier et al. 1984: 128). Unsurprisingly, the 
monopolistic mode of regulation was ill-adapted to remedy the profitability 
crisis and restore the conditions for effective accumulation through its 
habitual wage-growth inducing mechanisms. 
From the perspective of the Regulationist approach deindustrialisation 
appears as the natural concomitant of the exhaustion of the industrial 
paradigm associated with Fordism. Indeed, Fordism constituted the peak 
point of industrialisation since the ‘discovery’ of mass markets permitted the 
unprecedented development of both producer and consumer goods 
industries (Vidal 2001: 16). However, the crisis of Fordism and emergence 
of a post-Fordist era, ultimately, reversed these trends. Deteriorating 
conditions of production -manifested by lower levels of industrial 
investment- combined with the relative saturation of households' demand 
for consumer durables dissolved the Fordist model of industrial production 
based on the capacity of mass consumer demand to propel the 
development of consumer goods industries (Mazier et al. 1984: 121; Vidal 
2001: 16). The effects of the international conjuncture further aggravated 
the industrial decline already at work at the domestic level since the 
reorientation of domestic production towards export markets could not 
effectively succeed domestic mass consumption as a source of increasing 




The deindustrialisation and concurrent tertiarisation of advanced economies 
are the constitutive sources of the slow growth and stagnation 
characterising post-Fordist economies given that, compared to 
manufacturing, the service sector is less able to establish a stable relation 
between expanding market outlets and productivity growth, to and thus 
unable, on its own, to set the basis for a virtuous growth regime like Fordism 
(Petit 1988a, 1988b).Put simply, for the RT, sectoral changes and the 
industrial recomposition of economies must be explained in relation to the 
demise of a regime of accumulation (Petit 1988a: 173). In this vein, the 
‘vanguard role’ played by certain key industries (e.g. household equipment) 
during the Fordist era is progressively being degraded in the transition to a 
post-Fordist model of growth (DeVroey 1984: 56). Deindustrialisation 
appears as a liaison in the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism which 
along with the internationalisation of markets and the emergence of new 
information technologies constitutes one of the major structural traits of 
post-Fordist economies (Petit 1998: 175). In this context, ‘the development 
of the service sector involves a sector-based specificity that invites the 
introduction of new institutional regulations’ (Du Tertre 2002: 206). Indeed, 
the role of the state is to stabilise the emerging form of accumulation through 
the development of the appropriate regulatory mechanisms.  
While a successor to Fordism has not been clearly delineated nor has  its 
deminse led to the imposition of uniform economic reforms across countries 
(Lipietz 1997; Pettit 1999: 240), the post-fordist era has been characterised 
by the growing flexibilisation of the labour market and the production 
process (Pettit 1999: 247; Bertrand 2002: 85). Given the dissolution of the 
complementarity between wage and productivity growth, firms’ profitability 
came less to depend on the growing absorptive capacity of the domestic 
market and more in their capacity to capture innovative methods of 
production. As such firms have to take advantage of flexible factors of 




world consumption patterns, accrued international competition and the 
changing technological environment (Jessop 1996: 168-169).  
In this context, Jessop argues that the Schumpeterian Workfare State (SWS) 
replacing the KWS, focuses its interventionist capacities on maintaining the 
flexibility of labour and promoting innovation and technological change (e.g. 
through R&D funding) within industry in order to enhance the competitive 
potential of firms (Jessop 1993: 12-13). As a result, ‘states must shift 
industrial support away from efforts to maintain declining sectors and 
towards promoting new sectors’ (Jessop 1994: 25). In this vein the state 
accompanies the economy’s move towards a post-Fordist era and tailors its 
(industrial) policy to the benefit of the activities more apt to address post-
Fordist challenges (e.g. innovation, flexibility) (Jessop 2000). 
While Regulationists are often at pain to stress the crucial role of class 
struggle and their demarcation from the structuralism of Orthodox Marxism 
(Lipietz 1987: 15; Jessop 1988), they have been indicted of replacing it  with 
a sort of functionalist understanding of the state’s relationship to the 
economy. As Clarke (1991: 128) argues, in the regulationist view the 
evolution of political institutions is ultimately ‘determined by the functional 
imperatives of the regime of accumulation’. Consequently, the state and the 
economic sphere are arbitrarily understood as opposing entities whose 
cohabitation might be harmonious or under stress depending on the 
structural evolutions in accumulation (Bonefeld 1993: 9). Moreover, 
according to Open Marxists3 this methodological approach is revealing of 
the RT’s tendency to analytically prioritise the structural tendencies of 
capital over social practice and class struggle. Instead, the aim of critical 
theory is to prioritise neither structure nor struggle, but rather to disseminate 
the reasons why social relations are reproduced in such a way as to 
seemingly subordinate themselves to intransigent structural laws (Grollios 
2017: 244). 
                                                          
3 For a fuller discussion of the debates between Open Marxists and Regulationists see 




Even Jessop’s (1990) RT-informed attempt to reformulate the role of the 
state through his strategic-relational prism is said to ultimately replicate this 
dichotomy (Clarke 1991: 45). Despite Jessop’s insistence that ‘structure and 
struggle’ or ‘states and markets’ are not simply opposing poles but 
‘structurally coupled’ and dialectically interacting spheres (Jessop, 1990: 
328), they are still ultimately treated as technically distinct domains of 
capitalist society. As Bonefeld (1994) notes Jessop’s approach ‘takes for 
granted the fragmented character of social existence’. For Jessop (1990: 
206) the ‘particularisation of the state’ from the circuit of capital which allows 
it to ‘stand outside and above the market’ is an essential feature of capitalist 
society. This claim, while in appearance correct, prevents him from going 
beyond its merely descriptive character and disseminate the underlying 
social essence, namely the capitalist social relations, that give unity to 
seemingly distinct social phenomena and institutions (Psychopedis 1991: 
184-185; Bonefeld 1993: 11). Unlike the regulationists’ contention that the 
state can stabilise and regulate the economy ‘as from the outside’ the 
process of capital accumulation, according to the Open Marxist perspective 
the state must be seen as a moment of the accumulation process and as 
an institutional form in and through which capital accumulation and its crises 
are reproduced (Clarke 1991: 45).  
The significance of this critique rests on the fact that the main deficiency of 
RT is not in its empirical inadequacy but on the fact that its theoretical 
concepts often fail to go beyond a merely descriptive character. In fact, 
concrete developments in the capitalist economy are elevated into 
conceptual categories (e.g. SWS) rendering theory circular and self-
validating since such categories are tested against the empirical reality from 
which they directly derive (Bonefeld 1993: 44). For instance, the analytical 
category of post-Fordism is used to explain the decline of certain industries 
and the switch in the state’s industrial and macroeconomic policies while at 
the same time it is precisely these developments that signal the transition 




perceptible processes that underline social development and which cannot 
be grasped/measured merely by way of empirical observation (Adorno 1976: 
24). 
Thus, for the OM framework advanced here, empirically observable 
changes in accumulation, such as deindustrialisation, ought to be grasped 
as epiphenomenal manifestations of the unfolding contradictions of the 
labour capital relation: as concrete demonstrations of capital’s dependence 
upon the exploitation of labour for profit and its simultaneous struggle to 
minimise necessary labour time by conforming to the increases in the 
productivity of social labour (Holloway 1988: 101). 
THE ‘NEW’ NEW INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR 
The contributors of the NNIDL endeavour to provide an upgraded and 
refined version of the New International Division of Labour (NIDL) advanced 
by Frõbel et al. in the late 1970s, firmly grounded in Marx’s critique of 
political economy. Fröbel et al. (1980) argued that world production patterns 
were undergoing fundamental qualitative shifts as an important number of 
industrial activities progressively sprung in previously raw-material 
furnishing countries. Indeed, thanks to improvements in transport and 
communication technologies as well as the availability of a large pool of 
labour in the so-called Third World, Multinational Corporations driven by 
their stern urge to maximise profitability were able to disengage from certain 
industrial activities performed in advanced countries and install plants in 
locations characterised by their cheap and disciplined workforces. As such 
the NIDL and the global re-allocation of industrial resources is conceived as 
the outcome of capital’s structural adaptation to changing techno-economic 
circumstances. In this vein, nation states in the advanced world have been 
unable to resist deindustrialisation and instead were impelled to conform 
their policies to these new conditions (Fröbel et al. 1980: 46).   
Drawing from Fröbel et al.’s initial insights as well as from the Open Marxist 




permeates other approaches to the IDL (e.g. World Systems) and argue that 
the global capitalist economy in fact operates as a unitary whole which takes 
the form of distinct national processes of accumulation (Grinberg and 
Starosta 2014: 240). Diverse national breeds of capitalism are but territorial 
expressions of the contradictory and uneven development of surplus value 
extraction that occurs at the global level (Fitzsimons and Starosta 2018: 
111). A country’s position within the international division of labour is thus 
structurally determined by processes that escape the reach of political 
subjects. In fact, NNIDL proponents concur, that class struggle and policy-
making are the vehicles through which the unfolding of the law of value 
manifests itself in territorially differentiated spaces of accumulation 
(Charnock and Starosta 2016: 6; Fitzsimons and Starosta 2018: 118). 
Caligaris (2016: 59) puts this straightforwardly: ‘political relations can be 
grasped as what they actually are, namely, concrete forms of the realisation 
of economic relations’. Thus, the uneven conditions of global capital 
accumulation lock-in countries in a specific position within the IDL from 
which national political movements cannot break from but only adapt to 
(Carrera 2016: 38).  
While, the empirical focus of these authors is not the deindustrialisation of 
advanced capitalist centres but the industrial evolutions in developing areas 
(especially Latin America), the implications of their framework indicate that 
the roots of this process cannot be sought in the behaviour of domestic 
capital or state elites but in the changing conditions of the exploitation of the 
global working class. More precisely, the growth and demise of certain 
industrial activities within national territories is determined by technological 
evolutions in the production process as well as the subjective and technical 
characteristics of national working classes (Grinberg 2011: 35; Charnock 
and Starosta 2016: 9). In its search for higher profitability, global capital 
allocates different production processes in distinct geographical locations 
depending on the cost, discipline and skilfulness of their respective 




advanced countries and the relocation of certain manufacturing activities 
from the North to parts of the global South merely reflects the more attractive 
productive qualities of the regimented, say, East Asian workforce and the 
technical changes in the global process of production. According to the 
framework of the NNIDL, the industrial preferences of political authorities in 
advanced economies can only acquiesce to  the position that was 
structurally bequeathed to them within the international division of labour. 
While this thesis’ theoretical framework is sympathetic to the claim 
advanced by the proponents of the NNIDL that, in line with Marx himself 
(see Pradella 2015), national forms of accumulation cannot be conceived of 
as independent from the world market but only as its constitutive elements, 
it also at times finds distressing certain of their implications for the study of 
the state and industrial policy. Their attempt to derive the position of different 
nation-states within the IDL straight from Marx’s law of value suggests that 
class struggle and political processes do not affect but merely acquiesce to 
industrial transformations (Starosta 2010). Indeed, it is the ‘capital-
determined international division of labour’ which ultimately allows the 
emergence of qualitatively distinct national forms of capital accumulation 
(Fitzsimons and Starosta 2018: 119). However, as Bonefeld (2006b: 50) 
puts it: ‘Marx’s account does not focus on inter-national comparative 
advantages but, rather, on the equalization of the rate of profit on a global 
scale.’ In other words, Marx focuses on the value relations that underpin the 
world market as opposed to the phenomenal characteristics and attributes 
of distinct national economies. As such the NNIDL approach moves 
arbitrarily from higher levels of abstraction to more concrete and empirical 
appreciations of capitalist accumulation without making explicit the relation 
between the two. However, as it has been pointed out within OM the 
abstract theorisation of capital’s accumulation dynamics serves to illustrate 
the economic problems facing social agents without deterministically 
anticipating the strategies or policies that they will adopt to confront them 




hand, for the NNIDL the concrete responses to these economic problems is 
already presupposed in their abstract analysis as state policies are bound 
to reproduce their capital-determined position within the global division of 
labour. 
Rather, the level of development and ultimately the position of a country 
within the global division of labour is determined by the concrete 
development of class struggle and the evolution of capitalist social relations 
within a given territory rather than the a priori logic of the IDL (Brenner 1977; 
Milios 1989: 166). Global value relations compel states to guarantee the 
competitiveness of their domestic economy vis-à-vis foreign competition but 
cannot in themselves determine the concrete character of the international 
division of labour. Indeed, while remaining captive to the need to reproduce 
conditions for profitable capital accumulation, states can mould ‘the 
character of their integration into the world economy’ (Burnham, 2000: 18). 
Thus, a fundamental shortcoming of the NNIDL stems from their attempt to 
deterministically deduce the concrete character of the IDL from the abstract 
laws of motion of capital accumulation. Instead, the law of value only 
pressures states to maintain the productivity of labour at world average or 
higher levels regardless of the concrete nature of productive activities with 
which they are engaged (Bonefeld 2000: 38).  
To return to our case study, while deindustrialisation can be retrospectively 
explained with reference to value’s crisis-ridden self-expansion, value’s 
motion does not contain the concept of deindustrialisation in its inception. In 
order to understand a country’s peculiar position within the IDL one must 
examine the domestic industrial responses to global economic challenges. 
In other words, one needs to examine the practical and concrete ways 
through which state managers attempt to improve domestic conditions of 
accumulation and improve their position within a globally competitive 





Drawing from both the Regulation School and the post-operaist4 strand of 
Marxism in the likes of Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004), the CC current 
examines the qualitative transformation that capitalism underwent since the 
1970s and tracks its transition to a distinguishable form of economic regime 
whose main gear has become the increasingly immaterial and cognitive 
activities of society.  This strand of thought is furthermore part of a wider 
theoretical endeavour that emerged in the 1990s aiming at decrypting the 
so-called informational age of contemporary capitalism and which finds 
expression in the works of Hardt and Negri (2000), Rifkin (1995, 2014), 
Castells (2000) or even Mason (2016). Despite the differences existing 
between these authors, their work is characterised by a common ambition 
to stress the wealth-producing functions acquired by social knowledge, to 
elucidate the cognitive form adopted by capitalist social relations and the 
potential limits that such developments impose on the reproduction of 
capitalism itself. 
For Hardt and Negri (1994, 2000, 2005) the new civilisational stage of 
capitalism is better captured by the notion of Empire by which, the authors 
suggest, that capital has secured an all-pervading presence across 
geographical territories and aspects of social life that renders superfluous 
the previous nation state-based political order. A striking feature of 
capitalism’s new morphology is the ‘informatisation’ or ‘post-modernisation’ 
of production whereby immaterial forms of labour, engaged in cognitive, 
informational and affective activities, surpass the industrial sector in their 
capacity to shape social life. Empire expresses capital’s adaptation to the 
new productive powers of the Multitude, that is the contemporary 
                                                          
4 Operaismo or Workerism refers to a strand of Marxism developed in Italy in the 1960s 
and 1970s (see: Bologna, 1973; Tronti, 1979; Wright, 2002). Unlike more orthodox Marxist 
currents of the Soviet type, Operaismo places its analytical focus on the role of workers’ 
resistance and struggles in shaping the developmental course of capitalism. Changes in 
production structures reflect capital’s attempt to undermine working class strength in order 
to re-establish its command over the labour process. Post-operaismo, as developed by 
Hardt and Negri retains the theoretical insights of workerisms but places them within the 
new context of capitalism in which immaterial labour as opposed to the manual working 




revolutionary entity of Empire's era.  It constitutes capital’s effort to 
appropriate the means of wealth creation which now reside in the subjective 
and creative activities of the Multitude itself. 
Similarly, CC proponents argue that contemporary capitalism has witnessed 
a fundamental shift from an industry-dominated economy to a cognitive one. 
In fact, the post-1970s stage of capitalism constitutes a third distinct 
capitalist era which was preceded by mercantilist and industrial capitalism 
(Moulier-Boutang 2011: 9). The Fordist labour process, based on the 
ascription of repetitive manual tasks, is  replaced by a division of labour 
centred around the increasing intellectuality and versatility of labour 
(Vercellone 2008: 80; Monnier and Vercellone 2014: 5). As a result of this 
fundamental qualitative transition, the categories of cognitive capitalism 
cannot be grasped through the analytical tools peculiar to industrial 
capitalism and, as such, its proponents deem the post-Fordist thesis 
advanced by the Regulation School and the tenets of traditional political 
economy, including a great segment of Marxism, as anachronistic (Corsani 
et al. 2001: 16; Dieuaide et al.  2003: 3-4). 
More precisely, under Cognitive Capitalism, a regime centred on the 
accumulation of knowledge ‘by means of knowledge’ (Corsani et al. 2001: 
3; Corsani 2003: 57; Moulier-Boutang 2011: 57), the pertinence of various 
(Marxist or not) economic categories such as value, labour time, productivity 
or profit, dissolves. Indeed, the increasing immateriality of the production 
process renders immeasurable the actual output contribution of labour 
performed within a specific time slot (Vercellone 2008: 14). Knowledge 
existing independently of production sites themselves, the distinction 
between work and non-work, between productive and non-productive 
labour, tends to blur since wealth-creating processes increasingly occur 
outside the strict confines of the market sphere. They reside instead in the 
intellectual faculties and cooperative interactions of social actors (Corsani 
et al. 2001: 15-16, 24; Moulier-Boutang 2011: 20-30).  The presence of such 




as a result, forces firms to centre their strategies around seizing socially 
produced knowledge and its integrating it into their valorisation process in 
order to secure their economic viability (Corsani et al. 2001: 10).  
In other words, capital's profit does not depend, anymore, upon the 
extraction of surplus value within the productive process but rather on the 
monopolisation of intellectual innovations through the imposition of 
intellectual property rights over the circulation and use of knowledge 
(Vercellone 2008: 13). Thus, industrial capital's capacity to generate profit 
through its endogenous mechanisms of productivity maximisation has given 
way to cognitive capital's rentier attitude (Negri and Vercellone 2008: 47). 
In this emerging capitalist era the production of wealth is not anymore 
defined in industrial terms, that is as the increasing exploitation of labour in 
the factory (Lazzarato 2004: 200; Fumagalli and Lucarelli 2010: 12) but as 
the appropriation of the social body’s subjective and knowledge producing 
activities. 
Within, the cognitive framework of contemporary production it is not hard to 
see that for CC proponents the deindustrialisation of advanced economies 
simply mirrors the shift towards a knowledge-based pattern of accumulation. 
It reveals the changing localisation strategies of capitalist firms which 
essentially consist in capturing areas rich in cognitive resources and where 
the existence of multiple positive externalities can sustain an expanded 
accumulation of knowledge. Indeed, the exhaustion of profitability channels 
within an industrial setting based on the accumulation of physical capital, 
forces firms to reorient their strategies towards the appropriation of 
commonly held knowledge resources through for instance, the privatisation 
of previously state-provided services or the endorsement of patent rights on 
socially produced knowledge. As such the effective insertion in the 
Cognitive IDL is increasingly determined by a national economy's capacity 
to sustain an adequate pool of scientific/technical assets and a highly 
qualified human capital (Mouhoud 2003). Deindustrialisation is a by-product 




cognitariat (i.e. knowledge workers) and a steady supply of knowledge-
intensive resources surpasses its need for the maintenance of an ever-
expanding infrastructure of physical capital operated by a mass industrial 
proletariat (Mouhoud, 2003; Vercellone, 2002: 15).  
The CC’s understanding of wealth in capitalism is contestable. Its main 
pitfall lies in the distinction between an industrial form of wealth and a 
cognitive one rendered possible by the growing preponderance of 
knowledge-producing activities. In fact, it can even be argued that the 
degree of novelty presented by cognitive forms of labour in advanced 
capitalist centres is overstated as the application of knowledge has always 
been essential to the production process. While the rise of immaterial 
working practices noticed by CC is a, broadly speaking, fair characterisation 
of the path followed by certain developed economies,5 as Caffentzis (2013: 
100) aptly notes it is impossible to draw a clear line between the knowledge-
content embodied in say an automobile and a software program. In fact, the 
rise of ‘cognitive’ activities is an insufficient phenomenon to claim that the 
form of wealth in capitalist society has been transformed since capital does 
not discriminate against the different characteristics of concrete labouring 
activities, whether manual or intellectual.  
Instead, capital’s valorisation rests on its capacity to commodify the 
products of such labours (Caffentzis 2013: 108; Moraitis and Copley 2017). 
In themselves, cognitive activities do not bear greater wealth than ‘material’ 
ones given that it is the abstract, devoid of any concrete characteristics, 
capacity to labour in general that is the source of value for capital. Thus, 
Pitts (2018: 208) argues that ‘labour has always been in some way 
immaterial’ since the production of capitalist wealth cannot be grasped in 
terms of the material attributes of different working practices. In contrast, for 
CC proponents it is the concrete (industrial or immaterial) division of labour 
                                                          
5 It is important to stress however that the knowledge intensity of immaterial labour activities 
is at the same time greatly overstated as the spread of immaterial labour has often been 
accompanied by a decrease in the skill-intensity of such jobs. For the relationship between 




that determines the value-bearing character of labour. However, ‘the real 
existence of value logically… precedes more complex phenomena such as 
the division of labour’ (Jeon 2010: 102). It is the expenditure of abstract 
labour time that homogenises commodities and allows their 
commensurability in the marketplace while rendering their external 
attributes insignificant (Marx 1904: 26-28; see also: Bonefeld 2010).  
As such, the shrinking size of manufacturing in the West does not 
demonstrate the progressive obsolescence of the categories of industrial 
capitalism. Rather the growing superfluity of the industrial labour force is 
revealing of capital’s inherent contradiction between expelling labour from 
the process of production through technological developments while at the 
same time posing labour time as the constitutive source of wealth and the 
basis of its profitability (Marx 1973: 705-706; Postone 2008: 133-134). 
Concrete changes in the form of the (global) division of labour are not able 
by themselves to give rise to or lead to the demise of the value-form of 
capitalist wealth. In our case, deindustrialisation cannot be merely viewed 
as the consequence of the progressive obsolescence of industrial logics of 
production. Instead, as the subsequent section will demonstrate, 
deindustrialisation can itself be explained in terms of the persistent validity 
of the value-form of wealth and that in fact it can retrospectively be explained 
by capital’s incessant dependence upon the exploitation of labour within the 
process of production. 
TOWARDS AN OPEN MARXIST APPROACH TO 
DEINDUSTRIALISATION 
This section will now introduce the OM theoretical framework through which 
the phenomenon of deindustrialisation will be tackled. In this thesis’ view, 
OM does not refer to a finished theoretical system or a strictly delineated 
intellectual current but to an ongoing project of reconstitution and 
reinterpretation of Marx’s critique of political economy. In its attempt to 
elucidate the social constitution of capitalist society and the immanent laws 




influence from Rubin’s (1973) early social form approach to Marx’s theory 
of value, the critical thought of the Frankfurt school (e.g. Horkheimer 1972; 
Adorno, 2003), the value-form approach advanced by the so-called New 
Reading of Marx (e.g. Sohn-Rethel 1978; Postone 1993; Heinrich 2012) as 
well as the contributions to social-form analysis (e.g. Clarke 1988; Bonefeld, 
et al. 1992; Burnham 1994). 
The first section will expoundthe epistemological foundations of OM. For 
OM, capitalist society’s political and economic institutions are forms of the 
underlying antagonistic labour-capital relations. However, these relations 
acquire a reified character which is experienced in the form of an 
independent compulsion to accumulate value, the particular form that 
wealth acquires under capitalism. The subsequent sub-sections will move 
to a more concrete level of analysis and explain how the value-form analysis 
can shed light to deindustrialisation and the role of industrial policy in 
mediating it. More precisely, the second sub-section argues that 
deindustrialisation can be understood as the concrete manifestation of 
capital’s immanent tendency towards over-accumulation crises which beget 
the devaluation of uncompetitive capital. The last section postulates that the 
state is the political form of capital’s overaccumulation tendencies and as 
such  capital’s crises necessarily manifest themselves in and through the 
state. It is in this way that this chapter supports the argument that 
deindustrialisation can be understood as a state-endorsed strategy aiming 
at eliminating the superfluous capital that inhibits the country’s commercial 
performance. 
VALUE, CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE STATE 
Both traditional and orthodox Marxist theorising has been dominated by the 
tendency to conceptualise theory as an intellectual activity extrinsically 
related to society, treating the latter as an objective and reified form 
rendered intelligible by the analytical categories externally imposed on it by 
theory (Gunn 1994: 53-54). Society, in this instance, is conceived as an 




evidence and facts for theory to bring to the fore. Against this ‘idolisation’ of 
observable reality (Adorno 1976: 81), the dialectical endeavour proposed 
by Marx, and espoused by Open Marxists, situates its theoretical focus on 
the hidden human practice that sustains the capitalist social edifice as a 
whole (Gunn 1992: 9).  It is in this sense that Marx (1976b: 4) posits that ‘all 
mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in 
human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.’ For indeed, 
capitalist society is permeated by the paradox of social interactions being 
presided over by immutable economic categories (e.g. money, commodities, 
prices, capital), while at the same time being the constitutive source of these 
apparently alien forms (Marx 1976a: 165). Thus, the ‘ad hominem critique’ 
that Bonefeld (2014: 62) credits to Marx’s critique of Political Economy 
amounts to a deciphering of the socially and historically definite ways in 
which human society organises its production and exchange relations. In 
other words, the Open Marxist project aims at unravelling the ways through 
which everyday social practice reproduces and reinstates society’s 
submission to capitalism’s seemingly necessary and ‘natural forms of social 
life’ (Marx 1976a: 168).  
The peculiar alienating nature of capitalist relations owes to the fact that 
capitalist social relations subsist ‘through and by the value-form’ (Pitts 2018: 
109). Value is the peculiar form that wealth acquires in capitalist society and 
in contrast to real or material wealth (i.e. use-values) its magnitude is 
measured in labour time units as opposed to the volume and qualitative 
characteristics of produced goods (Postone 1993: 193). More precisely, 
value, whose concrete embodiment or ‘universal material representative’ is 
money (Marx 1973: 216), refers to the capacity to appropriate a share of the 
total social product; to command and lay claim on the labour of other 
individuals. As a result, value knows no quantitative limits as it must be 
constantly reproduced anew in order to maintain its holder’s entitlement to 
society’s labour. As Marx (1973: 270) explains: ‘Fixed as wealth…as value 




quantitative limit: an endless process’. Therefore, the accumulation of value 
appears as an alien, exogenously imposed, compulsion upon the individual 
producers of bourgeois society. The object of capitalist production becomes 
the accumulation of not only money but essentially more money: ‘the 
immediate aim of the capitalist…is rather the unceasing movement of profit-
making’ (Marx 1976a: 254).  
Despite the seemingly objective and structural coercion to accumulate 
capitalist wealth, that is ‘money as more money’ (Bonefeld, 2014: 40), Marx 
insists that value is a social relation albeit one ‘concealed beneath a material 
shell’ (Marx, 1976a: fn167). Even more, the reproduction of capitalist wealth 
is founded on an antagonistic relationship between labour and capital. Its 
antagonistic character lies in the separation of the labouring masses from 
the means of production and the conversion of labour into a commodified 
factor of production for the creation of privately appropriated wealth. Indeed, 
as Marx’s analysis conveys, the profit realised in the market has its origins 
in the ‘hidden abode of production’ where the exploitation of labour takes 
place (Marx 1976a: 279). This process is depicted in his formula of the 
circuit of capital: M-C<LPMp...P...C'-M'. Within this scheme, an initial sum of 
money (M) is invested for the purchase of the commodities (C) necessary 
for kick-starting the production process (P), namely means of production 
(Mp), including machinery and raw material, and labour power (lp). After 
production is completed, the newly produced commodity (C’) now yields a 
higher value (M’) than the money initially supplied for its manufacture.6 
According to Marx the surplus value that appears at the end of the process 
consists in the appropriation of the unpaid labour time that  workers dedicate 
to production beyond the labour time that corresponds to the value of their 
labour power (i.e. their wage). Consequently, the surplus labour obtained 
by capital ‘free of charge’ is the point of supply of profit and the foundation 
of capital’s continual valorisation (Marx 1976a: 672, 1973: 365). 
                                                          




Surplus labour extraction and the resistance to it constitutes the antagonistic 
basis upon which capitalist class society rests (De Ste. Croix 1981: 44). 
While the conditions of production render capital’s profitability and workers’ 
reproduction depended on the exploitation of the latter’s labour-power, at 
the same time capital secularly tends to expel labour from the process of 
valorisation (Postone 2015: 20). As capital attempts to compress the part of 
the working day pertaining to necessary labour time and increase surplus 
labour time through increases in productivity, it simultaneously renders 
superfluous a great share of the working population since less labour 
expenditure is required to produce an increased sum of material wealth 
(Marx 1976a: 798). Social antagonism in capitalist society takes the form of 
labour’s daily struggle for subsistence and capital’s strive to diminish its 
dependence upon human labour. Value, or capitalist wealth, constitutes the 
terrain in and through which this struggle is fought out. 
The state is not extrinsic to the class struggle but is itself a form of the 
antagonistic social relations that sustain capitalist society (Holloway and 
Picciotto 1991: 58). In short, if ‘the purpose of capital is to accumulate 
extracted surplus value’ then ‘the state is the political form of that purpose’ 
(Bonefeld 2014: 168). The state reproduces the conditions for labour’s 
exploitation by establishing the legal framework that constitutionalises 
capitalist property relations and guarantees the individuals’ right to engage 
in the contractual exchange of their commodities (including their labour 
power). By extension, it guarantees the employability/exploitability of labour 
and strengthens its reproduction’s dependence on the market. The state 
does not reproduce capitalist relations by taking a position within the class 
struggle as it were, but by governing neutrally citizens’ formal equality as 
market actors and freedom as property owners (Gerstenberger 1977; 
Heinrich 2012: 203-204). In essence, the state preserves capitalist class 
relations while concurrently appearing to pursue the general interest (i.e. 
capitalist wealth) by governing under the impartial confines of the rule of law. 




‘the only common welfare possible under capitalist social relations’ on which 
wage-labour and capital alike depend (Heinrich 2012: 213). 
The OM understanding of the state stands in opposition to much debates in 
IPE that view the global economy as an arena of power competition 
between states and markets in which each sphere tries to impose its 
authority over the other. 7  Mainstream IPE accounts are criticised for 
conceptualising the state and the market as institutions that are related in a 
purely external way with states having to conform and adapt their policy 
ambitions to the changing exigencies of globalised markets (Burnham 1999). 
Instead, Open Marxists argue that states and markets are not opposed 
entities but instead organically tied institutions that represent different facets 
of capitalist relations of production (Burnham 1994: 227; 2001: 104).  
Open Marxists are equally opposed to Neo-Gramscian accounts of the 
state’s role in the global economy which while avoiding a strict ‘states versus 
markets’ dichotomy, emphasise the role of hegemonic ideational factors or 
dominant fractions within the capitalist class in determining economic 
statecraft (see van der Pijl 1989; Gill 2003; Robinson 2004; for a critique 
see Burnham 1991, 2006; Bonefeld 2006a). Instead of a conceptualisation 
of the state as a structure susceptible to the influence of prevailing 
ideologies or dominant economic elites, Open Marxists argue that state 
policy is determined by the pragmatic necessity to reproduce favourable 
conditions for capital accumulation and as such ‘the interests of capital-in-
general’ (Burnham 1991: 84). States reproduce the conditions for the 
effective accumulation of capitalist wealth within their territory because their 
own material reproduction depends on it (e.g. profitable accumulation 
translates into higher state revenues or higher debt sustainability) (Heinrich 
2012: 212; Clarke 1991: 173; Burnham 1995: 105).  
Nation-states thus constitute the political facet of capital valorisation. The 
autonomised force of value imprints itself upon the state as a necessity to 
                                                          
7 For an overview of the debates on the relationships between states and markets within 




guarantee its territory’s competitive presence within the international market. 
Indeed, states are interlocked in a competitive interstate system in which 
territorially fixed units compete to capture globally mobile capital and 'retain 
within their territory a share of global surplus value produced' (Holloway 
1995: 127). Domestic conditions of exploitation are constantly compared to 
those of competing states through exchange in the world market and as a 
result states must ensure that the surplus value yielded domestically 
matches or supersedes that of their competitors (Holloway 1996: 127; 
Bonefeld 2006: 51). It is in this sense that Burnham argues that states are 
ultimately ‘nodes’ or ‘moments in the global flow of capital’ (2001: 107) since 
national policies, in their pursuit of economic growth, inadvertently preserve 
the global reach of capitalist relations. 
Hence, as opposed to inimical social spheres the state and the market are 
in fact different instants in the continuum of capitalist surplus extraction and 
the accumulation of value. States do not struggle against markets, but 
against the unproductiveness of labour; their burden consists in 
competitively inserting domestic labour within the global race for surplus 
value. Even further, the state and the market are not tangible artefacts or 
object-like institutions capable of independent existence, rather, they figure 
as historically specific mediations of a social relation of an antagonistic kind. 
To speak with Marx, they are mere abstractions, ‘nothing more than the 
theoretical expression of those material relations which are their lord and 
master’ (Marx 1973: 164). Conversely, the same social relations can only 
exist through the form of the state, the market etc. (Clarke 1978: 42; 
Burnham 2001: 105). Entrapped as they are in the historically specific 
imperative to accumulate capitalist wealth, both market participants and 
state actors unknowingly reproduce through their own actions the conditions 
for the global exploitation of labour. 
It follows that contrary to pre-capitalist societies the peculiar and alienating 
nature of capitalist social relations makes it that power is not directly 




instead operates in an indirect manner through the seemingly exogenous 
imperative to accumulate surplus value. Postone (1993) makes this case 
explicitly as he argues that capitalist society is better understood as ruled 
by an abstract form of domination whereby bourgeois subjects are indirectly 
compelled to labour productively given their own reproduction’s 
dependence on the creation of capitalist wealth.   
Indeed, while the exploited subject of pre-capitalist formations, be it the serf 
or the slave, was inescapably tied to a particular master or lord by means 
of ‘personal dependence’ (Marx 1973: 163; Holloway 1995: 139-140), the 
worker of the capitalist era is freed from this attachment. Having been 
deprived of the means of production, the worker in capitalist society 
acquires a double freedom: firstly, a formal freedom to present his/her 
labour power on the labour market and dispose of it as he/she pleases by 
agreeing to a selling contract with a potential employer, and secondly, a 
‘freedom’ from the means of subsistence as labour power becomes the 
worker’s only property and whose exchange is a necessary precondition for 
his/her physical reproduction (Marx 1976a: 71-72). On the other hand, 
neither is capital tied to a particular labour force, as the source of wealth 
now resides in the homogenised ability of labour to generate value. 
Nevertheless, the capitalist is also constrained in his/her options as the 
expansion of his/her capital by means of increased exploitation is the sole 
way to avoid expulsion from market competition (Bonefeld 2014: 155).  Both 
capitalists and workers are subject to the same ‘human self-estrangement’ 
(Marx and Engels 1975: 36) as they are both entangled in the socially 
constituted necessity to accumulate capitalist wealth. As explained by Son-
Rethel (1978: 25), in capitalism, ‘social power has lost [its] personal 
character and in its place is an anonymous necessity which forces itself 
upon every individual commodity owner.’ The international political 
economy is dominated nor by markets nor by states, but by the invisible, 




As it will be shown in the next two sections, the foregoing abstract 
presentation of the compelling and impersonal force of value that capitalist 
social relations give rise to is key to understanding both capital’s tendency 
towards overaccumulation crises (of whom deindustrialisation is a concrete 
manifestation) and the inclination of the state to formulate counteracting 
strategies in order to restore conditions for profitable accumulation (such as 
the strategy of selective disengagement/devaluation). 
OVERACCUMULATION, DEVALUATION AND DEINDUSTRIALISATION 
As mentioned earlier the measure of value is labour time. However, it is not 
the labour time directly expended on a commodity that constitutes the 
source of value but rather the established socially necessary labour time 
which is determined by the average productivity levels required to produce 
a given commodity at any stage of the development of productive forces 
(Marx 1976a: 129, 202). Competing capitals strive to match or supersede 
average productivity levels as ‘socially necessary labour time… asserts 
itself as a regulative law of nature’ (Marx 1976a: 168). Bonefeld (1999: 20) 
succinctly explains this process:  
The determination, then, of value through socially necessary labour-
time is decisive. Those capitalists who exploit ‘their’ labour-force 
less effectively than others will gain a rate of profit lower than the 
average. Thus competition…distributes the value to the individual 
capitalists according to their effectiveness in exploiting labour within 
the limits of socially necessary labour-time on a global scale. 
Thus, the market acts as neutral judge and ultimate arbitrator of the 
production process (Pitts 2018: 49), as higher-than-average productivity 
capitals are rewarded with higher profits (i.e. surplus profits) while those 
producing below the social average are penalised with lower returns.  
For individual capitals the compulsion to accumulate value concretises in 
world market competition (Marx 1976a: 205). Indeed, the competitive 




external compulsion to realise their inherent vocation to valorise themselves 
(Marx 1973: 651, 1976a: 739). The race for profits within a context of limited 
market shares forces individual capitals to constantly enhance their 
competitive potential ‘as a means of self-preservation and under penalty of 
ruin’ (Marx 1981: 353). Competitive pressures act as a constant incentive 
for individual capitals to increase their productivity by accentuating the 
exploitation of labour, increase the surplus labour contained in their 
commodities and ultimately the profits realised in exchange. Competition 
thus ceaselessly stimulates the deployment of an array of cost reduction 
strategies, technological innovations and rationalisation measures by firms 
that endeavour to secure their share of global surplus value by reducing the 
necessary labour time devoted to the production of commodities (Lohoff and 
Trenkle 2014: 34).  
At the same time, the compulsion exercised on individual firms by 
competition is revealing of capitalism’s latent economic instability. As put by 
Bologna (1993: 39): ‘it is the selfsame increase in labour productivity in 
order to offset the rigidity of necessary labour, which results in the "crisis of 
overproduction"’. More precisely, the uneven development between and 
within branches of production, that is the co-existence of advanced and 
backwards firms, constitutes a fundamental condition for the development 
of crises (Clarke 1989: 144). Indeed, the existence of pockets of surplus 
profit across and within sectors, encourages the adoption of innovative 
methods of production by all competing capitals as the productivity 
increases of advanced capitals manifest themselves as an overflow of 
commodities in the market that threaten to appropriate a greater share of 
available profits. Given that the inundation of the market by an amassed 
sum of commodities decreases their market price, only those capitals that 
bring production costs below the newly established market price are able to 
remain on a profitable course and secure a share of surplus value large 
enough to reproduce themselves. Therefore, capitalist competition calls for 




additional wave of extra commodities in the market. At the heart of capitalist 
development thus lies the tendency of accumulation to grow independently 
of the confines of the market (Marx 1968: 535; Clarke 1990: 454; Heinrich 
2013: 26). In other words, there is a fundamental disjunction between the 
development of productive capacities at the supply side and the absorptive 
capacity of the market on the demand side. The recurrent imbalances in 
supply and demand rest on the ‘discrepancy between material and value 
production’ and capital’s exclusive concern with accumulation of surplus 
value as opposed to merely meeting consumers’ demand for material goods 
(Mattick 1969: 69).  
As a result, overaccumulation crises can often manifest themselves as an 
overabundance of commodities in different industrial sectors. 
Fundamentally however, a crisis of overaccumulation reveals that too much 
capital has been globally invested in relation to the mass of surplus value 
that could be realised for the totality of capital to remain profitable. At last, 
the limitless need to realise surplus value in exchange encounters the finite 
nature of the market while the imperative to increase profitability is limited 
by still insufficient levels of exploitation reached by capital (Marx 1981: 364).  
In essence, overaccumulation denotes the contradictory and antagonistic 
character of capitalist social relations (Clarke 1990: 457; Pitts 2018: 133).  
It is in fact the clash between capital’s incessant necessity to intensify the 
exploitation of labour and the ‘antagonistic conditions of distribution’ in 
which the labouring class is bound to consume less than it produces in value 
terms, that constitutes the source of capitalism’s tendency towards 
overproduction (Marx 1981: 352). While capital’s profitability depends on 
the realisation of its products’ value in the market, the very existence of 
exploitation makes it so that the actual value of workers’ wages prevents 
the constitution of a market large enough to realise the potential value 





On the other side of the coin of overaccumulation thus, lies devaluation. 
Given the existence of a plethora of capital, the liquidation of excess capital 
becomes necessary to bring back the volume of capital invested in 
production to a level compatible with an increasing global rate of profit.  The 
threat of devaluation that hangs over the superfluous capitals initially takes 
the form of ‘sale at ruinous prices’ (Mattick 1934: 13) as inefficient capitals 
producing above the socially necessary labour time cannot profitably sell 
their products at current market prices. There next ensues a process of 
devaluation of excess capital and labour, that leads to the inactivity and 
idleness of the means of production and workforces that cease ‘to function 
and operate as capital’, that is as means to the further accumulation of profit 
(Marx 1981: 362).  
In the 1970s, once the course of the post-war boom came to a halt, the 
global economy witnessed such a typical crisis of overaccumulation (Clarke 
2001: 86; Kettell 2006: 35; Lohoff and Trenkle 2014: 59). Overproduction in 
the market for certain industrial goods (e.g. coal, leather, shipbuilding, 
machine tools) was a result of both the growing competition among 
advanced capitalist states, such as the USA, European economies and 
Japan, as well as the growth of exports from newly industrialised economies 
in manufactured goods (Williams 2015: Ch.5). In fact, all three sectors 
examined in this thesis experienced an excess of productive capacities at a 
global level by the 1970s. The development of productivity in Western textile, 
steel and car industries in addition to the rise of South-East Asian textile 
producers or Japanese car and steel exports resulted in a global market glut 
whereby too many competitors were coping to make profits in sluggish 
markets. Devaluation took the form of the destitution of industry-depended 
regions, the bankruptcy of industrial groups, the shutdown of factories, the 
dismantlement of obsolete and ageing equipment alongside a growing mass 




concrete form taken by the devaluation process brought about by the in-
built propensity of capital to overaccumulate.8  
However, as explained in the previous chapter deindustrialisation is not only 
a ‘negative’ process leading to the dismantlement of a country’s industrial 
infrastructure. In fact, it also contains a ‘positive’ moment whereby the loss 
of various industrial facilities is accompanied by the increasing productivity 
of others. Overaccumulation crises, are in Grossman’s (1992: 99) words a 
‘healing process’ or a necessary instance of ’purification’ as the capital 
surviving the wave of liquidation now operates profitably at a lower level of 
socially necessary labour time. Indeed, the crisis-ridden motion of capital 
accumulation  
lead[s] to explosions, crises, in which momentary suspension of all 
labour and annihilation of a great part of the capital violently lead it 
back to the point where it is enabled to go on fully employing its 
productive powers without committing suicide (Marx 1973: 750). 
Capital devaluation and its concrete expression as deindustrialisation while 
entailing the elimination of a portion of existing productive forces, also beget 
the overall enhancement of capital’s productive power. The contraction of 
certain industrial capacities thus stems not from their failure to produce large 
quantities of material wealth but from their incapacity to be productive in 
value-terms and match the globally established necessary labour time. 
Industrial production ‘that is not completed within time is wasted, valueless, 
regardless of the usefulness of the material wealth that it has created’ and 
is exposed to the threat of liquidation (Bonefeld 2010: 269). 
                                                          
8 Within the Open Marxist literature, it has often been stressed that since the 1970s large 
segments of capital have found refuge from the industrial sector’s unprofitable conditions 
of accumulation and the spectre of devaluation into the world’s financial markets (Bonefeld 
and Holloway 1996a: 1; 1996b: 213). While this is of course one of the routes taken by ‘idle’ 
or ‘unemployed’ capital (Marx 1981: 572), the thesis’ focus lies on the form and 





To cope with the threat of liquidation, individual capitals have recourse to 
various rationalisation (e.g. wage cuts) or modernisation (e.g. introduction 
of labour saving technologies) measures, the spatial reallocation of their 
industrial units or they altogether migrate in new high-rewarding spheres of 
production. Deindustrialisation manifests capital’s disinvestment from 
regions and obsolete production units that cannot be profitably integrated 
into its valorisation cycle. Production is thus restructured across sectoral as 
well as intraregional lines (Dunford 1979; Massey 1984). These processes 
can find different sectors and regions industrially strengthened and others 
severely weakened. For instance, as chapter 6 demonstrates, the 
automobile industry witnessed the substantial retreat of its productive 
activities from the Paris area to the benefit of more modern industrial units 
in provincial areas. As Komninos (1989: 352) explains the restructuring of 
industrial production that follows overaccumulation crises consists of a 
complex process involving simultaneously ‘de-industrialisation, re-
industrialisation, high-tech clustering and decentralisation’.  
At the risk of caricature, this process is, in its simplest form, exemplified by 
the eminent decline of Rust Belt’s traditional industries in the USA and the 
contemporary concertation of the country’s most important industrial 
resources in the high-technology sunrise belt. The liquidation process can 
also occur through the elimination of specific activities or units operating 
within a given sector. To return to the aforementioned example, the US steel 
industry, long considered as a declining, sunset, activity, has increased its 
productivity from 10.1 hours per ton of steel in 1980 to 1.5 hours in 2018 
(AP News: 2018). The decline of US steel has thus concerned plants and 
units of production that failed to raise their productivity levels. 
Deindustrialisation is a phenomenon that occurs both within sectors (e.g. 
elimination of specific steel units) and across sectors through the weakening 
of whole sectors (e.g. iron mining in the UK). 
To sum up, deindustrialisation consists of a process of devaluation of capital 




the material infrastructure, geographical localities and workforces that 
cannot serve the profitable operation of their business. It follows that 
deindustrialisation is a double-sided phenomenon that contradictorily 
involves both the erosion of certain industrial capacities as well as the 
modernisation of others that are able to operate profitably at higher 
productivity levels. The next section demonstrates how this fundamental 
contradiction manifests itself in the political form of the state and is 
concretely translated in (industrial) policy terms.  
INDUSTRIAL STATECRAFT AND SELECTIVE DISENGAGEMENT 
If as mentioned earlier the state is the political form of capital valorisation, 
then it follows that it also constitutes the political form of its crisis. Indeed, 
the state experiences capitalist crises in various state-specific forms such 
as ‘pressures on the exchange rate, the accumulation of balance of 
payments deficits and drains on national reserves’ (Bonefeld 2000: 38). 
Firms’ loss of market shares and the ‘sale at ruinous prices’ experienced by 
unproductive capitals in situations of overproduction is for instance endured 
by the state in the form of growing trade deficits. Furthermore, the balance 
of trade is affected differently depending on the specific industries mostly hit 
by overproduction and their relative importance in the economic life of the 
country. It is no surprise then that, as Chapter 6 shows, the French state 
desperately attempted to finance Peugeot’s modernisation, against the 
volition of the firm’s ownership who wished to reduce its industrial activity, 
given the tremendous importance of car exports for France’s balance of 
trade. Thus, rather than overaccumulation being merely resolved by the 
‘competitive struggle’ among individual capitals (Marx 1981: 362), its 
unfolding is in fact mediated and managed by the state.  
In effect, the state is not blessed with the luxury of passively observing the 
unfolding of devaluation from a safe position since its own reproduction 
depends on the latter’s outcome. Put crudely, ‘when capitalists go bankrupt 
so too does the state’ (Grollios 2017: 254). It is in the state’s interest to 




time and thereby strengthen the exporting capacity of the country and 
improve its trade balance vis-à-vis its international competitors. It must 
struggle to ensure that the devaluation process will hinder as little as 
possible its world market performance and thereby be directed towards the 
commercially least critical industrial spheres. Indeed, the state might direct 
policy and financial efforts at promoting industries which play a critical role 
in improving the country’s balance of payments while authorising the decline 
of less efficient ones (Dunford, Geddes and Perrons 1981: 400; Hudson 
1986a; Martin 1986:284-285). In short, against the threat of calamitous 
devaluation, states strive to ensure that the deindustrialisation process will 
be of a ‘positive’ kind and that falling manufacturing employment, factory 
closures etc. will be in fact translated into higher productivity gains. 
In times of overaccumulation the state can play a crucial role in the 
redistribution surplus value among competing capitals by for example 
discriminately allocating subsidies or low interest loans to selected industrial 
firms in order to reproduce the overall smooth resumption of accumulation 
at the national level (Holloway and Piccioto 1991: 122-123). States are 
increasingly called to adjust policy-making to the benefit of firms that can 
spearhead the effort to produce at a lower necessary labour time and 
thereby enhance the value-producing capacity of the economy. It is in this 
sense that this thesis argues that deindustrialisation consists of a 
political/statecraft practice. It is defined as a state-sponsored strategy of 
selective disengagement from certain manufacturing activities, across and 
within sectors, intending to remedy a crisis of overproduction by rationalising 
the country’s industrial apparatus and rendering it apt to confront 
international competition. 
In addition to securing its strictly speaking economic reproduction, the state 
must also endeavour to insure its political survival. In other words, when 
formulating industrial strategies state managers not only have to consider 
industry’s competitiveness in the world market but also the domestic 




are enmeshed can be conceptualised in terms of the accumulation and 
legitimation imperatives that weigh upon contemporary capitalist states 
(Offe 1975; Rogers 2013). More precisely, policy-makers must safeguard 
the undisturbed reproduction of the domestic economy and its successful 
insertion within the global market while simultaneously securing political 
backing and minimising contestation at the domestic level (Elger and 
Burnham 2001: 250; Kettell 2004: 24; Rogers 2013: 6). Still, the wedding of 
these objectives is a conflicting process which presents itself as a policy 
quandary for state managers as achieving a dynamic presence in 
international markets might necessitate the implementation of popularly 
abhorred policies (Rogers 2009: 973). As a result, economic policy in 
general, and industrial policy in particular, constantly navigates between two 
governing objectives, namely adapting domestic economic structures to the 
conditions of global competition and averting a major political crisis directed 
at the governing elites. As put even more pragmatically by Bulpitt (1986: 21-
22), the mission of elected state officials is to recapture electoral success 
and achieve ‘some necessary degree of governing competence’. Industrial 
policy becomes a conflictual process which requires of state managers to 
both reproduce domestic social compromises as well as maintain domestic 
industry’s competitive international performance. 
In the case of deindustrialisation and selective disengagement, this 
governing impasse acquires a particular form. On the one hand, devaluation 
is necessary step towards the (temporary) ‘resolution’ of the crisis (Marx 
1981: 362) and the resumption of economic growth and on the other a 
socially and regionally painful process. Consequently, governments 
contrive policy tools and discursive strategies that demonstrate the 
necessity of selective devaluation and legitimate the hardship that 
accompanies it. This process is further complicated by the fact that industrial 
policy is by its nature selective and directed at the promotion of deliberately 
chosen sectors and firms (Chang 1994: 61; Landesmann 1992; Pack and 




every [industrial] policy choice you make, however “general” the policy may 
look, has discriminatory effects that amount to targeting’. Inversely then, 
industrial policy is not solely confined to ‘picking winners’ but also to 
‘designating losers’. Even so-called horizontal industrial policies, that is 
policies that are not targeted to specific sectors or firms but more generally 
establish a framework that facilitate the competitiveness of all participants 
firms, entail a selective bias as different firms and sectors respond 
asymmetrically to similar policy environments (Rodrik 2008: 6).  
State involvement in the process industrial conversion necessarily draws 
contestation over the allocation of resources back on to itself (Evans 1995: 
6). The way out of the dilemma with which policy-makers are faced over the 
allocation of policy resources (Offe 1975: 128-129) in order to promote 
certain sectors and encourage disinvestment in others necessarily entails a 
process of 'hierarchisation of sectoral policies' (Jobert and Muller 1987: 222) 
which ultimately deeply implicates statecraft in the strengthening or 
weakening of certain sectors. Selective disengagement as a statecraft 
strategy reflects the double-sided aspect of capital devaluation as it 
simultaneously involves the pursuit of a stronger, more productive 
manufacturing sector and the management or endorsement of industrial 
decline in certain areas. Ultimately, the dilemmas inherent in industrial 
policy-making over the distribution of resources stem directly from capitalist 
form of wealth. Policies and resources must be mobilised to favour activities 
that generate value and avoid the spread of unproductive activities. After all, 
the perpetual preservation of lame duck industries worsens the country’s 
commercial position and incurs a considerable drain on state revenues 
without setting the basis for the future resumption of accumulation (Offe 
1984: 124). 
However, as previously mentioned, the state reproduces capitalist relations 
by way of the neutrality of its rule vis-à-vis commodity owners. In fact, the 
state derives its legitimacy ‘by appealing to symbols and sources of support 




rather than succumbing to the pressures and influence of society’s 
conflicting and fragmented interests, the state struggles to assert the 
primacy of the nation’s general interest (i.e. the production of capitalist 
wealth) and subdue the particularised interests that impede its pursuit (Marx 
and Engels 1976a: 41). The discriminatory character of industrial policy and 
selective disengagement  threatens the neutrality of the state as the crisis 
of accumulation increasingly calls for the application of policies involving a 
certain degree of ‘arbitrariness and imbalance in the way that the state 
ensures the reproduction of capital’ (Holloway and Picciotto 1991: 123; see 
also Burnham 2011b). As a result of its deepened involvement in economic 
affairs, the state can fall subject to intense pressures from social groups (e.g. 
trade unions, professional associations) that seek to further their material 
interests and benefit from certain economic/industrial measures. The state 
is thus faced with the challenge of shielding itself from the influence of 
‘politicised social interests’ (Bonefeld 2017: 60) while maintaining the overall 
conditions for the uninterrupted creation of value at the national level. 
Deindustrialisation is, thus, not only a market phenomenon. It fundamentally 
entails a delicate political process of selective disengagement according to 
which the state’s efforts to maintain its competitiveness in the world market 
significantly impact the distribution of lossess and gains among domestically 
operating industries. The state’s struggle is to manage the tension of 
enacting discriminatory industrial policies while upholding its legitimacy. In 
other words, the state is faced with the task of gearing policy to the benefit 
of targetted competitive sectors and at the expense of lame duck ones all 
while appearing to reconciliate the diverging interests of domestic social 
actors. 
THE DEPOLITICISATION OF SELECTIVE DISENGAGEMENT 
One way for state managers to faciliate the implementation of discriminatory 
or socially sensitive but economically vital industrial choices is by 
depoliticising industrial policy, that is by relegating the latter’s political 




Depoliticisation, as a governmental strategy (Wood and Flinders 2014) is 
the concrete expression of the state’s struggle to maintain a capitalist order 
and gain governing autonomy from ‘politicised’ groups. Outsourcing the 
responsibility for the formulation of certain industrial policies to extra-
governmental spheres, allows to ‘reduce the culpability of state officials’ 
(Kettell, 2008: 631) over certain harsh social conditions that might 
accompany them such as, in our case, growing unemployment, subsidy 
reduction and regional dislocations. Depoliticisation is thus pursued by state 
managers in order insulate themselves from domestic pressures (coming 
both from workers’ groups and disadvantaged firms) and safeguard their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate (Rogers 2009: 637; Sutton 2017: 
214; Copley 2017: 696). Depoliticising policy devises, rather than 
decreasing the authority of the state permit state manager to in fact gain 
newfound leeway to implement certain unpopular policy-preferences 
(Rogers 2013: 7; Burnham 2014: 195).  
There is an array of depoliticising strategies that policy-makers have at their 
disposal such as preference-shaping (i.e. invocation of discourses aiming 
to persuade the polity that certain issues lie beyond governmental control), 
rule-based (i.e. inscription of definite rules into the policy-making process 
such as inflation targets) and institutional (i.e. delegation of responsibilities 
to specialised non-elected bodies) (Flinders and Buller 2006). Such 
strategies can equally be exported to the international arena giving rise to 
what might be termed ‘transnational depoliticisation’ (Chalmers 2005: 649). 
This a process allows the channelling of political powers over certain 
sensible issues to international organisations with weak democratic and 
public accountability (Majone 1999: 3; Mair 2005: 4; Hay 2007: 85). 
Empowering non-majoritarian institutions operating at a transnational level, 
such as the EC, with executive and legal powers can allow national 
governments to enhance the credibility of their policy-making commitments 
and the efficiency of their implementation while simultaneously shifting the 




consequences away from elected authorities (Tallberg 2004: 22-24).Indeed, 
membership in certain supranational organisations can legally constrain the 
industrial policy choices of member states. Such is the case of, for instance, 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) whose legal provisions are said to 
erode the industrial policy autonomy of states (Bora, et al. 2000: 557; Haque 
2007: 5). For example, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCMs) restrict the ability of governments to distribute subsidies 
that distort trade by offering unfair advantage to domestic producers over 
foreign exporters. In the case of the EU, its prohibitive rules on state aids 
that distort competition within the single market can also restrict certain 
industrial policy choices of member states (Clift and Woll 2013: 106). 
Articles 87-88 of the EC treaty give the Commission leverage to reject 
member states’ proposals for subsisdised assistance to domestic industry. 
Overall, the European Union’s rules formally prohibit the discriminatory and 
favoured treatment of specific domestic firms and sectors (Kassim and 
Menon 1996: 7).  
However, as mentioned above industrial policy is, to different degrees, 
always selective and contains discriminatory elements (Chang 1994, 2002). 
For instance, the Commission’s state aid rules do not prohibit aids destined 
to R&D which traditionally tend to benefit more modern and high-tech firms. 
In fact, the EU’s state aid rules primarily serve to divert ressources from 
declining industrial activities and prioritise the development of more efficient 
industries (Rumford 2000: 161). More generally, the external constraints 
that tie state managers’ hands (e.g. EU state aid rules) have allowed states 
to abandon industrially debilitating policies to the benefit of competitiveness-
inducing ones. 
In this way, by transferring certain policy-making responsibilities to 
supranational bodies states can enhance their efforts to maintain conditions 
for profitable accumulation. In fact, the obligations of member states 
towards supranational organisations can effectively be used as compelling 




preferences (Kallestrup 2002). Rather than a mere constrain on domestic 
policy-making capabilities, Europeal-level disciplinary mechanisms can 
serve as anchors for the pursuit of unpopular policy reforms domestically 
(Masi 1996; Buller 2000; Thatcher 2004). The EC’s ‘sector-neutral’ rules on 
subsidies distribution and fair competition allows member states to 
circumvent pressures for favourable treatment stemming from declining 
industries while offering legal justification for their incapacity to assist them. 
Transnational depoliticisation strategies seek to obscure the sources of 
industrial policy change all while limiting the possibilities for alternative 
forms of industrial management. 
The depoliticisation, and transnational depoliticisation, of certain features of 
decision-making can indeed be particularly tantalising for state managers in 
the area of industrial policy. Indeed, intense international competition and 
technological change gives rise to a peculiar political dilemma as high-
technology sectors and traditional industries benefit from different sets of 
policies. Governments are torn between adjusting policy-making or the 
allocation of public resources to the benefit of lame duck sectors and 
promoting the rise of high technology industries (Block 1987: 127; Gilpin 
1987: 99; Moraitis 2018: 47). This selective bias and the progressive 
substitution of lagging industrial activities by cutthroat ones is underpinned 
by the political contestation of workers and businesses within displaced 
sectors. More concretely, workers and firms operating in declining sectors 
are in quest of greater import protection and state aid distribution. On the 
other hand, expanding sectors might benefit from more horizontal measures 
such as increasing internationalisation and greater public funding in R&D. 
In other words, the state is increasingly called to manage the sectoral 
allocation of resources and the disengagement from certain industrial 
activities. The clash between the accumulation imperatives to replace 
obsolete industrial capacities by modern and labour-saving ones and the 
legitimation pressures to safeguard threatened jobs and activities are at the 




vein, governments can ground their preference for industrial measures that 
involve the retreat from certain sectoral activities in national or supranational 
economic rules for which they cannot be held directly accountable. In so 
doing, they attempt to insulate the process of industrial restructuring from 
excessive democratic deliberation. 
In particular, the 1980s witnessed the growing assertivenesss of the EC in 
the management of competition regulation and the control of state aids 
within the common market (Warlouzet 2018: Ch.5). Indeed, traditional 
sectos such as textiles, steel and shipbuilding were characterised by 
significant overcapacities and in need of sweeping rationalisation. At the 
same time, the intensification of global manufacturing competition 
overburdened states with demands for financial assistance and protection. 
Faced with increasing demands for subsidies Western European states 
were increasingly inclined to enhance the competencies of the European 
Commission in industrial matters in order to manage the crisis hitting their 
traditional manufacturing activities (Buch-Hansen and Wigger 2011: 78; 
Warlouzet 2018: 117). Frans Andriessen, European Commissioner for 
Competition (1981-1985), famous for his critique of state interventions that 
distorted the principles of competition, clearly expressed the rationale 
behind installing a stricter control of state aids: 
In our lethargic Europe…we should do much more to promote the 
creative restructuring and retooling of our industry. The Japanese 
challenge will remain unanswered if we would simply keep on 
subsidising dying industries with short term objectives in mind.’  
(Andriessen 1981: 8) 
In this view, the control of state aids exerted by the EC liberates the state 
from the temptation to aimlessly distribute handouts to obsolete industries 
in order to assuage social tensions or win political support. Equally, it allows 
the phasing out of such industries and the flourishing of more competitive 
ones that are better placed to confront international competition. Indeed, the 




the efforts of more competitive firms with longer term viability to expand their 
markets shares and enhance their productivity (European Commission 
1983: 114). It follows that the monitoring of state aids actually facilitated the 
selective disengagement strategies of countries like France. By limiting 
state support for ailing sectors, state aid control imposed a stricter market 
discipline on domestic industry that progressively permitted the national 
economies’ disengagement from unviable activities. Indeed, the process of 
transnational depoliticisation insulates industrial restructuring from domestic 
political pressures as it renders the state institutionally unable to meet civil 
society’s divergent sectoral interests through the use of protectionist 
measures or subsidised assistance. 9  As such it minimises the risk of 
compromising competitiveness objectives. 
Looking at French industrial policy through the prism of depoliticisation is of 
particular interest given the crucial role of held by the state in spurring post-
war industrial development through a dirigiste and politicised industrial 
policy (Zysman 1983; Hall 1986; Dormois 1999: 75; Clift 2003: 176). 
Nevertheless, the dirigiste management of social relations in the postwar 
era led to the adoption of policies towards industry that progressively 
undermined the competitiveness of the sector and placed it in a particularly 
vulnerable position once the crisis of the 1970s erupted (Chapter Three). As 
such state managers sought to gradually distance themselves from 
traditional interventionist methods (Levy 2008: 427) through, for instance 
the (transnational) depoliticisation of industrial policy. 
Indeed, industrial policy towards the sectors studied in this thesis witnessed 
a significant degree of depoliticisation. In textiles (Chapter Four), the EC’s 
legal provisions on state aids reinforced the Minister of the Economy’s 
advocacy for a strict and unassisted market-led adjustment of the sector to 
the conditions of global competition. In steel (Chapter Five), the 
responsibility for selective disengagement was voluntarily transferred by 
                                                          
9 The analysis of the European monitoring of industrial policy draws many of its in from 




both Giscard d’Estaing’s and Mitterrand’s governments to the European 
Commission which became responsible for enforcing a pan-European plan 
to cut-down steel production capacities across member states. In 
automobiles (Chapter Six), in 1984 industrial policy was subject to a rule-
based form of depoliticisation. Indeed, in 1984 the Socialist government 
recruited a technocratic committee charged with evaluating the productivity 
gains, and by consequence the employment losses, necessary for the 
preservation of the industry’s competitive presence in world markets. 
However, the management of deindustrialisation also acquired at times an 
overtly politicised character. With the explicit aim to strengthen electoral 
support both Barre’s and later Mauroy’s government through various 
systems of public subsidies, upgrading textiles into the ranks of high priority 
sector or implementing stricter import controls explicitly took political 
responsibility over the management of the sector’s crisis without however 
abandoning their overall rationalisation plans. In automobiles and steel, the 
depoliticisation of selective disengagement became a costly exercise as the 
demanning of plants was accompanied by the granting of expenensive 
compensation packages to laid off workers, such as the CGPS scheme for 
steelworkers and the FNE for autoworkers. Such palliative measures were 
frequently employed by French state managers in the 1980s. Indeed, the 
radical industrial restructuring policies pursued during that period were 
accompanied by massive welfare compensation such as generous early 
retirement schemes in order to placate resistance to downsizing (Levy 
2008). When the free operation of the markets alone fails to bring about the 
social order necessary to smoothly reproduce capitalist wealth, politicisation 
and the government’s assumption of certain palliative measures can be 
crucial in obtaining social peace without surrendering the overall aim for 
industrial reform. As such, the (transnational) depoliticisation of French 
industrial policy was thus not a frictionless process but came at the cost of 
increased state responsibilities in the realm of welfare distribution (Levy 




the tensions stemming from the divergence of sectional interests but in fact 
generates new tensions that might necessitate politicised forms of 
intervention in order to ensure the cohesion of the domestic social order 
(Burnham 2017: 365-366).   
The tensions inherent in policy-making might thus lead to the co-existence 
of depoliticised and politicised forms of economic management to effectively 
reproduce class relations (Burnham 2011a; Burnham 2014: 198). Overt 
government intervention in certain areas might allow for a better monitoring 
of (industrial) reforms by channelling workers’ and sectoral grievances into 
institutional forms that do not challenge its liberal mission. Ultimately both 
politicising and depoliticising governing strategies seek to avert the 
‘politicisation of social relations’ and the escalation of conflict by maintaining 
political power at one remove from civil society, whether firmly in the hands 
of elected officials or non-state actors (Burnham 2014; Bonefeld 2017; 
Dönmez and Zemandl 2018; Dönmez 2019). Depending on the balance of 
class forces and economic pressures that characterise different spheres of 
economic activity selective disengagement can be carried out through 
diverse strategies which involve to different degrees the politicisation and/or 
depoliticisation of industrial policy. 
By way of conclusion, our theoretical exploration of the links between capital 
accumulation and the state suggests that selective devaluation, that is the 
selective disengagement from chosen manufacturing activities, constitutes 
in times of crisis a necessary strategy for the resumption of profitable 
accumulation and for the state’s own reproduction in an internationally 
competitive system of exchange. The necessity of such a strategy indicates 
nor the form nor the degree of its success. Rather, it points out that 
devaluation occurs in and through the state and is inevitably mediated by it. 
Deindustrialisation is not a mere market phenomenon but also a political 
practice. Ultimately, its degree of success is conditioned by the evolution of 




in enhancing the exploitation of labour domestically to levels compatible with 
the average productivity of capital at an international level.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter first reviewed existing critical and Marxist-inspired approaches 
to contemporary global industrial transformations whose insights could be 
used to understand the deindustrialisation of advanced economies such as 
France.  It was argued that the RT conceptually reproduces an arbitrary 
opposition of the state and the economy as two distinct social spheres. As 
such its analysis of post-Fordist industrial developments fails to disseminate 
the underlying social praxis that reproduces capital accumulation and gives 
rise to certain industrial transformations on the empirical level. On the other 
hand, the NNIDL provides a deterministic conception of the formation of 
domestic industrial structures. Industrial policy is allegedly a priori moulded 
by the abstract motion of capital accumulation, which renders the NNIDL 
unable to account for the room for manoeuvre that states have in their efforts 
to competitively integrate their economies in the world market and shape 
national industrial trajectories. Finally, CC’s erroneous association of value 
and industrial production leads it to the conclusion that the current 
productive structures of advanced countries stem from the waning 
importance of material production as a source of wealth rather than as a 
realisation of capital’s necessity to restore profitability by constantly 
decreasing the socially necessary labour time spent on industrial production.  
As an alternative to these approaches this chapter has proposed an OM 
theoretical framework which accords epistemologicall priority to the social 
praxis that constitutes and reproduces capitalist society. It was argued that 
while the political and economic institutions of capitalist society are modes 
of existence of the antagonistic labour-capital relation, their day-to-day 
activities seem to be presided over by the dictates of immutable economic 
structures. Indeed, bourgeois subjects appear to be entrapped in the 
economic necessity to accumulate capitalist wealth (i.e. value). This socially 




capitals which in their race to realise value and capture higher profits 
generate a disjuncture between the growth of productive capacities on the 
supply side and the limited absorptive capacity of the market on the demand 
side. This overaccumulation of capital signals the limits to profitability and is 
followed by an expanded devaluation of uncompetitive industrial facilities 
that fail to withstand the intensification of competition. At the same time, the 
liquidation of uncompetitive capital constitutes a precondition for the 
resumption of profitable accumulation at higher productivity levels. Thus, 
deindustrialisation constitutes a concrete manifestation of capital’s 
immanent overaccumulation tendencies and their accompanying capital 
devaluations. It is ultimately a contradictory phenomenon that involves both 
the erosion of certain existing industrial capacities as well as the 
development and modernisation of others. 
It was furthermore argued that within the context of overaccumulation crises 
the state does not remain a passive observer but plays a central role in 
coordinating the devaluation process. In fact, the state engages in a strategy 
of selective disengagement from specific manufacturing activities both 
within and across sectors in order to concentrate the liquidation process 
towards the commercially least crucial sectors and ultimately enhance the 
country’s competitive position in the world market. By defining 
deindustrialisation as a strategy of selective disengagement it is possible to 
conceptually encompass both the double-sided nature of deindustrialisation, 
as modernisation and decline, as well as the pivotal role of the state in 
promoting industrial contraction and development across sectors and 
regions. 
Concurrently, the devaluation of capital is accompanied by a labour market 
and regional crisis which threaten the legitimacy of the government. In order 
to cope with domestic contestation and depending on the urgency of a 
sector’s rationalisation, government officials might be prone to depoliticise 
industrial policy by outsourcing the responsibilities for the socially painful 




own legitimacy. Equally, aspects of the management of deindustrialisation 
might also acquire a politicised character as state elites assume the political 
responsibility over the industrial development of a sector. Selective 
disengagement, as a statecraft strategy, thus reflects the double-sidedness 
of deindustrialisation, as it both promotes the modernisation of industry and 
manages the economic and social aspects of decline such as regional 
underdevelopment and unemployment. 
The task of thesis’ three case studies will be to expound the precise 
modalities through which the state formulated and implemented a strategy 
of selective disengagement in the textiles and clothing, steel and automobile 
industries in order to demonstrate that the state, juggling with both 
legitimation and accumulation imperatives, can orient the liquidation or 
development certain selected manufacturing activities and areas. Before 
however, the next chapter will outline the social and political conditions that 
underpinned France’s road to deindustrialisation by examining its postwar 
industrial development and the ways it led to the country’s competitively 
vulnerable position within the international industrial market once capital’s 






THE ROAD TO DEINDUSTRIALISATION: 




The previous chapter argued that deindustrialisation can effectively be 
conceptualised as a state-sponsored strategy of selective disengagement 
from designated manufacturing activities across and within sectors 
deployed to offset the global overaccumulation tendencies of capital. Before 
examining how this strategy was implemented in practice within the different 
industries investigated in this thesis, this chapter charts the historical 
background to the industrial crisis that hit France in 1974. It argues that its 
seeds were firmly planted in the country’s post-war pattern of accumulation. 
In other words, this chapter analyses the development of the competitive 
weaknesses of French post-war capitalism that ultimately rendered 
necessary a drastic strategy of selective devaluation from 1974 to 1984. 
France’s post-war development is examined as a steady march towards a 
major industrial crisis. Instead of focusing on the continuities and dynamism 
of French post-war growth (for such analyses see Carré et al. 1972; 
Fourastié 1979), this chapter stresses the tensions and crisis-ridden 
tendencies that underpinned the so-called Trentes Glorieuses. The core 
argument of this chapter is that the industrial crisis in which France found 
itself in the 1970s and 1980s can be traced back to the major tension that 
characterised its post-war growth between its backward industrial apparatus 
in need of modernisation and the difficulties in incorporating the dissenting 




an inflationary pattern of growth that constantly undermined the 
competitiveness of French manufactures in foreign markets.  
The first section of this chapter paints France’s postwar economic and 
political landscape and analyses how the tension between the 
modernisation needs of industry and the failure to institutionalise labour 
dissent gave birth to a conflictual form of industrial relations that 
exacerbated inflationary tendencies as price increases reflected both 
workers’ wildcat struggles for higher wages and firms’ search for profits. The 
second section argues that the French dirigiste state attempted to reconcile 
the tension between labour indiscipline and industrial modernisation by 
mobilising its interventionist apparatus and excluding labour representation 
from the policy-making process. The state endeavoured to remove the 
barriers to modernisation by smoothing the transfer of resources (i.e. labour, 
capital, credit) towards heavy industry. At the same time, it attempted to 
rectify the conflictual model of industrial relations by sporadically enacting 
price-stabilisation measures to regiment income formation. However, the 
revolt of May 1968 demonstrated the strains on the management of labour 
relations in the context of industrial modernisation and was followed by an 
increased institutionalisation of labour’s redistributive interests which further 
exacerbated inflation. Section three argues that state managers also sought 
to discipline domestic industry’s inflationary propensities by exposing it to 
the competitive pressures of the Common Market. While France’s industrial 
trade performance did grow impressively, most domestic industry failed to 
reach the competitiveness levels of other OECD countries. As the crises of 
the 1970s unfolded, France’s manufacturing sector became increasingly 
unable to correct its growing balance of trade deficit. France was entrapped 
between the higher competitiveness of OECD manufactures and the 
growing export potential of newly industrialising economies as the 
inflationary spillovers of labour management had rendered French 




While the post-war era witnessed a remarkable growth and restructuring of 
French industry, the latter was achieved by the redistribution of wealth to 
industry through inflation, currency devaluations and cheap credit. In other 
words, the post-war development of French industry rested on artificial 
means rather than the substantial enhancing of its competitiveness vis-à-
vis its advanced commercial partners which ultimately put it in a particularly 
vulnerable position once the global overaccumulation crisis erupted. The 
existence of a plethora of uncompetitive capitals paved the way towards a 
drastic strategy of selective disengagement in the face of the coming 
overproduction crisis while the newfound power of French labour after 1968 
foreshadowed the social complications that could follow such a strategy. 
THE CRISIS IN LABOUR-CAPITAL RELATIONS 
At the end of the war, France’s economy faced two fundamental challenges. 
On the one had the slow growth of the 1930s and the ravages of war left a 
backwards economy, substantially lagging behind those of other 
industrialised countries and on the other the key role of Communists in the 
Resistance and the concurrent Nazi collaboration of many industrialists 
during the occupation created the conditions for the emergence of a 
radicalised working class. As such, early after the Liberation, France’s 
economic development was marked by a fundamental tension between the 
substantial transfers of resources necessitated to modernise industry and 
the disruptive presence of a labour movement seeking to enhance its 
material conditions. This tension crystallised into a distorted system of 
industrial relations whereby worker’s militancy became the main means to 
wage growth while capital responded with price increases in order to re-
establish profitability. French post-war growth became thus inflationary 
since within the prevailing conditions of class struggle, inflation constituted 
the most effective way to secure the much-needed transfer of resources 
towards industry. 




In the aftermath of the Second World War, France was far from achieving 
Fourastié's prophecy of a Tertiary Age. With one third of the active 
population working in farming, France was still a predominantly agricultural 
country compared to its Western European counterparts. Despite France's 
perceived economic strength stemming from its status as a colonial power, 
the country was domestically marked by its economic and industrial 
backwardness. At the dawn of Liberation, its economic landscape was 
characterised by a low-productivity agricultural sector dominated, especially 
in the South and West, by poor farmers holding small sized lands, detached 
from the rest of the economy and often producing for subsistence (Zysman 
1977: 52; Postel-Vinay 1991: 84; Lynch 1997: 132; Maclean 2002: 91; 
Boinon 2011: 24). Indeed, throughout the 1930s and until the Liberation, the 
proportion of farm holdings under 10 hectares exceeded 50% of existing of 
total farm holdings (Carré, et al. 1972:  106; Lynch 1997: 132). Until, 1949 
around 5.5 million people worked in agriculture and constituted around 29% 
of France's total employed labour force (INSEE 1981: 26).  
France's industry too featured traits of a backwards sector with a particularly 
low pace of modernisation. Especially the 1930s were characterised by a 
general economic immobility as industry suffered from chronic 
underinvestment which negatively influenced its level of technical 
development. As Villa (1993: 165) observes, the low investment rate of the 
1930s increased the average age of capital equipment to almost 11 years 
from its average 8 year lifespan during the 1920s, while the rates of hourly 
labour and capital productivity growth were both negative throughout the 
decade at -0.4% and -1.4% accordingly. As a result, Sicsic and Wyplosz, 
(2002: 217) stress that the major challenge of France's post-war 
reconstruction was not so much recovery from war-induced damage, but 
the plethora of obsolete capital passed on by the stagnation of the 1930s. 
Felix Ponteil (1971), paints the picture in sociological terms and attributes 
the standstill of the French economy to the bourgeoisies' conservatism and 




profits through inflation and to safeguard their market shares in a 
protectionist environment, were disincentivised from expanding their 
horizons beyond the confines of the domestic market (Ponteil 1971:368-
372).  
Another illustrative aspect of France's industrial backwardness was the 
predominance of handicraft production and the notably low levels of 
concentration in its industrial structures. In 1936, 17% of industrial 
establishments were run by independent artisans that did not employ any 
personnel, while overall, around 40% of workers in the industrial sector were 
employed by firms employing fewer than 10 people (Carré et al. 109). In 
addition, the industrial sector was also supplied by a weak labour market 
with only 50% of the active population being waged and a great share of 
workers being involved in non-waged activities that ultimately limited their 
subsistence's dependence upon the selling of their labour-power (Whiteside 
and Salais 1998: 141). 
Furthermore, having gone through a process of deindustrialisation under 
the Vichy Regime as part of the wider Nazi strategy of economic resources 
(i.e. labour and capital) transfer from the occupied territory to Germany, the 
industrial potential of France was further weakened. During the last months 
of 1944, industrial output levels reached around 55% of their 1938 levels 
which in turn were 25% inferior to their 1929 levels (INSEE 1958: 69-70). 
Overall, the 1930s bequeathed to post-war France an economy in need of 
a generous transfer of productive resources from labour, farmers and 
handicraft towards heavy industry (Herberg 1981: 513-514) for the country 
to join the ranks of advanced industrial powers. After the Liberation in 1944, 
France's economic agenda featured not only the task of reconstruction but 
more importantly, the task of substantial modernisation (Adams 2014: 73). 
At the same time, the end of the war unleashed the prospects not only for 
economic modernisation but for a more inclusive political management of 




reinstatement of free trade union activity marked a break with the 
authoritarian rule of the Vichy era and its hostility towards labour unions.10 
In fact, the immediate post-Liberation period witnessed an impressive 
political shift in the balance of power between workers and employers that 
took an insurrectionary tone. Indeed, the 1944 general strike proclaimed by 
the country’s two major trade unions, the Confédération Général du Travail 
(CGT) and the Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens (CFTC) 
was accompanied by a violent purge that targeted members of the Vichy 
administration and the employers who collaborated with the occupier. At the 
firm level there was a spread in absenteeism and a high frequency of work 
stoppages, while various comités de gestion were set up by communist 
forces and trade unions to manage the production process in firms which 
capitalists had abandoned in order to escape the repercussions of the 
purge. All these events reinforced the image of the Liberation as a ‘social 
movement’ rather than a mere military episode (Pigenet 2014a).  
Concurrently, trade unions and leftist political forces experienced a 
broadening of their social base and popularity. In 1945, the more radical 
CGT witnessed an important hike in its membership managing to enlist 3.8 
million members and almost matched its 1937 membership rates when the 
socialist Popular Front was in government (Prost 1994). At the electoral 
level, the Communists of the Parti Communiste Francais (PCF) and the 
socialists of the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) 
                                                          
10 During the occupation economic and industrial relations were governed by a form of 
state-directed corporatism which discarded existing associations representing labour or 
employers' interests and replaced them by state-surveilled ones that operated in the name 
of the 'national interest'. Thus, the state set up the Comités d'Organisation as well as the 
Office Central de Répartition des Produits Industriels, which became the primary organs 
for the coordination of industrial production and distribution. Both figures from the big 
business elite and ministerial personnel were appointed in these institutions and in fact, the 
preponderance of business managers made it often difficult to distinguish between the old 
employers' associations and the new Committees (Kuisel 1981: 138). In addition, prevailing 
labour relations were replaced by the 1941 Labour Charter which forbid strike action and 
mandatorily ascribed members of different occupational categories (from workers to 
employers) into professional families each representing a specific sector of economic 
activity. The intended purpose of the new industrial relations system and the elimination of 
workers’ unions was to shift labour interests around their profession so as to eliminate 




together gathered close to 50% of total votes during the first post-war 
elections in October 1945, with the PCF reaching the first position absorbing 
26.2% of votes, or 5 million voters. 
With the political composition of France's social body being fundamentally 
altered, one could expect the emergence of an alternative, labour-inclusive, 
system of economic and industrial management. Rising social dissent, 
signalled that France’s successful modernisation dependent upon securing 
labour's productive cooperation and integration into the post-Liberation 
political system. Thus initially, both representatives of the CGT and the PCF 
accessed positions in the state apparatus and other institutional bodies. 
From the first legislative elections in 1945 until 1947, the communists, 
counting CGT representatives too, had secured more than five ministerial 
positions within the successive provisory post-Liberation governments 
including the key ministries of Industrial Production and Labour. More 
generally, through their participation in the Conseil National de la 
Resistance,11 trade unions as well as the PCF were able to influence the 
broad political and economic goals of post-liberation France. They moulded 
some of the most notable features of French post-war economic policy such 
as the setting up of the Planning Committee, Social Security and the 
nationalisations program. 
Similarly, trade union representatives occupied positions across various 
governmental bodies responsible for the country’s socioeconomic 
management. For instance, during the First Industirial Plan (the Monnet 
plan), the CGT and the CFTC together held 20% of positions within the 18 
Commissions de Modernisations (Mioche 1984: 213), the latter consisting 
of the Plan Committee's subgroups responsible for the exchange of 
information between technocratic experts, state officials, employers and 
unions at a sectoral level. Equally, trade unionists were present in the 
                                                          
11 The Conseil National de la Resistance was the organisation for the coordination of the 
resistance againstthe occupying forces. It was composed of representatives from various 
political currents and trade unions and in 1944 it formulated a policy program listing the 




tripartite (state-labour-consumers) administrative boards of nationalised 
industries, often holding a majority of the seats such as in the nationalised 
coal industry. In 1946, the IVth Republic’s constitution gave birth to the 
Conseil Economique et Social which debated law proposals between the 
representatives of all economic groups (from workers and farmers to 
employers and artisans) and ostensibly permitted a direct dialogue between 
labour and capital. There, trade unions were the largest group holding 27% 
of the Council’s 164 seats. In addition, the successive laws of the 22nd 
February 1945 and 16th of May 1946 institutionalised the role of labour 
representatives in the firm by making mandatory the presence of works 
councils, or Comités d'Entreprise (CE) in companies employing at least 50 
people.  
As it is argued below, these initial attempts to institutionalise the presence 
of labour within the post-war management of the economy failed to eliminate 
the fundamental tension between the modernisation needs of industry and 
the redistributive interests of a radicalised working class and soon met their 
limits. 
A CONFLICTUAL SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Labour’s increasing representation in the workplace and official institutional 
bodies failed to create the conditions for a stable system of industrial 
relations that could guarantee a long-lasting tripartite cooperation between 
trade unions, employers and the state. In the early post-Liberation era, trade 
union officials and the representatives of the parties of the left subordinated 
the pursuit of further reforms in labour relations to the objectives of 
economic modernisation (Pigenet 2014b; Kuisel 1981: 217; Steinhouse 
2001). La bataille de la production (i.e. the battle for production) became the 
watchword of the CGT and the PCF, while Maurice Thorez's (1945) 
contention that ‘production constitutes the highest form of class duty’ 
summed up the strategy of the radical left at the time: the restoration of 
France's productive capacity was prioritised over the improvement of the 




For instance, within the CE the CGT officially aligned itself with the 
employers’ pursuit of price increases without equivalent increases in wages 
(Le Crom 2003: 66). As a result, while in April 1947 hourly wages had more 
than quadrupled since 1938 and augmented by 120% since October 1944, 
rampant inflation undermined any wage gains that had been made since the 
liberation. During 1947, in Paris alone, purchasing power was still 40% 
weaker than in 1938 (INSEE 1958: 117-118). In the meanwhile, in 1947 the 
index of production had reached again its 1938 levels. Along with the 
strategy of moderating working class demands, the CGT and the PCF threw 
themselves in the battle of production by disciplining labour through the 
discouraging and stigmatisation of industrial action which was famously 
condemned as ‘the weapon of trusts’. As a result, in 1946 only 386,000 days 
were lost due to strike action compared to the yearly average of 1.6 million 
days from 1931-1935, prior to the unprecedented 1936 strike wave that 
followed the Popular front's electoral victory (INSEE 1952: 102).  
The unions' cooperation with management and their prioritisation of the 
production effort was also indispensable in achieving labour time increases. 
Thus, despite the reestablishment of the 1936 legislation on the 40-hour 
workweek, in early 1946 average weekly working hours were constantly 
higher than the 40-hour limit and in the manufacturing sector increased from 
43.6 hours a week in 1946 to 44.8 hours in 1947 and from 44 hours a week 
to 45 in the whole economy (INSEE 1958: 59). During the early post-
Liberation years the radical left was charged with the task of disciplining the 
workforce. The CGT constituted a ‘crucial link between labour and 
management’ (Holter 1982: 42) since it was ostensibly in a better position 
to exercise effective control on workers than the discredited employers' 
class (Le Crom 2003: 59). 
The social consensus based on the CGT's managerial role within the CE 
was quickly disrupted by the long-lasting strike wave that started in a wildcat 
fashion on the 25th of April of 1947 at the Renault-Billancourt car plant and 




steel, construction, education, transportation, merchant marine). After a 
failed attempt to halt the growing mobilisation of labour, the CGT and the 
PCF were promptly forced to condone the movement given the wide support 
that it received. Overall, 2.285 different strikes took place that year with 22 
million and half days being lost to industrial action, a record in France's 20th 
century history only topped by the 1936 strike wave (INSEE 1952: 102).  
Some violent strikes continued during the autumn-winter of 1948, such as 
the miners' 8-weeks-long strike or those in metallurgy and the aeronautical 
industry, that amounted to a total of 1,425 strikes and 13 million idle days. 
The insurrectionary character of both strike waves was matched by the 
state's authoritarian intervention and recourse to the armed forces to 
reinstate order. French labour’s upheaval turned into a political crisis which 
resulted in the expulsion of the communist Ministers from Rammadier's 
government. More importantly, the rupture of 1947-1948 marked the onset 
of a multifaceted crisis in French industrial relations which rendered 
obsolete the system of labour control based on labour’s increasing 
representation with the firm and the state.  
Three major and interlinked processes underpinned the crisis in French 
industrial relations. Firstly, the link between trade unions and their base of 
support was significantly weakened. Indeed, the trade unions' reluctance to 
advocate labour demands in times of inflation-led income degradation 
severed their ties with the working class. Only in 1948, the CGT lost 1.5 
million of its members (Dreyfus 1995: 238), while the unionisation rate in 
France was subject to a steady drop between 1949 and 1958 as it fell from 
40% to 20% and stabilised itself at around 20-25% until the late 1970s 
(Labbé 1995: 28). In addition, the relative dissociation between the working 
class and the unions greatly affected the patterns of labour mobilisation. 
Indeed, in contrast to other developed Western economies, industrial action 
took place quite independently of trade unions and often took the character 
of wildcat strikes with unions intervening to mediate workplace issues only 




Howell 2005; Parsons 2005: 155). Unions themselves lost the capacity to 
discipline their own basis and mediate their grievances through institutional 
channels (Jobert and Muller 1987: 200). Given its spontaneous and 
undisciplined character, the pattern of strike action in France thwarted 
prospects for a cooperative negotiation between labour representatives and 
capital. Instead, it contributed to the lack of ‘as in the Anglo-Saxon mode, 
an institutional and almost automatic relation between the strike and 
negotiation, between negotiation and agreement, between agreement and 
social peace’ (Adam and Reynaud quoted in Birnbaum 1988: 497). 
Ultimately, the relative autonomy of workers from trade unions also 
stimulated the radicalisation of the latter as they too begun to reject 
cooperation with capital or the state in order to gain the approval of their 
constituency (Hayward 1986: 61). 
Secondly, the fractures and discordance within the trade union movement 
itself further undermined the possibility for an effective labour-capital 
cooperation (Clift 2005a: 59). Indeed, French trade unionism was 
characteristically fragmented by diverging ideological and political positions 
(Delamotte 1982: 328; Hayward 1986: 58-59). Since 1919, the trade union 
scene was dominated mainly by the CGT and the CFTC, but the political 
crisis of 1947 was followed by a split in the CGT. A long-standing rivalry 
between the unitaires, which were politically aligned to the PCF, and the 
confédérés, who advocated a politically independent form of unionism, 
resulted in the creation of the CGT-Force Ouvriere (CGT-FO) in 1948 by the 
latter. At the same time, the Fédération de l'Education Nationale (FEN), until 
then a branch of the CGT representing the personnel of French national 
education, also parted ways with the CGT. At the time of the scission, the 
CGT-FO and the FEN stripped 340,000 and 150,000 of CGT’s members 
accordingly and reached 460,000 and 540,000 members in the mid-1970s 
(Labbe 1995: 76). 
Further divisions ensued in the trade union movement in 1964 when a 70% 




(Confederation Française Démocratique du Travail) while a minority centred 
around Joseph Sauty decided to reform the ‘old’ CFTC in 1965 and keep 
Christian social ethics as its main ideological point of reference, an 
endeavour which was joined by 25,000 members. Until the mid-1970s and 
with its membership fluctuating from 500,000 to 750,000, the CFDT 
remained the main antagonist of the CGT, which managed to take a hold of 
50% of unionised workers throughout the period (Labbé 1995). Scissions in 
the trade union movement rendered impossible the articulation of a single 
voice in employers-unions negotiation or of a unified strategy of labour 
mobilisation.12  
Finally, and as a result of the two previous processes, the channels of 
dialogue between labour and capital over income distribution broke down. 
It has often been pointed out that the lack of a growing, or even stable, 
unionised membership, the political rivalries among unions as well their 
insufficient economic and technical resources were at the source of the 
structural weaknesses that characterised the French labour movement 
within France’s post-war political setting (Herberg 1981: 513; Jobert and 
Muller 1987: 191, 200; Birnbaum 1988: 125; Howell, 2005;). If trade unions 
are charged with the task of incorporating the aspirations of the working 
class within the system of wage labour and the profitable reproduction of 
capital (Clarke 1988: 137-140), the noted frailty of French trade unionism 
betrayed its inability to embody working class demands within the 
framework of French post war capital's necessity for extensive 
modernisation. Trade unions failed to fill the role of the middleman between 
the workforce and employers as they did not assert effective control over 
the social body that they ostensibly represented. This in turn reinforced 
employers' view of unions as unreliable interlocutors (Parsons 2005: 33). 
                                                          
12 Only on rare occasions was the rivalry between the CGT and the CFDT interrupted such 
as in 1966 and 1970 when they agreed on a common program of action for improvements 
in employment security, lowering the retirement age. Their cooperation was progressively 
discontinued due to both diverging political stances with regards to the Programe Commun 
concluded between the PCF and the Socialist Party as well as tactical disagreements 




As an example, since 1948 the role of the CE was greatly undermined. By 
1962 the number of existing CEs was halved to 4,691, and their role was 
largely reserved to the management of the social affairs of the labour force, 
such as leisure time and catering, instead of being informed and consulted 
about crucial economic issues (Le Crom 2003: Ch.3). Consequently, France 
lacked the kind of institutional arrangement or negotiating process that 
would guarantee the adjustment of wages to productivity increases a la 
Fordism (Wall 1996: 116-117). Instead, the strike, rather than collective 
bargaining, constituted the primary mean through which workers were able 
to enhance their incomes (Kesselman 1980: 98; Herberg 1981: 513; Howell 
2005: 57-59; Parsons 2005: 34).13 
                                                          
13  The relation between wildcat strike action and wage concessions was in fact 
apprehended by the business elite early after the Liberation. Indeed, irregular wage growth 
due to strike actions was a constant threat to capital’s profitability according to the Conseil 
National du Patronat Francais (CNPF) itself, the employers’ national association, which 
between 1946 and 1947 repearedly urged its members to resist such pressures in order to 





Source: own calculations based on INSEE (1990) Annuaire Rétrospectif de la France: 1948-1988 
The dependence of wage growth on workers’ militancy explains the 
irregularity of the former over the years (Figure 1). One can notice the yearly 
discrepancies in wage increases especially during the IVth Republic (1946-
1958): while on average the hourly remuneration of industrial workers 
increased by 11.5% yearly from 1949 to 1956, in reality its yearly increase 
featured many divergences from year to year with, for example, hourly 
wages rising by 27.8% in 1951, 2.3% in 1953 and 7.7% in 1955. During the 
Vth Republic these discrepancies were diminished, but again the average 





























































































































Figure 1: Yearly rate of growth of hourly remuneration and purchasing power 




some irregularities from year to year such as the 5.7% increase in 1967 and 
the 12% increase in 1968.  
On the other hand, the lack of an automatic procedure securing a stably 
growing income share for workers permitted employers to undermine wage 
growth through price hikes. Indeed, as noted by the OECD's 1963 survey of 
the country, the employers' transfer of increasing costs onto consumers to 
shield profitability was a major contributory factor in France's persistent 
inflation (OECD 1963: 35). Thus, nominal wage increases were not always 
followed up by increases in purchasing power (Figure 1). For instance, while 
between 1949 and 1953 wages augmented on average by 14%, purchasing 
power augmented only by an average 3.6%. The unstable evolution of 
purchasing power, which increased on average by 5.6% between 1953 and 
1957, 2.5% between 1957 and 1967 (it was even null and even negative 
between 1957 and 1959) and 5% between 1967 and 1972 accordingly, 
confirms the lack of a social compromise that would automatically distribute 
the gains of modernisation among social actors. Indeed, the irregular 
developments in wage growth contrasted with the systematic and consistent 
intensification of work and productivity. In 1957, the average weekly 
duration of work had risen to 46 hours and stabilised itself at around 45 
hours until the 1970s, while hourly labor productivity growth during the 
1960s rose at an average 4.8% in the whole economy and 7.2% in 
manufacturing (INSEE  1981: 32, 82). The developments at the supply side 
permitted the doubling of industrial production levels in ten years from 1947 
to 1957 and their augmentation by 360% until 1972 (INSEE 1990: 399-400).  
As Howell (2005: 56) notes French modernisation consisted of a one-way 
transfer of resources towards the industrial's sector profit shares. 
These developments contributed to the proliferation of an exceptional and 
distorted pattern of industrial relations which was based upon the 
unpredictability of labour militancy and the inability to establish institutional 
mechanisms to channel working class discontent. This posed a problem of 




industrial relations, periods of stability could be succeeded by periods of 
violent confrontations. Thus, the conflicts of 1947-1948 were revived in 1953 
when a month-long general strike spreading from the mining sector to the 
public services marked the end of a cycle of intense industrial confrontation 
(1947-1953) which saw a yearly average of 10 million days lost to strike 
activity. From 1953 until 1962, industrial peace was relatively restored as 
the yearly average of days lost to strike fell to around 2 million. Furthermore, 
there was a decrease in the intensity of industrial action with the average 
duration of strike per worker being 1.9 days compared to 4.4 days between 
1947 and 1953. The legendary month-long national strike of the coal miners 
in 1963 reinvigorated a period of working class militancy which saw a 75% 
increase in the volume of strikers until 1967, which ultimately culminated in 
the events of May 1968 (INSEE: various years).  
Table 1: Inflation in France (1947-1973) 
(1) Consumer price index 
Source: INSEE (1990), Annuaire rétrospectif de la France 1948-1988, p. 286 
In essence, the conflictual unfolding of industrial relations in France since 
1947 was the epiphenomenon of a wider tension between the need for a 
rapid modernisation of an arguably backwards capitalist economy and the 
limited room for substantial social reform to accommodate labour's material 
aspirations. This fundamental opposition gave rise to an inflation-prone 
economy (Table 1) which, as the next section shows, called for substantial 
state interventionism to regulate the seemingly anarchic determination of 
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wages and prices and alleviate the obstacles to France’s industrial 
modernisation. Inflationary growth was a response to labour’s 
disruptiveness and threat to capital’s profitability as it permitted the smooth 
one-way transfer of resources towards heavy industry. The state, as the 
political form of the rising labour-capital tension, played a key role in 
disciplining labour and enhancing domestic industry’s productive potential 
in order to effectively insert it within global industrial competition. 
THE DIRIGISTE MANAGEMENT OF POST-WAR CAPITAL 
The post-war state found itself in the position of having to both guarantee 
the effective refurbishing of industrial structures and manage the erratic 
growth of incomes and prices. It is within this context that the emergence of 
the so-called Dirigiste character of the French state ought to be analysed. 
The dirigiste state sought to remove the social barriers to modernisation 
through the exclusion of labour representatives from positions of influence 
within the state apparatus, the implementation of price policies aiming at 
disciplining workers’ grievances and an activist industrial policy securing the 
smooth transition of resources to the heavy manufacturing sector. However, 
dirigisme failed to sustainably curb the disquieting inflationary tendencies of 
the economy. The conflictual development of industrial relations culminated 
in the labour upheaval of May 1968 forcing the state to buy social peace by 
introducing legislations that bolstered the negotiating power of workers. The 
post-1968 management of labour however threatened to re-ignite an 
inflationary spiral that could significantly undermine the competitiveness of 
French manufactures in foreign markets. 
THE DIRIGISTE FORM OF THE STATE 
The French post-war state has often been perceived as an exceptional one 
that greatly demarcates it from state models common in Europe and 
elsewhere in the advanced capitalist world. Its consistently interventionist 
role in economic management has led authors to argue that French 




Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach, the French variant of capitalism 
could not be categorised within the dominant models of capitalism, namely 
Liberal Market Economies (LME) in which competitive market mechanisms 
constitute the primary coordinators of economic activity and industrial 
relations, and Coordinated Market Economies (CME), in which non-market 
institutions and practices play a great role in regulating relations among 
different economic actors (Hall and Sockice 2001). Instead, France was 
categorised within the ‘Mediterranean’ type of capitalism in which the 
extensive role of the state enables the appearance of CME features in terms 
of firm financing alongside LME features in industrial relations (Hall and 
Sockice 2001: 21).  
Schmidt (2002; 2003) took the VoC approach a step further and proposed 
a novel categorisation of post-war capitalist models in accordance with the 
economic role of the state in them. She distinguishes the Liberal and 
Enabling state that characterise British Market Capitalism and German 
Coordinated Capitalism accordingly and opposes them to the French 
Interventionist state. The interventionist state undertakes the role of 
formulating industrial strategies, coordinating firm activity in accordance 
with nationally formulated goals and mediating collective bargaining. 
Schmidt (1996; 2003) thus describes the French economy as a ‘state 
capitalist’ one as the state coordinates many of the activities that in other 
models are mediated by the market or non-state networks.  
Even further, Loriaux (1999) argues that France's model can be more 
adequately captured by the Developmental State paradigm, which has 
traditionally been associated with East-Asian late industrialisers. According 
to him, just as in late industrialisers, the state, strengthened by its control 
over credit allocation, nationalised industries and industrial planning, 
actively promoted a specific kind of national development aiming at 
modernising France and liberating it from its economic vulnerabilities vis-a-




Thus, ‘French exceptionalism’ is often attributed to the peculiarly Dirigiste 
character of the French state.  Dirigisme sums up the state's capacity to 
subordinate firms' activities to its own developmental strategy through its 
discretion to exert control over financial resources and to selectively allocate 
credit destined to industrial investment in accordance with its own policy 
priorities (Zysman 1983: Ch.3; Hall 1986; 153; Clift 2003: 174). The dirigiste 
state is thus characterised by its intense industrial activism and its capacity 
to mobilise macroeconomic policy tools to influence firms’ investment 
decisions, both in the public and private sectors (Levy 1999: 18, 2008: 419; 
Clift 2008: 391-392). 
At times, dirigisme appears as an inherent and natural quality of the French 
state, or even an ‘instinctive preference’ of the French (Maclean 2002: 107). 
The literature often identifies a deep-seated cultural quality to dirigisme. 
Dirigisme rests upon the state's centralised power and its capacity to 
superimpose its will over diverging pluralist interests, which itself constitutes 
the outcome of a long-lasting political culture that stretches back to the 
Jacobinist tradition inherited from the Revolution (Schmidt 1999: 142-143; 
Le Galès 2006: 199) or even the economic policies of Louis XIV’s finance 
minister Colbert in the 17th century (Clift 2005b: 106; Knapp and Wright 
2006: 18).  
The strong statist culture of French politics should not analytically 
overestimate the post-war state’s capacity of taking the upper hand and 
subjugating the market to its own strategic objectives nor should its dirigiste 
traits overshadow its liberal intents. In fact, early after the liberation, the 
dirigiste economic reforms were undertaken to firmly consolidate a market 
order within France. For instance, the épuration (i.e. the purge following the 
Liberation) pursued by the first De Gaulle provisional government, was 
restricted to the expropriation and nationalisation of the Renault and Berliet 
car manufactures and the confiscation of some profits acquired by other 
collaborationist employers while it permitted most employers to ‘remain in 




The limited extent and the ‘symbolic’ character of the épuration 
demonstrated the state's dependency on the market and the private sector 
to resume post-war growth. Similarly, the programs of nationalisation that 
followed the Liberation did not intend to simply strengthen state control of 
the economy but to stimulate competition in the private sector and increase 
the efficiency of market mechanisms (Sheahan 1963: 208-209). Many of the 
post-war policy innovations, such as planning, did not intend to shake the 
organisational foundations of the economy, but instead to increase the 
efficiency of private industry itself (Mioche 1981: 428). Just like French 
employers depended on state action regarding the determination of wages 
(Vinen 1995: 69) the state’s reproduction depended as much on the smooth 
functioning of the market.  
Rather than the perpetuation of a long-standing cultural tradition or merely 
a reflection of a state-dominated economy, the dirigiste form of the state is 
here traced back to the wider context of the post-war crisis in labour capital 
relations and conceptualised as the political form of this crisis. Following 
Nizard (1972, 1975) a useful starting point for analysing the dirigiste role of 
the state is to situate its emergence within the precise historical conditions 
of post-war capitalism and the barriers to its reproduction. More precisely, 
dirigisme can be conceptualised as a form of economic management 
appropriate to the postwar conditions characterised by the tension between 
the backwardness of the economy and the growing disruptive presence of 
labour. In this vein, to secure the modernisation of heavy industry and 
discipline labour, the institutional practices of the state emulated, at the 
political level, the ‘unobtainable labour democracy’ in the workplace (Le 
Crom 2003) by resisting labour’s political influence in policy-making.  
Industrial planning, one of the main features of French exceptionalism, aptly 
echoes the above contention. The Commissariat Général du Plan (CGP) 
was the institution responsible for setting the broad economic and industrial 
objectives of the country. While trade unions were present in the 




boycotted it after the first 5-year plan- and occupied 9% and 11% of seats 
during the third and fourth plan (Cohen 1969: 194), their role was essentially 
that of ‘active bystanders’ who were solely informed on the state of the 
economy rather than consulted on key issues as equivalent participants 
(Gruson 1968: 324). Indeed, trade unions were ill adapted both resource- 
and expertise-wise to effectively accustom themselves to the bureaucratic 
and technical nature of the planning process (Cohen 1969: 195-197). 
Despite the characterisation of French economic planning as a 'concerted 
economy' founded on the permanent exchange between the 
representatives of different social and economic groups (Bloch-Lainé 1964), 
the Plan Committee was in fact a platform of exclusive dialogue between 
the representatives of big industrial groups and state officials (Cohen 1969: 
169; Hayward 1986: 27). Employers held the majority of seats in the 
modernisation commissions and along with state officials seized 342 out of 
612 seats during the second plan and 639 out of 1006 during the third plan, 
the rest being predominantly distributed to technical experts (Cohen 1969: 
193-194).  
In fact, the structure of the Plan emulated a wider idiosyncrasy of the French 
political establishment which consisted in the exclusion of labour from 
positions of influence within the decision-making process and the 
constitution of privileged channels of dialogue between employers and the 
state (Kuisel 1983: 37). The French configuration of policy making 
structures based on the marginalisation of trade unions reflected the wider 
incompatibility between the extensive modernisation of industrial structures 
and a regularised and institutionalised improvement of workers’ incomes. In 
essence, planning sought to eliminate the uncertainties stemming from the 
conflictual form of industrial relations. Its indicative nature which was based 
on the forecasting of key economic indicators was the practical solution to 
Keynesian uncertainty (Armstrong et al. 1984: 203; Cohen 1969: 9) as it 




over the trends of demand and supply and indulge confidence over the 
future profitability of investments. 
The French state sought to ostracise labour from positions of influence 
within the post-war political system in order to smooth out industrial 
modernisation without succumbing to the worker’s costly material 
aspirations. Indeed, the institutions of the IVth and Vth Republic have been 
characterised as a coalition between big employers and high-ranking state 
officials (Shonfield 1965: 28; Zysman 1983: 107). Labour representatives 
consistently figured as this ‘policy community’s outsiders’ (Hayward 1986: 
Ch.4). In such crucial issues as the country’s industrial restructuring, 
‘broader participation could only endanger things’ (Cohen and Goldfinger 
quoted in Zysman, 1977: 198). The essence of dirigisme consisted of an 
attempt to discipline an ‘aggressive and unruly working class’ (Crozier 
quoted in Hayward, 1986: 61) and allow the effective liberation of resources 
needed to modernise domestic industry. Thus, the state equally pursued its 
autonomy with regards to the interests of smaller and backwards firms. 
Instead, it sought to forge political and economic channels of cooperation 
with the industrial conglomerates most apt to assist modernisation and 
sustain accumulation (Levy 1999: 32-33). Rather than the French state 
being inherently ‘exceptional’ it is the socioeconomic conditions, which 
involved a high degree of class conflict and economic backwardness, that 
were exceptional and called for the activation of the authoritarian reflexes of 
the state.14 
In short, rather, than the autonomous formulation of industrial objectives, 
dirigisme consisted in the political and economic mechanisms adopted by 
the state in order to reproduce and enhance capital accumulation within the 
                                                          
14 The exclusion of labour interests from the political system did not mean that the state 
relinquished its formal neutrality vis-à-vis civil society and social classes as discussed in 
Chapter Two. Instead, the authoritarian reflexes of the state were triggered by the 
increasing incompatibility of the French working class’s particularised interests with the 
general capitalist interest (i.e. the creation of capitalist wealth). Wage-earners’ redistributive 
interests increasingly clashed with the modernisation of the heavy industrial apparatus 




prevailing conditions of class struggle. The dirigiste character of the state 
directly stemmed from the pragmatic necessity to modernise the country’s 
industrial apparatus in a context of labour indiscipline. As shown below, the 
successive post-war governments pursued two main objectives: firstly, to 
create favourable conditions for an upsurge in private investment by 
eliminating barriers to accumulation and secondly, to ‘fill in’ the gap in 
industrial relations dialogue and manage its inflationary spillovers through 
the manipulation of price policy. 
MANAGING MODERNISATION AND UNRULY LABOUR 
Faced with an unproductive agricultural sector, a weak labour market and 
the overall immobility of French economic structures, the state undertook 
measures to accelerate the transition of France to an advanced industrial 
economy. In agriculture, the 1946 laws on land renting and métayage 
effectively decreased the price of land and gave extensive rights to tenant 
farmers to renew tenancy. These laws were designed to give incentives to 
farmers to invest more thoroughly in their production techniques by 
receiving a higher portion of gains generated by productivity increases and 
at the same time, limit the amount of resources being redistributed to the 
proprietor (Boinon 2011). Thanks to the high productivity gains that 
followed, from 1949 to 1962 the active population employed in agriculture 
had shrunk by one third while the sector's share of total employment 
decreased from 30% to 20%. During the Gaullist era, in light of the Common 
Agricultural Policy of the EEC ratified in 1962, the state further accelerated 
the pace of agricultural concentration and modernisation. The two loi 
d'orientation agricole of 1960 and 1962 aimed at reorganising the structures 
of farm holding: subsidies to farms failing to meet the minimum size criteria 
imposed by the Surface Minimum d'Installation were waived and institutions 
such as the Fond d’action social pour l’ aménagement des structures 
agricoles were set up to facilitate the retirement of farmers or their transition 




absorbed only 10% of the active population liberating in the process the 
productive resources, especially labour, necessitated by heavy industry.  
In terms of the domestic labour market, the state sought to respond to the 
modernisation needs of industry by developing an available labour force 
rendered completely depended upon the market (Salais and Whiteside 
1998: 142). Indeed, as Salais and Whiteside (1998) argue in their 
comparison of French and British welfare policies, in France welfare policies 
were designed so as to attract and maintain labour within the market sphere 
in exchange of guaranteed social protection rather than to redistribute 
wealth as in Britain. Introduced in 1945, the Sécurité Sociale was financed 
by workers’ and employers’ contributions unlike the Beveridgean welfare 
provision which is financed by a universal tax. Thus, while British welfare 
policies were largely centred on the protection of those unable to participate 
in the labour market, in the French case there was a tighter link between 
employment and social insurance (Bonoli 2003). Ultimately, the French 
social security system enhanced the dependency of the population on the 
labour market as it is the wage-labour condition that gave privileged access 
to security against social and natural risks (e.g. old age, sickness, 
unemployment) to the class of dispossessed labourers (Castel 1995: 274). 
These measures created the conditions for the emergence of a readily 
exploitable industrial labour force.   
The state-engineered rural exodus and the consolidation of a stable labour 
market were the first steps taken to liberate the (labour) resources 
necessary to restore and modernise French industry. Between 1945 and 
1946, in an attempt to remedy the stagnancy and sluggish growth of 
investment in the industrial sector, the state proceeded to an extensive 
program of nationalisations of key companies in the energy, transport and 
financial sectors. Within the freshly expanded public sector now figured the 
coal industry (Charbonnages de France), electricity (Electricité de France) 
and gas (Gaz de France) production, along with five main national banks 




Paris, Credit Lyonnais, Banque Nationale de l'industrie et du commerce) 
and 34 insurance companies. These nationalisations allowed the state to 
provide industry with the necessary resources (i.e. energy and credit) to 
favour reconstruction and the resumption of accumulation. 
The first five-year industrial plan (the Monnet plan), onset in 1947, put these 
resources to use by undertaking a massive reconstruction investment plan 
that targeted the recovery of key upstream activities in both the public 
(railways, electricity, gas) and the private (steel, iron, construction material) 
sector. Indeed, from 1947 to 1952 the share of capital investment in relation 
to total state expenditures remained, on average, at 30%, reaching even 
40% in 1949, before retrenching back to 20% in 1956 once private 
investment begun to rise (INSEE 1958: 201). Throughout the post-war era, 
state control and funding of nationalised upstream sectors was a key 
component of industrial modernisation since it alleviated the production 
costs of private capital by supplying it with under-priced products and 
services (Margairaz 1998: 42-43). Indeed, despite the inflationary context of 
the French economy, the prices of state-provided goods fell by 20% 
compared to the prices in the whole economy between 1959 and 1974 while 
energy prices alone fell by 30% (Loriaux 1999: 244).  
While state control of certain sectors permitted the relief of capital's 
production costs, the lack of an institutionalised compromise between 
labour and capital rendered much more difficult the control of another 
component of production costs, namely wages.  
Throughout the thirty glorious inflation is quasi-constant (Table 1) and 
traditionally higher than in its European counterparts (Zysman 1985: 154; 
Dirlam 1975: 103). While, external conjectural factors have played their 
contributing part in periodically intensifying inflation, 15  there was 
nevertheless, a deep-rooted and definite political element in the unfolding 
                                                          
15 Such factors were the increase of the price of primary materials between 1950 and 1952 
following the Korean War, the hike in oil prices following the Suez crisis in 1956 and the 




of inflationary tendencies in the French post-war economy. French inflation 
constituted the theatre of confrontation between different social groups 
trying to seize a greater part of domestically produced wealth (Parodi 1971: 
74; Zysman 1983: 139). Arguably, rising inflation was even permitted by 
state managers who sought to avoid an overt social confrontation over the 
redistribution of national income (Parodi 1971: 74; Carré et al.  1973: 206; 
Dirlam 1975: 109; Zysman 1983: 139): wages grew to attenuate workers’ 
grievances while firms restored their profitability by compensating 
increasing production costs with higher prices in the sphere of circulation. 
The fresh recollection of the 1947 insurrectionary strikes made governments 
reluctant to implement deflationary measures that would erode nominal 
wages by fear of triggering social upheaval (Betrand 1993: 113). Cohen 
(1989: 297) has described this settlement as an ‘inflationary social 
compromise’ whereby inflationary growth was politically allowed given the 
mutual refusal of the state, capital and labour to cooperate and assert 
control over wage and price formation. Ultimately, by allowing the effective 
redistribution of profits through circulation the inflationary compromise 
allowed ‘the executive to pursue two contradictory purposes in growth and 
social order’ (Zysman 1983: 144). 
The historical foundations of the state's reluctance to curb inflationary 
growth stretch back to the early years of the reconstruction period and De 
Gaulle’s first provisional government. By fear of social backlash, De Gaulle 
opted in 1944 for his Finance Minister's, Pleven, credit-based expansionist 
recovery program, rejecting Mendes-France's, the National Economy 
Minister, austerity program based on a generous price and wage freeze. 
Mendes-France’s austerity program included a vast taxation of capital and 
wages as well as a freezing of bank accounts aimed at resisting inflation by 
reducing the money supply. However, Pleven’s looser reflationary policy 
would be more welcomed by France’s war-torn and fractured populace. De 
Gaulle’s ‘original sin’ set the basis for the inflationary spiral that would 




(Bertrand 1993: 55). Nonetheless, it should be noted that the post-war 
inflationary prone arrangement was not so much actively pursued as 
tolerated as the adverse side-effect of an impaired social dialogue. The 
national ‘inflationary social compromise’ was erected on the absence of 
compromise at the workplace level.  
Furthermore, this inflationary settlement was tolerated as long as it did not 
significantly inhibit France's competitive position with its partners. In this 
case the dirigiste mechanisms of the state would take over with a set of 
macroeconomic policies aiming at containing inflation and restoring price 
parity with its advanced trade partners. An example of such emergency 
counter-inflationary measures was Pinay's 1952 plan. Following an 
important degradation in France's trade balance which went from practically 
neutral in 1950 to an average 1530 million francs in deficit between 1951 
and 1952 (Figure 2), Prime Minister Pinay adopted an austerity program 
involving a price and wage freeze as well as severe budgetary restraint. In 
addition, within its deflationary ambitions, Pinay's plan imposed an 
indexation of wages to prices in order to shield the economy from a wage-
push inflationary wave. The plan successfully halted the ongoing march of 
inflation until 1956 with the evolution in the retail prices' index ranging from 
-1.1% to 1.1% while it also achieved an equilibrium in the balance of trade 




Source : INSEE (various years) Annuaire Statistique de la France 
However, without tackling the fundamental social sources of inflation, such 
plans were destined to be ill-fated and their deflationary effects were only 
temporary (Bertrand 1993: 112). Indeed, the wage concessions obtained 
within certain industrial sectors following the 1955 strikes of Saint-Nazaire’s 
and Nantes’ metalworkers as well as the left’s return to power in 1956 which 
saw the implementation of a series of demand-enhancing policies, including 
increases in pensions, the minimum wage and social services provision, 
were enough to set the economy back on its inflationary course. The index 
of wholesale prices augmented by 11.5% from 1957 to 1958, while the 
balance of trade relapsed into deficit.  
Similar limitations were encountered by the Pinay-Rueff plan in 1958-1959. 
With the demise of the IVth republic and after De Gaulle’s return to power, 
the latter’s government sought to strike a final blow to the inflationary spiral 
(Du Boff 1968: 102).  In addition to a 17% devaluation of the Franc, the 1958 
plan deployed an arsenal of liberal measures involving most notably the 















































































































to force employers to align their prices with those of their foreign competitors 
(Lynch 2000: 133) as well as the suppression of any form of wages’ 
indexation to prices. These measures were motivated by an attempt to 
flexibilise the process of wage formation, remodel existing labour relations 
and render them compatible with France's ongoing industrialisation (Fayolle 
and Zachman 1987: 119). While the plan managed to moderate the growth 
of inflation - the index of wholesale prices until 1962 at around 2.3%- and to 
achieve a surplus in the balance of trade between 1959 and 1961, it failed 
to place wage growth under control in the long term.  
In 1962 and 1963 wage growth even outstripped productivity gains plunging 
the private sector into a profitability crisis. In the industrial sector, the hourly 
productivity of labour augmented by 6.7% and 4.8% in 1961-1962 and 1962-
1963 accordingly while nominal hourly wage increases reached 8.5% during 
these same periods. These developments greatly affected French firms 
which experienced an acute fall in their profit shares. From 1960 to 1963 
profit shares in the whole economy fell from 24% to 21.9% and from 23.9% 
to 19.8% in the manufacturing sector (Armstrong et al. 1984: 286). Thus, 
the lack of an institutionalised social dialogue and a regularised control of 
wage growth continued to haunt French industry.  
In fact, it was largely acknowledged that a socially negotiated ‘incomes 
policy’ was indispensable for harnessing the cost-push pressure on prices 
(OECD 1964: 36). As prime Minister Pompidou (1964: 96) conceded: 
If individuals’ incomes, wages and profits, rise faster there can only 
be either an increase in prices or a decrease in firms’ profit margins 
large enough to dry up investment… It is therefore desirable…to 
harmonise and to discipline the progress of wages, and not only of 
wages, but of the totality of individual incomes, including profits. 
Indeed, the failure to discipline wages, and to restrain the urge of firms to 




country’s commercial performance with foreign partners. Pierre Massé, 
leading commissioner of the plan committee, stressed: 
Only a conscious action at the level of income formation can permit 
the realisation of rapid and equilibrated expansion…in an outward-
oriented economy whereby competiveness is henceforth our law 
(quoted in Brochier 1964: fn870)  
In the absence of strict price discipline firms were able to effectively transfer 
rising wage-costs on prices instead of improving their material 
infrastructures thereby delaying their catching-up with European producers. 
The necessity to impose strict regulations on the evolution of incomes 
became all the more evident after the onset of the new cycle of labour 
struggles that begun with the miner's 1963 strike and put the French 
economy under additional stress. Initially, the persistence of inflation and 
trade imbalances forced the state to return to deflationary policies with 
Giscard d'Estaing's stabilisation plan in 1963 which re-imposed price 
controls until 1965. However, within the context of the new-found working-
class militancy there was a concurrent realisation of the need to systematise 
the monitoring of wage growth rather than contingently respond to their 
erratic growth with deflationary plans (Bertrand 1993: 156).  
To this end various steps were taken with limited effects. In 1964, in the 
public sector the application of the 'Procédure Toutée' allowed technocratic 
commissions to observe the evolution of wages and purchasing power in 
certain enterprises based on which the government would  determine price 
increases for the following year. In the private sector, the state allowed a 
partial liberalisation of price-setting at the end of the 1963 stabilisation plan. 
The 1965 contrats de stabilité involved periodic consultations between 
industrialists and the government in order to negotiate the variation of 
certain products’ prices. More importantly, the government compelled firms 
to align their wage levels in accordance with productivity gains since under 




only for the increasing cost of other inputs (Westphal 1968: 39-40). 
Similarly, the contrats de programme in 1966 allowed signatory firms to 
freely set their prices as long as they complied with the targets set by the 
fifth industrial plan over export prospects, productivity gains, and wage 
growth, while the government always retained the right to veto eventual 
price increases (Coffey 1973: 89).  
Despite its efforts, price policy had ultimately little effect on the monitoring 
of wages given the existing absence of consensus between workers and 
management within firms themselves (Fayolle and Zachman 1987: 122). As 
Table 2 suggests throughout the period following the stabilisation plan, 
wage growth consistently exceeded productivity gains across sectors 
putting additional stress on firms’ profitability and by extension their 
investment-capacity (Coffey 1973: 82).  
Table 2: Annual Growth of wages and productivity (1965-1972) 
 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
         
Hourly wage 
growth (%)1 




4.4 5 4.3 7.5 3.5 4.9 5.4 6.3 
Sources: (1) INSEE (1981) Le mouvement économique en France 1949-1979; (2)INSEE (1969, 1970, 1973a) 
Rapport sur les comptes de la Nation. 
Eventually, the recurrent attempts to target and monitor wage growth failed 
to curb labour’s grievances which culminated in the social explosion of May 
1968. The month-long upheaval saw the participation of 10 million workers 
in strike movements and the loss of more than a hundred million days due 
to work stoppages. While the turmoil of 1968 was a global and multifaceted 
phenomenon that requires a more detailed examination than can be 
provided for here, in its French guise it demonstrated the limitations of the 




that characterised May-June 1968 illustrated the difficulties of a political 
system based on the exclusion of labour from every level of policy-making 
and of its authoritarian state bureaucracy in dealing with class conflict 
(Maclean 2002: 106-107). It equally manifested the obstacles in the pursuit 
of intense economic modernisation without institutionalising labour dissent 
by establishing regulatory mechanisms to negotiate workers’ redistributive 
or otherwise workplace interests (Howell 2005: 66-67). 
The revolt was halted with the signature of the Grenelle agreements 
between the representatives of all unions, the employers' association and 
the government and marked the beginning of important attempts to reform 
industrial relations. The agreements themselves included a 10% increase 
in wages, a 35% increase in the minimum wage and the pledge for a greater 
involvement of unions in industrial affairs which was actualised by the laws 
of the 27th of December 1968. These laws permitted the creation of the 
Section Syndicale D'Entreprise, that is sections run by an acknowledged 
trade union within firms that facilitate the transmission of labour grievances 
to employers, and the institutionalisation of the Délégué Syndical, an 
elected trade-union representative charged with the task of negotiating 
collective agreements with a firm's managers. Unlike the previously weak 
role reserved to the CEs, the trade unions’ presence within firms was 
bolstered as a result of the 1968 social outburst (Bridgford 1989: 116). This 
was also manifest in the resurgence of collective bargaining with 
interprofessional agreements augmenting from 385 in 1968 to 885 in 1974 
(Willard 1995: 54). The fear of the revolutionary grand soir, or the 'spectre 
of 1968' (Howell 2005: 111) was institutionally crystallised in the creation of 
multiple channels of expression for trade unions set to mitigate the 
legitimation crisis that constantly hanged over the state since the May revolt 
(Levy 1999: 236). More importantly in the post-1968 era state elites and 
employers became more susceptible to workers’ pressures for economic 




them increasingly ‘risk-averse’ and reluctant to deploy radical measures 
undermining labour interests (Levy 2008: 420). 
However, with retail prices indexes' rising by an average 5.8% per year 
between 1969 and 1972 and wages growing at double the rate of 
productivity during the same period, the post-1968 arrangement bought 
social peace but reduced the effectiveness of containing inflation. Even 
further, Fayolle and Zachmann (1987: 122) argue that since 1968 
government policy gave up attempts to control the inflationary cycle but 
instead acquiesced to it and restricted its policies to a conjectural 
management of its short-term effects. The inflation-inducing concessions of 
1968 were made possible by the existence of accumulated foreign reserves 
that lessened their burden on the government’s balance of payments 
(Mitchel 1972: 327). However, the secured and permanent presence of 
trade unions in wage negotiations revitalised wage-growth-led inflation at a 
time where France's economy became increasingly export-oriented and 
where the rapidly internationalising economic environment made France's 
price parity with its EEC partners an even more important indicator of 
competitiveness.  
As the aforementioned contentions of Pompidou and Massé hint at, in times 
of increasing international competition -and eventually overproduction- 
France’s industrial firms would be the primary candidates for a massive 
capital devaluation. The pressure of wages on profitability would lessen 
firms’ capacity to increase investment for modernisation and hence 
decrease their competitive potential in world markets. Productivity gains 
were not rising fast enough to accommodate the increasing value of labour 
power. The ‘rising cost of exploiting labour’ (Bonefeld 1995: 44) prevented 
certain firms from producing at the socially necessary labour time as their 
profits dependent on inflationary redistribution as opposed to productivity 
breakthroughs. Clearly, the dirigiste state had failed to induce the desired 




FRANCE IN THE WORLD MARKET 
In the decade following the Monnet Plan, France’s colonial market outlets 
held an important place in its external trade as they allowed the realisation 
of surpluses that relatively assuaged its trade deficit with the rest of the 
world. At the same, time colonial trade disencitivised French industry from 
increasing its productive potential and instead perpetuated the domestic 
inflationary cycle. Since the colonies steadily became a handicap to 
industrial competitiveness, the state’s effort to curb excess demand was 
backed up by a reorientation of France’s trade relations towards the 
countries of the EEC by signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In an effort to 
manage the inflationary cycle, the state opted for an increased exposure of 
French manufactures to European imports in order to further deter domestic 
capital’s propensity to raise its prices higher than its advanced counterparts. 
While, this strategy did, in effect, improve France’s export performance 
within the common market, it ultimately failed to raise its competitiveness to 
levels comparable to other advanced industrial economies. The opening up 
to the European market was not enough to discipline domestic capital as 
the persistence of inflationary tendencies allowed the preservation of 
uncompetitive industrial units and delayed the rationalisation of the sector. 
Facing on the one hand a relative backwardness with regards to OECD 
industries and on the other a mounting pressure from newly industrialising 
countries, France met important difficulties in competitively inserting its 
industry in the world market. As the growth of international competitiveness 
exacerbated the overacummulation tendencies of global capital, French 
industry became increasingly susceptible to a substantial devaluation of its 
industrial capital. 
FROM THE COLONIES TO THE COMMON MARKET 
In the decade following Liberation, the state, facing the pressures of 
reconstruction and of an unfavourable commercial position, opted for a 
trade strategy of extended trade relations with the colonies. Indeed, in 1948 




materials this ratio stood at 19.6% and 57.3% respectively (INSEE 1990: 
603), revealing France's great dependency upon the importation of the 
resources necessary for reconstruction. In this economic conjuncture, 
increasing openness with the advanced world would only exacerbate 
France's commercial deficit given the more productive nature of the US and 
European industries.16 Protectionism and preferential trade relations with 
the colonies served as a means to alleviate the deficit in France’s trade 
balance (Fitzgerald 1988: 377).17 
The colonies held a privileged position as French industry's export outlets. 
Between 1949 and 1956 the Zone Franc absorbed on average 37% of 
France’s total exports, double the value of the colonies’ exports (INSEE 
1958: 239; INSEE 1981: 177). Well into the first decade of the Trentes 
Glorieuses, France’s pattern of trade with its empire was still ‘a typical 
imperial one’ whereby the metropolis exported manufactures and imported 
from the colonies the inputs necessary for their production (Kresl and 
Gallais, 2002: 86). In fact, most imports from the colonies consisted of 
agricultural products (e.g. vegetables/fruits, oleaginous products, 
coffe/tea/cocoa) and raw materials (rubber and textile raw materials) while 
exports to these territories consisted of finished or semi-finished products 
mainly from the metallurgical, textile and smelting industries. During the 
initial stages of reconstruction, expanded colonial trade even allowed a 
significant degree of self-sufficiency in industrial products as France 
managed to achieve on average a trade coverage of 147% in industrial 
products between 1949 and 1955 (INSEE 1981: 163). In fact, expanded 
                                                          
16 This was testified during the short-lived attempt to liberalise trade between countries of 
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation and remove a number of quantitative 
barriers to imports between 1949-1951. The immediate deterioration of the country’s 
balance of payments forced the government to undertake a turnaround in its trade policy 
and re-introduce trade barriers by 1952 (Lynch 1997: 110-116). 
17  The only exception to the protectionist rule was the exposure of coal and steel to 
European competition after the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in 1951 which founded the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The pivotal role of these upstream sectors 
both for the reconstruction effort and the supply of a large range of consumer goods 
industries made it necessary to increase their productivity at a higher pace than other 
sectors and thus induce their modernisation through their exposure to intra-ECSC 




preferential trade with the Zone Franc compensated to an extent France’s 
chronic deficit with advanced industrial countries (Woronoff 1998: 522). 
However, the benefits of colonial trade came with their own contradictions 
as the insulated environment that colonial trade provided to French industry 
was also a barrier to its optimal modernisation. The fragile state of labour-
capital relations at home and the inflationary environment that they gave 
birth to played an important role in shaping the extended trade partnership 
with the colonies since the latter provided a profitable and protected outlet 
for French commodities that were overpriced and uncompetitive in the world 
market (Fitzgerald 1988: 381). In a sense, the colonial path was politically 
and socially convenient for the state as it did not require drastic measures 
against wage growth as a prerequisite for the effective sale of French 
products. Within this context, the lack of competitive pressures exercised 
upon domestic industry (Kresl and Gallais 2002: 87) further exacerbated the 
inflationary tendencies of the domestic economy. The penalty for failing to 
curb inflationary excesses and bring prices in line with those of advanced 
competitors was a frequent recourse to currency devaluations – 8 between 
1944 and 1958! – to compensate the lack of price competitiveness by 
artificially cheapening imports (Maclean 2002: 61). 
Profit redistribution through inflation and intensive exchange with the non-
industrialised colonies drastically reduced firms’ incentives to invest in 
productivity-enhancing innovations (Fitzgerald 1988: 380-381). Colonial 
trade became problematic for France's industrial structures and its ability to 
effectively compete in the European market in light of the future prospects 
of joining the EEC. Given the tenuous competition faced by metropolitan 
France colonial trade did not contribute to the development of high-
technology sectors and permitted the survival and reproduction of activities 
with a low value-added contribution to GDP (Marseille 1985: 135). This 
posed a significant barrier in raising French industry’s technological 
potential to the level of its future competitors in the EEC. As De Gaulle 




coupled with a definite mediocrity in terms of industrial performance (De 
Gaulle quoted in Bertrand 1993: 117).  
Thus, towards the end of the IVth republic, Mollet’s government opted for a 
progressive opening up of the economy towards its European partners by 
signing up the Treaty of Rome in 1957.18 Indeed, by the mid-1950s French 
state elites realised that the colonies had ceased being an asset and turned 
into a strain on the metropolis' resources (Marseille 1985: 134; Fitzgerald 
1988: 382-383). On the one hand, France risked losing its exports’ 
privileged access to the Zone Franc as the latter would be accessed by 
other EEC members while at the same time bearing the burden of financially 
supporting the colonies alone.  On the other, in a less protected 
environment, the colonies’ negative trade performance with the rest of the 
world would only aggravate the Empire's total trade deficit (Fitzgerald 1988: 
384).  
Opening up to the EEC was a strategic manoeuvre to master inflation by 
disciplining domestic capital’s pricing practices. Exposing the latter to the 
EEC’s competitive pressures would in theory induce a more responsible 
behaviour on the part of firms which would restrain their urge to constantly 
increase prices and instead seek greater productivity gains (Bertrand 1993: 
69, 101). By abandoning traditional protectionist instruments such as export 
subsidies and quotas, the state allowed the free flow of imports from the 
common market to automatically force a downwards readjustment of prices 
‘in case one sector or another should get out of kilter’ (Pinay 1959: 596). 
                                                          
18  The decision to abandon the preferential trade partnership with the colonies and 
reorganise trade relations around the EEC was at first politically opposed by domestic 
producers and their representatives in the national employers' association (CNPF) who, 
anxious about the preponderant place taken by wages in their production costs, urged the 
adoption of policies aiming at the harmonisation of social policies, regarding wages, social 
contributions paid holidays and the length of the working-week at the EEC-level (Balassa 
1979: 947-948; Balassa 1981: 208). French employers’ initial reluctance to integrate the 





The advent of Vth Republic in 1958 consolidated the state's new approach 
to intra-European trade and initiated the break up of protectionist 
temptations: international competition was not considered anymore as a 
'constraint' but as an opportunity to galvanise domestic industrial production 
(Balassa 1979: 941-942). Early on, however, the weak price 
competitiveness of French exports led to the 1958 devaluation of the Franc. 
The ‘overdevaluation’ of the latter (Balassa 1979: 954) was devised to give 
domestic industry an ultimate push in order to temporarily enhance its 
competitiveness and grant it a period of transition before standing on its feet 
to face the European challenge (Fayolle and Zachman 1987: 120). At the 
heart of the Vth Republic's policy preference for internationalisation lies an 
attempt to depoliticise price policy by assuaging the burden that price and 
wage determination added to the state. Given the difficulty of the IVth 
Republic's government to master inflation, De Gaulle installed a permanent 
market-driven disciplinary mechanism over domestic capital since firm 
competitiveness was to be evaluated at a supranational level. Unlike the 
protectionist era, during which inflationary waves affected equally all firms 
and therefore, did not threaten their competitive position within the domestic 
market, the exposure of French products to European competition forced 
employers to bypass pressures for wage increases in order maintain their 
market shares in the European market. 
Though prior to its accession to the common market France is considered 
to be one of the most protectionist European economy (Maclean 2002: 68; 
Lynch 1997: 110), the post-1957 era did not initiate a qualitatively different 
state-(world) market relation. Rather protectionism and colonial trade were 
different modes of France’s integration in the international arena. 
Regardless of the content of its trade policies, ‘the framework of the present-
day national state…is itself in its turn economically within the framework of 
the world market’ (Marx 1989: 90). In a sense, colonial trade and post-1957 




the domestic class relation within a globally competitive system of 
exchange.  
Ultimately, the liberalisation of exchange failed to achieve these objectives 
too. As it will be shown below, while this strategy allowed for an expansion 
of France’s external commerce, French industry failed to catch up with its 
European rivals thus steadily building up its competitively vulnerable 
commercial position in the wake of the first oil shock.   
THE FRAILTY OF FRENCH INDUSTRY  
The progressive opening up of the domestic market and the implementation 
of the EEC’s import quotas restrictions, was accompanied by a reorientation 
of industrial policy and planning objectives. Admittedly, the first (1947-1952) 
and second (1954-1957) industrial plans largely aspired to domestically-
oriented goals such as the reconstruction of the economy and the 
quantitative expansion of upstream and consumer goods industries. From 
the third plan (1958-1961) on, industrial planning became increasingly 
concerned with the country’s competitive insertion in foreign markets (Green 
1978:  62). Indeed, for the CGP it was necessary to reorient the goals of 
industrial policy towards rectifying the disequilbrium of France’s external 
commerce that was caused by the persistence of an ‘excess demand’ at 
home (CGP 1959: 8).  
Similarly, the fourth plan (1962-1965) did not prioritise the growth of specific 
industries as the previous ones but the increased productivity and ‘price 
discipline’ that was required to equilibrate the country’s balance of payments 
(CGP 1962: 20, 45). The subsequent plans further consolidated the state’s 
stance over the deeper integration of French capital in external markets. 
Indeed, the fifth (1966-1970) and sixth plans (1971-1975) adopted stricter 
evaluation criteria of French industry's competitiveness. Trade equilibrium 
and price parity between French and EEC products were monitored with the 
aid of clignotants or indicateurs which, based on certain economic indicators 




the comparative evolution of different French sectors. Any deviation of these 
indicators from the expected or tolerated disparities between France and its 
competitors could call for a correctional set of measures and a 
corresponding adaptation of macoreconomic policy (INSEE 1971). 
To surmount the ‘European Challenge’ industrial policy under de Gaulle and 
Pompidou also favoured the adaptation of the French productive apparatus 
to competition by favouring the creation of national champions and adopting 
a policy of industrial concentration in both the public and private sector 
(Maclean 2002: 84). Throughout the fourth and fifth plans, an array of fiscal 
and tax incentives were proposed to firms willing to merge, such as the 
provision of cheap loans and tax exemptions, in order to promote the 
emergence of economies of scale and of large rationalised manufacturing 
groups. Indeed, public financial incentives were crucial in ‘curbing firms’ 
‘natural resistance to change’ and in encouraging the ‘artifical’, state-
backed, creation of mergers (Stoffaes 1989: 111, 123). During the 1960s 
and early 1970s this process resulted in some remarkable fusions that gave 
birth to national champions across key industrial sectors: in petrochemicals 
the fusion of three different companies (RAP, SNPA and BRP) gave birth to 
Elf-Acquitaine, the electronics industry in 1967 witnessed the merge of 
Thomson-Brandt and CSF creating Thomson-CSF, in the steel industry de 
Wendel merged with Sidélor in 1968, in construction materials Saint-Gobain 
fused with Pont-a-Mousson a year later, while in aluminium Pechiney 
absorbed the Etablissements Kuhlmann. Similarly, the state sought to 
enhance the technological specialisation of France by coordinating and 
participating in the execution of large investment projects in diverse high 
technology sectors such as aviation (Airbus), nuclear energy (Framatome) 
and spatial exploration (Ariane project). Overall, by 1975 18.8% of workers 
were employed in firms employing more than 200 employees and 35.6% in 
firms employing more than 500 workers (INSE 1990: 69). In the context of 




sought to bridge the ‘technology gap’ between France and its trade partners 
(Aujac 1986: 14). 
However, despite the execution of state-engineered grand programs, the 
state progressively found it hard to sustain the competitiveness of 
manufacturing as evidenced by the uneven development of industrial 
structures. Indeed, the inflationary configuration of labour-capital relations 
affected domestic industry on yet another level. Through its control over 
credit allocation mechanisms, the post-war state allowed the expansion of 
the money supply by easing firms’ access to credit. This allowed industrial 
policy to target the development of key modern companies as well as to 
diffuse social contestation by preserving more traditional industries that 
were less able to resist market pressures (Zysman 1983: 134-144).  Firms’ 
recourse to credit was even accentuated after 1968 when money supply 
grew to accommodate the increasing cost of wages and social contributions 
(Patat and Lutfala 1990: 202). Amply available cheap credit offered 
protection to vulnerable and uncompetitive firms thereby significantly 
retarding the rationalisation of industry and the overall transition to a highly 
modernised economy (Lange, Ross and Vannicelli 1982: 38; Loriaux 1991: 
177). French industry became characterised by an important degree of 
uneven development or dualism as both laggard (e.g. textiles) and 
modernised sectors (e.g. cars) coexisted side by side (Lieberman 1977: 
193; Berger 1980). Lifting protectionist barriers was not enough to induce 
the desired price discipline and full modernisation of domestic capital as the 
domestic inflationary environment allowed the factitious survival of firms that 
would not be able to repay their debts in times of crisis and heightened 
international competition (Patat and Lutfala 1990: 174, 206). 
The difficulties in developing a highly competitive industry were reflected in 
the evolution of France’s export structure since 1957. Indeed, the results of 
France's trade performance in the Vth Republic are mitigated. On the one 
hand, the value of French manufacturing exports, in constant prices 




France's export performance even allowed to raise her in the fourth rank of 
the world's top exporters in 1973. At the same time, however the country 
was subject to greater import penetration. This was especially the case in 
manufactures as the foreign trade coverage ratio was constantly falling 
during the Vth Republic and was quasi-halved from 204% in 1959 to 107% 
in 1974 (Table 3). In addition, France's remarkable export performance 
obscure the fact that its industrial products had not reached the 
competitiveness levels of other advanced industrial countries. In fact, its 
performance with the latter significantly deteriorated over the years. For 
instance, while until 1962 France still held a trade surplus vis-a-vis the 
countries of the EEC, thereafter she witnessed a constant trade deficit which 
began to worryingly grow after 1966, the year that marked the full 
liberalisation of exchanges with the EEC (Figure 3). Even further, as Table 
4 suggests, during the early 1970s France found itself consistently in deficit 
with regards to both the EEC and the rest of the OECD revealing its 
persistent competitiveness gap with the advanced capitalist world.  
In fact, just like during the era of colonial trade France's export performance 
owed much to its trade with less developed countries (Boyer 1987: 43). 
Indeed, it is only with developing countries (except for oil-exporting ones) 
that France was able to achieve a commercial surplus (Table 4). As Boyer 
(1998: 13) observes, the pattern of French trade consisted in the importation 
of sophisticated industrial material from OECD countries and the exportation 
of similar products to less developed countries where the competitiveness 
criteria were less strict than in the OECD area and thus constituted an 
adequate market outlet for French manufactures. Just like during the era 
prior to the integration of the common market, France heavily relied on the 
markets of developing economies to avoid a further degradation of its trade 
balance.  
This trade pattern revealed an even more fundamental disequilibrium in 
terms of the technological content of French manufactures. Except for a few 




energy) where France held a definite advantage, most of its exports 
consisted of medium-technology products as opposed to the high-
technology manufactures of countries like Germany (Bellon and Chevalier 
1983: 25, 40). In fact, rather than effectively achieving the level of advanced 
industrialised countries, France was ‘an intermediate country with respect 
both to sales by product and to sales by country’ (Soulage 1985: 169). 
France found itself in a deadlock as on the one hand she had failed to 
achieve the industrial maturity of certain of its OECD partners while on the 
other, newly industrialising countries were threatening the market shares of 
its technologically less advanced industries such as textiles (Stoffaes 1978: 
195, 225, 235-6).  On both, fronts French industries found themselves in 
vulnerable position.  
 
Table 3: Trade Coverage in Industrial Products (1959-1974) 
 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Exports/Imports (%) 2 0 4 1 8 4 1 6 8 1 4 9 1 3 4 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 7 
 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Exports/Imports (%) 1 1 6 1 0 9 9 8 1 0 9 1 1 1 1 0 7 1 0 7 1 0 7 





Figure 3: France's trade with the EEC (1959-1969) in million current 
Francs 
 
Sources: INSEE (1981) Le mouvement économique en France 1949-1979. 
The weak competitiveness of French industry increasingly questioned the 
commercial viability of many firms as growing competition ignited the threat 
of devaluation. Indeed, the failure to curb inflation in a regular manner during 
the IVth and Vth Republics meant that industries where wage held a 
preponderant part in production costs -especially in the traditional sector in 
which small, labour-intensive firms operated (Howell 2005: 108)- would find 
it difficult to profitably sell in the domestic or European market. Such was 
the case of the (state-owned) coal industry where in 1960 the Minister of 
Industry, Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, organised the shutting down of various 
mines, mainly located in the Centre-Midi region, whose weak productive 
potential could not compensate the drain on the state budget. Indeed, in 
light of the competition incurred by the rise of alternative energy sources, 
and the relatively high cost of labour (wages absorbed 65% of the price cost 
of coal), Jeanneney decided to cut down excess capacities and centre 
national coal production on the most efficient sites. In this vein, the 
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production instead of having recourse to the arguably more socially costly 
strategy of reversing wage trends (Kocher-Marboeuf, 2003: Ch.2). 
Jeanneney’s plan constituted an early case of selective disengagement and 
demonstrates how the accumulation and legitimation imperatives weighing 
upon the state can shape the implementation of such a strategy. 
Table 4: France’s balance of trade with OECD and non-OECD countries 
(in current millions Francs) 
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
OECD countries -6,941 -4,985 -2,297 -3,923 -6,668 
Non-OECD countries1 3,234 6,445 4,901 6,451 4,868 
(1)Excluding OPEC countries 
Sources: INSEE, Annuaire rérospectif de la France 1948-1988, p.605. 
Overall, the failure to achieve a competitiveness level comparable to those 
of other OECD countries was a result of the inflationary cycle perpetuated 
by the crisis-ridden state of industrial relations. The compromise achieved 
in Grenelle after the events of May 1968 further exacerbated the competitive 
weakness of French industry and its price disparities with its advanced 
commercial partners. Indeed, the form of regulation of the labour market 
and wages had lost its ‘disciplinary power’ (Howell 2005: 119). The 
institutionalisation of the dissenting power of labour after 1968 allowed 
wages to grow independently of the economic conjuncture (Stoffaes 1978: 
210) forcing the state to adopt measures that artificially enhanced the 
competitiveness of manufactures such as the 1969 devaluation of the 
Franc. The post-1968 labour settlement further delayed the competitive 
adaptation of domestic capital and greatly penalised it in the wake of the 
1973 oil shock. As Howell (2005: 129) observes ‘alone among OECD 
countries, the costs of the oil shock did not fall first on labour but on capital 




While the inflationary social compromise was relatively benign as long as 
France held a protectionist stance, it became an ineludible burden once it 
opened its markets (Boyer 1998: 15). Equally, the consequences of the 
inflationary growth of credit on industrial competitiveness was delayed by 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates which 
allowed for periodic devaluations without risking speculative attacks on the 
currency (Loriaux 1991). The post-war inflationary compromise guaranteed 
firms’ profitability, their easy access to credit and by extension the 
increasing expansion of industrial capacities. At the same time, the 
quantitative growth of French productive capacities and exports masked its 
insufficient efforts to reach the competitiveness levels of most OECD 
countries and in fact led to the creation of substantial overcapacities that 
could hardly survive cutthroat international competition (Stoffaes 1989: 
122). In a sense, the state’s support to exports through currency 
devaluations, the reluctance to curb inflation and recurrent public financial 
assistance temporarily extended the survival of financially unsolvable firms. 
Both before and after EEC accession the maintenance of competitiveness 
and price parity depended on the adoption of ad hoc correctional measures 
such as currency devaluations (Levy 2005: 105; Clift 2016: 518). As Hancké 
(2002: 18) writes: ‘the state relied on competitive devaluations as a 
substitute for a weak and fragmented labour movement that could provide 
neither rank-and-file discipline nor wage restraint’. Indeed, the general 
political management of post-war growth merely ‘served to delay 
considerably the adjustment process and the reduction of uncompetitive 
overcapacities’ in various sectors (Stoffaes 1989: 123).  
As such, in the 1970s’ context of persistent domestic inflation and rising 
global competition the threat of capital devaluation became increasingly 
palpable for French firms. In this way, the bases for a generalisation of 
selective disengagement strategies, such as the one implemented in the 
coal sector in 1960, to alleviate the erratic spread of devaluation and 





As this chapter has argued, the competitively vulnerable position in which 
French industry found itself in the 1970s can be attributed to the persistent 
tension between the modernising needs of domestic industry and the 
redistributive interests of labour. This tension gave rise to an inflationary 
economy in which workers’ wildcat struggles for higher wages were 
compensated by higher commodity prices which in turn undermined 
industry’s competitiveness in world markets. Until 1968, the dirigiste state 
attempted to rectify the shortcomings of French capitalism by excluding 
labour interests from institutional apparatuses, ensuring the transfer of 
resources to heavy industry and enacting sporadic deflationary plans. 
However, by failing to address the foundational sources of inflation, 
dirigisme was unable to monitor the erratic growth of wages and prices. 
Instead, after the May revolt, the mounting dissenting power of labour was 
tackled through new legislation that bolstered its bargaining power in the 
workplace and further fuelled inflationary tendencies. Ultimately, the 
modernisation and competitiveness of domestic industry was supported 
artificially, through cheap credit, currency devaluations and the realisation 
of profits through inflation. Even the efforts to discipline price formation 
through the exposure of domestic industry to the Common Market did not 
manage to raise French industry’s competitiveness to levels similar to its 
OECD competitors (except in certain high-technology branches). The weak 
ability to effectively compete on OECD markets and the growing competition 
faced by developing countries was the double-edged plight endured by 
French industry once the 1973 crisis begun. 
While as the previous chapter argued the industrial crisis that formally 
begun with the 1973 oil shock ought to be understood as the concrete 
unfolding of capital’s global overaccumulation tendencies, the particular 
form in which this global crisis manifested itself in France can be traced back 
to its post-war pattern of development and the instability of its crisis-ridden 




fact manifested the wider contradiction between the political management 
of the class relation at home and the imperatives of global competition. More 
precisely, the limits of the dirigiste management of post-war capital led to 
two important developments: the institutionalisation of labour’s dissenting 
power after May 1968 and the creation of substantial industrial 
overcapacities. The increasing difficulty to resist labour pressures and the 
need for a sweeping rationalisation of industry constituted the two ends of 
the tightrope on which post-1974 governments had to walk. 
As growing competition exacerbated capital’s global overaccumulation 
tendencies, French industries figured as prime candidates for devaluation 
given their weak competitiveness. To avoid an unchecked devaluation of 
French manufacturing capital, the formulation of selective disengagement 
strategies became necessary. Well into the 1970s, the state found itself in 
the position of having to orient the devaluation of capital towards the least 
competitive and commercially least essential activities just like Jeanneney’s 
plan in the early 1960s. The three next chapters will demonstrate the 
concrete ways through which such strategies were formulated and 









TEXTILES & CLOTHING: FROM THE 
BACKBURNER TO THE MARKET 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter argued that French industry found itself in a 
competitively weak position by the early 1970s due to the inflationary 
tendencies of the economy which allowed for the redistribution of profits 
through price hikes rather than the productivity breakthroughs necessary to 
offset the rising cost of labour. The inflationary settlement reached its limits 
around the time of the first oil shock which revealed the deadlock in which 
French industry was caught. Its technological discrepancies vis-à-vis OECD 
countries and the mounting competition from NICs put severe pressures on 
its capacity to profitably sell in domestic and world markets. The T&C 
industry’s weak competitiveness on both fronts threatened the sector with 
extended devaluation. In a sense, the T&C industry was one of the first 
‘victims’ of France’s inflationary social compromise given its sensibility on 
wage costs. In order to prevent an anarchic devaluation of the sector’s 
capital the French state stepped in in order to formulate strategies for a 
selective devaluation of T&C capital or a selective disengagement from the 
sector’s activities. 
This chapter proposes an archival examination of the French state’s 
management of the sector’s deindustrialisation between 1974 and 
1984.The analysis of the archive-based evidence shows that in response to 
a global crisis of overproduction that put France in particularly vulnerable 
position in the international T&C market, the consecutive governments in 




devaluation of the sector's activities in order to offset the growing trade 
deficit and foster domestic production around certain key industrial units 
within the sector. Selective devaluation was, thus, the strategy through 
which the privileged beneficiaries of industrial assistance and the excluded 
production units were designated. This strategy was certainly not uniform 
nor without its contradictions as the devaluation process within the sector 
created an array of unemployed and partially-employed workers and led to 
the economic decline of formerly T&C-depended regions. In fact, this 
strategy entailed an increased politicisation of the sector’s situation as both 
towards the end of Giscard d’Estaing’s presidency and at the beginning of 
Mitterrand’s the state assumed the responsibility of the sector’s recovery 
from the crisis. Fearing a grassroots or electoral backlash, the consecutive 
state managers had to increasingly take into account the ‘collateral damage’ 
of deindustrialisation and devise intervention methods that could allow them 
to maintain a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the electoral body and 
incorporate such concerns within their ‘targeted deindustrialisation’ 
strategy. Thus, the main argument advanced here is that while 
deindustrialisation, as in the massive devaluation of industrial assets, was 
to some extent an inevitable outcome of the crisis of the 1970s, the form 
that it took in practice was largely due to deliberately devised statecraft 
strategies. 
The chapter begins by drawing the particular traits of the French T&C 
sector’s post-war development that, ultimately, contributed to its acute crisis 
during the 1970s and 1980s. While the T&C crisis was global, French 
producers experienced it in a particularly harsh way as a result of operating 
for decades within the context of a protected domestic market, a privileged 
access to colonial market outlets and a lack of incentives to modernise. 
French T&C had failed to technologically catch up its advanced partners 
and was unable to compete with NIC articles in wage terms. Next, the 
sector’s historical experience is divided into three distinct periods which 




legitimacy and industrial rationalisation. From 1974 to 1978, the state 
relegated the financial responsibility for restructuring to an inter-professional 
body consisting principally of the representatives from the sector’s 
industrialists and funded by a parafiscal levy perceived on the industry’s 
revenues. The limited resources held by this committee was the principal 
way through which selectivity in aids attribution operated. The early 1980s 
witnessed a sudden change of attitude from the part of the government and 
an increased politicisation of the sector’s restructuring. In the wake of the 
coming elections the government declared T&C as a key industrial priority. 
In fact, the MoI discreetly devised a policy of industrial targeting aiming at 
identifying the key clusters of the sector to which industrial aids should be 
channelled in priority. Following Mitterrand’s election, the socialist T&C 
strategy essentially consisted in temporarily slowing down the 
deindustrialisation strategy through a comparatively open and 
undiscriminating system of deduction in firms’ social contributions destined 
to a significant part of the sector’s firms. This strategy served as a means to 
temporarily slow down downsizing and palliate the labour market crisis 
before adopting a stricter stance and allow market competition to become 
the primary determinant of the devaluation process. 
A FORESEEABLE CRISIS 
If following Ponteil’s (1971: 368-372) remark the French post-war industrial 
class was marked by its aversion to modernisation and its contentment for 
growth within the context of a protected domestic market, then the T&C 
sector’s industrialists embodied the archetypal adherents to this pattern of 
industrial strategy. The sector’s industrial structures were dominated by 
traditional, small and often family-owned firms alongside few internationally-
oriented large companies (Underhill 1990: 194). Its uneven structure 
quadrated with the sector’s ‘archaic’ character, its antiquated managerial 
methods and its reluctance to expose itself to the international market 
(Benzoni 1983: 106-107). In addition, the privileged access of French firms 




imports as well as recurrent public subsidies were, according to Mytelka 
(1982), the main factors behind the textile’s industry’s weak incentives to 
accelerate its modernisation (Mytelka 1982: 130-136). It follows, that the 
post-war trajectory of the textile-clothing sector in France has been marked 
by its slow pace of modernisation and its persistent crisis-prone tendencies 
(Underhil 1988: 496).   
Within the context of the state-backed strategy of industrial concentration of 
the IVth and Vth industrial plans, the T&C sector was one of the last sectors 
to undergo such a process. To enliven the potential in the sector the state 
encouraged the reorganisation of its industrial structures and pushed for the 
creation of economies of scale. To this aim, in 1966, the Comité 
Interprofessionel de Renovation des Structure Industriels et Commerciales 
de L’Industrie Textile (CIRIT), an agency financed through a parafiscal levy 
set at 0.44% of the revenues of textile industries, was founded with the aim 
of providing grants to firms willing to merge or absorb smaller ones. The 
composition of the CIRIT consisted of eleven members appointed by the 
Ministry of Industry (MoI) and the Ministry of the Economy (MoE), six of 
which were employers of the textile sector, one from the clothing industry 
while the rest were representatives of (para-)public financial institutions 
such as the IDI, the Crédit National and the Caisse Nationale des Marchés 
de l’Etat.  
Despite the efforts to induce concentration within the textile industry, the 
sector retained its dualistic and uneven nature. The generally protectionist 
environment permitted the ‘artificial’ survival of smaller firms competing with 
textile giants such as Dollfus-Mieg et Compagnie or Boussac. While the 
number of textile firms with more than 5 employees was halved from 1958 
to 1969 bringing their number down to 4,300, firms with more than 500 
employees merely represented 3.5% of total firms (INSEE 1972: 151; 
INSEE 1973b: 147). In contrast firms with fewer than 20 employees 
represented almost half of total firms (INSEE 1973b: 148). The disparate 




only 1.9% of firms employed more than 500 employees while most firms 
(73.2%) employed less than 50 (INSEE 1973b: 158). Due to the structure of 
the French T&C industry the sector was inclined towards a persistent state 
of overproduction. Mytelka (1982: 140) describes the situation in textiles as 
follows:  
As the process of concentration proceeded during the 1960s, the very 
existence of a large number of less modernised firms, their ability to 
‘dump’ textiles onto the domestic market, and the mounting pressure 
from international competition brought a downward pressure upon 
profits.   
The gradual increase of developing T&C imports in the 1970s, although 
monitored by the consecutive Multi-Fiber Arrangements (MFA), brought to 
the fore in a radical manner the chronic excess production capacity of the 
French T&C sector. 
In the 1970s the French T&C sector experienced the general crisis of 
overproduction in the form of a continuous degradation of its export-import 
ratio (Table 5) and a global stagnation of demand for T&C products (Table 
6). Jointly, these processes put severe competitive pressures upon its 
capacity to secure its world market shares as the sector’s export-import ratio 
worsened with regards to both France’s EEC partners and developing 
countries. Between 1973 and 1976 for intra-EEC trade this ratio fell from 
116% to 90% while it fell from 213% to 86.2% for trade with developing 
countries.19 T&C manufactures faced the same predicament as the rest of 
France’s industry, described in the previous chapter: they became caught 
up between the competitive pressures of the cheaper products of newly 
industrialised countries (NIC) and their own technological backwardness 
vis-à-vis their more advanced partners. More precisely, the textile industries 
of countries like Germany and Italy had managed to broaden their product 
range and upgrade the technological level of their production processes 
                                                          




while South-East Asian textiles had taken advantage of their lower labour 
costs (Stoffaes 1978: 81-87).  
Overall, the French trade balance in T&C manufactures fell from 3,250 
million francs in 1973 to 191 million francs in 1976, and by 1979 it plunged 
down to a -1,600 million Francs deficit. The weakening of France’s trade 
performance in T&C articles was a manifestation of , not only, a continual 
flooding of foreign imports but also a, comparatively, slower progression of 
French exports. Indeed, while the value of imports augmented by 202% 
from 1973 to 1980, the total value of exports augmented only by 93%.20 
Lacking the low-wage advantage of newly industrialised areas and the 
modernisation levels of advanced ones, French T&C articles lost their 
capacity to effectively compete in domestic and foreign markets. 
 
Table 5: France’s trade in T&C 
 1973 1976 1979 
Balance of Trade (in 
current millions Franc) 
3277 191 -1604 
Coverage Ratio 
(Exports/Imports) 
137% 101% 93% 
Source: INSEE, Annuaire Statistique de La France, various years. 
The net degradation of French export competitiveness was aggravated by 
the evolutions in global demand as the post-1974 period was marked by a 
radical ‘rupture’ of consumption patterns in T&C products (Mytelka 1987) 
and the transition towards a state of slow demand growth. Indeed, in the 
industrialised world, consumer expenditure on clothing followed a similar 
trend to expenditures for all other products and fell from an annual average 
growth rate in volume of 4.5% during 1963-1973 to 2.5% in 1973-1983 
(Table 6). The slump was even more pronounced in the EEC, the largest 
                                                          




market for French exports, with the growth of expenditure falling from 4% in 
1963-1973 to 1% in 1973-1983.  
The slow pace of demand growth was significant in so far as it signalled that 
increasing production could not be fully absorbed by the market, ‘thereby, 
increasing the difficulty of making room for new producers’ (GATT 1984: 5). 
In other words, the increasing competition of late industrialisers which 
added up to the already competitive trade relations between developed 
countries revealed an excessive presence of capital within the global T&C 
sector. The overabundance of T&C producers created a hostile environment 
for French exports. As a result, the share of French products in the EEC 
market dropped significantly. Between 1973 and 1978 the share of French 
clothing dropped from 11.4% to 7.8%, while for textiles it dropped from 
11.4% to 10% during the same years (GATT 1984: 49). Thus, the relative 
saturation of demand for T&C products, while a crucial factor was not the 
cause of the crisis in itself. In fact, the crisis of the global T&C sector must 
be viewed within the inherent tendency of capital to produce limitlessly and 
independently of the market’s consuming capacity. 
Table 6: Annual growth of total consumer expenditure and expenditure on 





 Total Clothing Total Clothing 
1963-1973 5% 4.5% 4.5% 4% 
1973-1983 2.5% 2.5% 2% 1% 
(1) The industrialised world includes: the United states, Canada, the EEC, Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
and Switzerland. 
Source: GATT (1984) Textiles and Clothing in the World Economy. 
At the domestic level, the competitive struggle over the conquest of the T&C 
market had dramatic consequences on the sector’s employment and 
financial structures. Indeed, the combined pressures of a stagnant market 




with profitability falling from 7.5% in 1973 to around 5% in the late 1970s, 
after a marked fall to 1.5% in 1975 (Poncelet 1981: 254). The decrease in 
the rate of return put severe pressures upon firm’s financial structures. Debt-
to-equity ratio for 25% of T&C firms was around 110% in 1978, while in 
average the ratio augmented from 32% in 1972 to 66% in 1979, even 
reaching 72% in 1978 (Poncelet 1981: 254).  This is not extraordinarily high 
compared to for instance the steel sector’s indebtedness levels at the time 
(see Chapter 5), however it meant that firms’ operations became 
increasingly financed by debt at a time when returns were falling thereby 
increasing the risk of bankruptcy within the sector. Indeed, firms’ capacity to 
settle their debts was slowing down as the share of internal cash flows to 
value added decreased from an average 19% between 1973 and 1974 to a 
modest 9.35% during the last two years of the 1970s (Poncelet 1981: 256). 
Limited profit prospects and shrinking financial resources led to a drastic 
40% fall of investment between 1973 and 1978 (Poncelet 1981: 256). 
Falling investment rates further aggravated the competitive potential of the 
sector as in its majority it was already burdened with obsolete equipment 
dating from before the 1950s (Stoffaes 1978: 87). By not investing in new 
machinery, the sector was failing to circumvent the cost-advantage of NICs 
and imitate the technological advances of its developed counterparts. The 
repercussions on the sector’s employment were heavy since from 1973 to 
1979 jobs were shed at a rate of 27,000 per year leading to the 




Figure 4: Employment in the T&C industry 
 
Source: INSEE, Annuaire Statitique de la France, various years. 
In retrospective, the crisis experienced by the T&C sector was heavy in 
consequences but not unforeseeable. The inclination towards 
overproduction was an inherent attribute of the sector stemming from its 
uneven development and the profoundly dualistic nature of its industrial 
structures. In the 1970s, the flooding of foreign imports exacerbated the 
crisis-breeding tendencies already present domestically, accelerating the 
degradation of France’s trade performance. In fact, it is the mediocre 
progresses in modernisation and insufficient internationalisation efforts 
made by most of the sector that put French firms in a particularly vulnerable 
position within the spiral of overproduction in the global T&C industry leaving 
behind an array of empty factories and unemployed workers. Manifestly, a 
radical rationalisation of the sector was needed to eliminate the superfluous 
industrial capital weighing on the sector’s performance.  
The remainder of this chapter will outline the main ways through which the 
governments in power sought to implement a selective disengagement 



































































strategically most crucial T&C units. The different selective disengagement 




Table 7: Selective disengagement strategies between 1974 and 1984: 
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a large 
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is also able to 
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SEEKING ‘PROFESSIONAL’ HELP 
Throughout, the 1970s, the CIRIT remained the main organ through which 
aids were provided to the T&C sector to confront the grave crisis it was 
undergoing. This was a result of the limited support that the sector received 
from other established channels of industrial aids distribution (Poncelet 
1981: 305-315). By primarily relying on the CIRIT for the industry’s 
restructuring, Barre’s government was able to shift the financial weight of 
assistance to the profession itself while the general scarcity of resources 
imposed on the sector allowed the government to induce a prioritisation of 
the most competitive firms a as the CIRIT was forced to be sparing and 
selective in its attribution of aids. 
As mentioned earlier, in the 1960s, the effort to restructure the textile sector 
through the CIRIT was centred around a policy of industrial concentration. 
This strategy was by its nature very selective as it entailed the promotion of 
large conglomerates and the exclusion of marginal firms ‘unable to 
contemplate mergers or takeovers’ from state assistance (Underhill 1988: 
499). At the same time, the Committee assisted smaller, marginal, firms in 
their liquidation by providing funds for the compensation of the laid off 
personnel. In a sense the action of the CIRIT endorsed the conduction of 
an orderly devaluation of uncompetitive textile capital and the simultaneous 
promotion of bigger firms capable of facing the threat of foreign competition. 
Similarly, in the early 1970s the initial handling of intervention procedures 
by the CIRIT was based on equally restrictive criteria. From the 1st of July 
1971 to the 30th of June 1974, the CIRIT obtained government authorisation 
to implement a program of assistance to modernisation. This assistance 
was directed towards investments that were deemed ‘exceptional’; aids 
were granted insofar as the investments in question were significantly 
higher than the average volume of investment within the sector. The ‘period 
of so-called exceptional modernisation’21   was a strategy that de facto 
                                                          




excluded smaller or family-owned concerns from monetary help given that 
the plan already presupposed the financial capacity of firms to undertake 
large enough investments to modernise their productive structures. 
Selective disengagement was carried out by discriminating against smaller 
and uncompetitive firms in the provision of financial assistance. The end of 
the program coincided with the climax of the sector’s crisis and the 
acknowledgement of the increasingly threatening spectre of unemployment 
by business and government cycles. 
The importance of T&C employment for the stability of France’s social tissue 
rested not only on the fact that it occupied a considerable share of the 
country’s manufacturing jobs but also on its regional concentration. Indeed, 
in 1973 textiles occupied 390,000 and the clothing 300,000 wage earners, 
absorbing together, 11.5% of total manufacturing workers. Furthermore, 
these jobs tended to play a significant role in the employment structures of 
the Northern and North-Eastern regions of France: in the North, 31% of the 
manufacturing workforce of the Nord region was employed in the T&C 
sector while this number stood at 18% for the North-Eastern Region of 
Lorraine (INSEE 1975b: 57-58).  
In addition, even though the structure of the T&C sector based on the 
overwhelming presence of small firms acted as a natural barrier to the 
unionisation of labour (Berger 1980: 101), the social turmoil at the Lip watch 
plant in 1973 had shown that even so-called traditional sectors were not 
immune to social implosions (Zukin 1985: 357). At Lip, the plans of 
management to cease certain activities of the Besancon plant and layoff 
around 500 workers were met by a wildcat strike and an occupation of the 
plant along with massive regional support for the workers. Regional 
mobilisation constituted an important bastion against industrial restructuring 
and employment decline. The ‘Affaire Lip’ invigorated the necessity of 
containing and pacifying social conflicts. Necessarily, industrial policy had 
to also manage cases where the economic stakes were limited but where 




A strike at the Bouly tights and stockings plant in the city of Fourmies in the 
North occurring only weeks after the onset of the Lip strike, spread fears 
over the creation of a ‘new Lip’ (L’Unité 21 March 1974). The CIRIT and the 
MoI had renounced to provide financial assistance to the firm forcing it to 
bankruptcy as they deemed it economically inefficient.22 In order to mitigate 
the tense social climate local authorities and the professional association of 
the hosiery industry went to the rescue of part of the 500 laid off workers by 
assisting them in professional reconversion programs. The limited 
assistance received by governmental authorities in the Bouly case raised 
the alarm about the intransigency of intervention procedures in the sector 
and the regional implosions that such a stance could inadvertently 
engender.  
In a project submitted to the CIRIT in February 1974, the Union des 
Industries Textile (UIT), the employer’s association of the textile industry, 
was forced to admit that current procedures were ill-equipped to deal with 
cases ‘where operating difficulties experienced by firms run the risk of 
leading to the disappearance of jobs under conditions that are dangerous 
from a social perspective’.23 Indeed, the UIT observed that during the Bouly 
case the CIRIT’s lack of responsiveness became manifest and noted the 
incompatibility of its belated interventions with the rapid mediation required 
in contexts of growing social tensions.24 To remedy this situation, the UIT’s 
project stressed the necessity to institutionalise a preventive mechanism 
capable of automatically inciting emergency measures to prevent the 
escalation of conflict in situations where the financial decline of firms could 
significantly increase unemployment. The members of CIRIT shared similar 
concerns regarding the lessons drawn from the Bouly affair and reinstated 
the necessity to deploy a set of social measures on a case by case basis to 
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handle the situation of struggling firms depending on their employment 
situation and their geographical location.25 
The aggravation of the crisis and the concertation of the CIRIT with the 
professional associations of the sector led to the temporary adoption of a 
softer approach to grants distribution. Indeed, the CIRIT informed its 
members that its post-1974 intervention procedures, in addition to 
facilitating the structural adaptation of firms and their export performance, 
would also be motivated by social criteria such as the employment 
creation/maintenance capacity of firms which was expected to be further 
destabilised by the surge of imports following the conclusion of the MFA.26 
As a result, in its 9th annual report, the committee explained that while the 
initial restructuring aims of the CIRIT still persisted, the severe crisis that the 
sector’s firms were undergoing forced an adaptation of its procedures which 
in 1975 became guided by three essential preoccupations: the preservation 
of employment, the reinforcement of firms’ financial structures and the 
strengthening of their export capacity.  
Employment concerns became such a central feature of the CIRIT’s policy 
that in the same report, the committee explained that while its past policies 
towards marginal firms focused on facilitating their shut down, in 1975 it had 
to take into account the grave repercussions on employment and thus 
selectively provided support to firms on the basis of the efforts made to re-
employ the laid-off personnel.27  Similarly, the 10th annual report explained 
that in 1976, ‘the committee decided that it could not, given the prevailing 
employment conditions, incite the closing down of firms even if that would 
have been reasonable from a purely economic standpoint.’ 28  CIRIT’s 
intervention procedures were, thus, subject to some degree of flexibilisation 
which was further manifest in its increasing opening up towards smaller and 
medium firms. Out of the 160 cases that benefitted from interventions in 
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1976, 101 of them consisted of small and medium firms which implied an 
almost five-fold increase compared to the 1975 exercise.29 Evidently, the 
selective disengagement from less competitive units was slowed down by 
the tense social climate created by the rise of unemployment. 
For 1977, the government envisaged an increase in the responsibilities and 
tasks to be carried out by the CIRIT. On the 29th of December 1976 an 
interministerial committee allowed the CIRIT to engage in a new program 
aiming at increasing the competitiveness of the textile industry. This new 
round of assistance to the sector’s firms applied less strict criteria than its 
1971-1974 predecessor. It did not only consider exceptional investments 
but investments that were deemed interesting in terms of increasing the 
firm’s competitiveness rendering the conditions for CIRIT’s participation in 
a firm’s investment program less restrictive. The apparently semantic 
difference between the aims of the two programs rested on the fact that the 
CIRIT’s contribution to investment plans did not depend solely upon the 
extent to which proposed investments exceeded the average in the sector, 
as during the 1971-1974 period, but on a great set of conditions such as the 
market situation for the products affected by the investment program, the 
probability for the program to be successful,  the perspectives on the export 
performance of a firm or the intensity of foreign competition in the firm’s 
field.30  
At the same time, the CIRIT was instructed to become increasingly involved 
in cases pertaining to the clothing sector. The directives given by the inter-
ministerial committee thus, allowed the CIRIT to enlarge its field of action31 
and undertake a more comprehensive role in restoring the competitiveness 
of the sector which demarcated it from its initial aim of simply stimulating 
concentration to the benefit of larger firms. Additionally, one of the most 
                                                          
29 ibid. 
30 AN 19830427/24, Note for Mr Pivot, 11 March 1977; AN 19830427/24, 10th annual 
Report of the CIRIT, 1976. 




significant aspects of the post-1977 assistance to the sector was the 
introduction of the Plans Professionels, a set of sub-sectoral plans 
addressed to sectors hardly hit by intensified foreign competition and 
‘whose critical situation brought along localised problems in terms of 
employment’.32 These ‘emergency’ plans were worked out jointly by the 
concerned professional associations, the CIRIT and the MoI with the latter 
two providing around 25% of the necessary funds for the investment of firms 
belonging to the said sector. Such plans were executed in 1978 in the cotton 
industry, the texturisation and filament-throwing industry and the combed 
wool spinning industry.   
However, the attempt to broaden the criteria for CIRIT’s intervention and the 
adoption of emergency measures to rescue firms hardly hit by the crisis, 
was severely limited by two factors. Firstly, the concern over employment 
maintenance was undermined by the rational economic planning needed to 
confront the harsh conditions imposed by global T&C competition. For 
instance, the safeguard of production units despite the lack of viable 
economic motives run contrary to the overproduction tendencies of the 
sector. As an example, in May 1977 the president of the French Cotton 
Industry Federation transmitted to the CIRIT his dissatisfaction with the 
latter’s promotion of modernisation investments within the household 
textiles industry as it disregarded the already overwhelming overcapacities 
of the sector and the limited capacity of the market to absorb excess 
products.33 The prevalent overproduction tendencies in many subsectors of 
the textile industry therefore became a central concern of the CIRIT since 
early 1977,34 forcing it to officially include a clause on the discouragement 
of further investment in sectors known for their overcapacities in France or 
in the European Community, in April of the same year.35  Ultimately, the 
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emergency sub-sectoral plans of 1978 were implemented with a clear 
intention to cut down production levels and adjust them to the limits of the 
market rather than to maintain current employment levels (Underhill 1986: 
278-284). 
Secondly, the availability of financial resources within the CIRIT’s budget 
rested entirely on the sums collected from the parafiscal tax on the 
industry’s revenues. Its interventions were thus limited by budgetary 
considerations. In fact, given the aggravated economic climate, the CIRIT’s 
expenditures significantly exceeded its incomes by 35% in 1976, 45% in 
1977 and 15% in 1978, but was able to finance its programmes through the 
reserves it had accumulated during the previous years. In its own words the 
situation was as follows: 
For two years the sum of [CIRIT’s] interventions has exceeded the 
sum of the proceeds from the levy for the same period. This was 
permitted by the existence of reserves while awaiting for an increase 
in resources to come from, on the one hand, an extension of the tax 
base to the clothing industries, and on the other, from certain 
allotments expected from the CAPI [Credits d’Actions de Politique 
Industrielle].36 Neither of these measures has intervened so far.37 
Thus, by the end of 1978, the CIRIT regretfully observed that its 
interventions had not been supplemented by state-financed industrial 
subsidies. Instead, the MoI’s preferred solution to remedy the budgetary 
imbalances of the CIRIT was, on the one hand, to incite the CIRIT to 
‘decrease its expenses by applying a greater selectivity in the choice of 
subsidised projects’ and on the other, to augment its resources through a 
fusion of the textile and clothing parafiscal tax which would augment its total 
resources by 20%. 38  The increasing cost of intervention was to be 
transferred once again to the profession itself. Because of these financial 
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limitations and its reliance on its own funds, the CIRIT was forced to restrict 
its field of action and concentrate its participation to investments which could 
significantly enhance the productivity of firms.39 After 1978 the intervention 
procedures of the CIRIT became increasingly reminiscent of its pre-1974 
patterns of intervention as they privileged the most competitive firms whose 
proposed investment programs demarcated them from their domestic 
competitors. 
The first years of the textile crisis where marked by the absence of direct 
state involvement in the manner that other sectors, such as the shipbuilding 
or steel industry, had witnessed. Comfortably disengaged from the great 
crisis of the sector, the state confined itself to providing general guidelines 
for intervention while transferring the responsibility for the great bulk of the 
restructuring effort and the social costs associated with it to the CIRIT in 
which the representatives of the profession held a preponderant role. Along 
with the political responsibility for the management of the crisis, public 
authorities passed too to the professional associations the financial costs of 
intervention which was financed by the taxes collected from the concerned 
industries. The need for a selective disinvestment in the sector thus 
operated through the scarcity of funds imposed upon the CIRIT. By 
delegating the financial responsibility for the sector’s rationalisation to the 
professions themselves, the state put a limit to the CIRIT’s temptation to 
yield to social pressures to secure employment. Within a context of limited 
funds, increased selectivity became the main mechanism available for the 
attribution of aids. However, the failure of this strategy to redress the T&C 
crisis, which carried on rampantly in the late 1970s, showed the incapacity 
of an inter-professional body to on its own formulate an overall strategy for 
exiting the sector’s crisis.  
FROM BURDEN TO STRATEGIC SECTOR? (1980-1981) 
                                                          




The main shortcoming of the CIRIT-led strategy of industrial adjustment was 
the public impression that the government put the sector’s situation on the 
backburner as industrial policy prioritised the recovery of other sectors such 
as steel or shipbuilding which had benefitted from emergency plans in 1977 
and 1978 accordingly. In addition, since 1979 six sectors were granted the 
‘strategic sector’ status by the CODIS, an inter-ministerial Committee 
responsible for identifying the economically most promising industrial 
activities and coordinating the diffusion of existing subsidies towards these 
sectors (i.e. office equipment, consumer electronics, robotics, bio-
technology, underwater and energy-reducing activities). Conversely, until 
then the fate of the T&C sector was clearly relegated to a secondary role. 
In 1980 however, the inscription of T&C into the CODIS scheme led to an 
ostensibly increased involvement of the state into the sector’s affairs. The 
government’s intervention was devised in a way that allowed it to 
discursively show its determination to remedy the sector’s economic and 
social crisis while at the same time discreetly implementing an industrial 
strategy focused on promoting the development of strategic T&C clusters 
and endorsing the selective disengagement from the sector’s least lucrative 
activities. 
As the sector did not witness any significant improvement of its crisis-ridden 
situation by the early 1980s, Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s presidency lost the 
convenience of bypassing direct state involvement in the sector’s affairs by 
using the CIRIT as the sole medium for financial assistance. Indeed, with 
unemployment and partial employment in the T&C workforce growing in the 
wake of the 1981 presidential elections, the sector’s crisis acquired a fresh 
political significance. The political stakes of the T&C crisis were well 
captured by the senator of the Nord region and Vice-President of the 
Senate, Maurice Schumann, who in a letter to Valéry Giscard d’Estaing  
dating from September 1980 explained that in order to vanquish the ‘textile 




to formulate a comprehensive plan rather than to contingently implement a 
scattered set of measures.40 Even further, he argued that:  
The best course of action and one whose moral impact will be 
considerable is, of course, to apply on textiles the CODIS 
procedures. If it becomes the seventh prioritised sector, the 600,000 
textile and clothing workers will cease to, worryingly, lend an ear to 
those who tell them that public authorities are resigned to the demise 
of their livelihood and focus the totality of their efforts on cutting-
edge technologies.41  
On the 5th of November 1980, five months prior to the electoral confrontation 
with the socialists, the MoI announced the integration of T&C into the 
CODIS scheme and their official consolidation as a key sector for the 
reinforcement of France’s industrial tissue. As put by Bobe (1983: 19) later 
in a World Bank working paper: ‘On the eve of the last elections, in a 
somewhat unusual move, textiles were added to... [the] high priority sectors. 
Clearly, political necessity makes its own laws’. By elevating textiles to the 
status of strategic industry the government de facto politicised the 
management of T&C as the modernisation and recovery was inscribed into 
the state’s industrial priorities. 
The integration of textiles in the CODIS procedures was part of a wider plan 
in favour of T&C announced in 1980. This plan also included a relaxation of 
the rules of eligibility to obtain loans from the CIDISE, yet another inter-
ministerial committee charged with attributing participatory loans to 
medium-sized firms with weakened financial structures but strong export 
potential. In addition, the new plan entailed the substitution of the CIRIT by 
the CIRITH which operated according to the same principles as the former 
only with greater resources as it now benefitted from the parafiscal taxes on 
                                                          





both textile and clothing articles which altogether reached a yearly 150 
million francs.42  
Underpinning the design of the plan was the observation that the state 
should be the key formulator of the strategic aims necessary for increasing 
the international competitiveness of the sector. 43   Indeed, among the 
weaknesses of T&C listed by the MoI featured the inability of the sector’s 
industrialists to formulate sound long-term strategies in the absence of a 
firmly protectionist environment.44 Without a decisive public intervention, the 
T&C industrialists would adopt a defensive strategy and retreat from the 
international scene. 45  The necessity to concede the delineation of the 
sector’s blueprint to the state was a concern shared not only among public 
figures but within T&C industrialists as well.46 In break with the policy of the 
first years of the crisis, the government was, now, forced to assume the 
political and financial responsibilities of the sector’s recovery from the crisis. 
However, the government’s changing attitude towards T&C did not entail an 
at all costs attempt to save the totality of the sector. This idea had been 
explicitly dismissed in a CODIS reunion in July 1980.47 Rather, it consisted 
of a targeted deindustrialisation effort underpinned by an increasing 
selectivity with regards to the choice of destination of public aids. While, 
previously selective disengagement operated through the scarcity of 
CIRIT’s funds, it was now achieved by way of prioritising the funding of 
specific segments of the industry and leaving the rest to the fate of 
international competition. Thus, the MoI was resigned to ‘accept a limited 
trade deficit with developing countries’, while ‘aiming to stabilise or even 
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achieve a surplus in the trade balance with the country’s developed 
counterparts.’48  
More precisely, as suggested by the MoI’s forecasting agency, the desirable 
objectives to be sought were, the stabilisation of the deficit in hosiery 
garments and apparels, a slight surplus in chemical textiles and strong 
surplus in upstream T&C activities. 49  Overall, this ‘ordered 
deindustrialisation’ strategy was guided by a double aim: firstly, to contain 
the degradation of France’s trade balance in T&C products by limiting the 
deficit at 20,000 million francs regardless of the employers’ call for greater 
protectionism 50  and secondly, to slow down the shedding of jobs and 
instead of the projected 40,000-50,000 yearly job losses to bring this rate 
down to the more ‘acceptable proportions’ of around 15,000-20,000 yearly 
job losses.51 As described by the MoI France’s T&C policy was one of 
‘selective protectionism’52 aiming at maintaining the core of the sector’s 
potential while allowing the fading away of its superfluous elements. Since, 
under the prevailing conditions a complete ‘disengagement’ from the sector 
‘was socially as well as economically impermissible’,53 the state intended to 
implement a strategy permitting a temporary political palliation of the 
undergoing social disruptions while limiting its intervention to the 
commercially most strategic sub-sectors. 
As an ‘expert’ in identifying and promoting the strategic elements of 
France’s industrial body, the CODIS was charged with implementing the 
government’s intended selective devaluation strategy. Indeed, the CODIS’s 
intervention in T&C was designed to concern a very limited number of firms 
pertaining to the sector. When designing the principles of the CODIS’s 
interventions the MoI determined the main attributes and assets that should 
characterise the candidate firms such as their capacity to innovate, their 
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international renown and their internationally oriented commercial 
strategies.54 It was argued that out of the 500 firms of the sector employing 
more than 200 workers only a meagre 20% could satisfactorily correspond 
to the profile sought, with ultimately only 20 to 30 firms being potentially 
retained and granted aids through the CODIS. 55  Its rigorous selection 
criteria entailed a promotion of firms able to adopt international dimensions 
and competitiveness levels.56 Selective liquidation concerned small-scale 
firms since the presence of a vast number of small and medium-sized firms, 
particularly vulnerable to international pressures, contributed to the sector’s 
lack of overall strategy.57 
Based on a study by the PEAT MARWICK MITHCELL and Co consultant 
agency, which was charged with providing a list of the T&C markets in which 
French firms could develop a stronger presence, the MoI sought to identify 
the main T&C clusters that should be prioritised through the CODIS’s 
actions. Ultimately, these were reduced down to nine in September 1980 
and included: women’s leisure trousers, sports clothing, dyeing and finishing 
of fabrics, textile printing, textiles for the automobile industry, textiles for 
medical usage, geo-textiles and other textiles destined for technical and 
industrial use.58  The industrial choices of French authorities were thus, 
motivated by an intention to circumvent the saturated markets of T&C in 
which production in developing countries had taken the upper hand and to 
orient the domestic industry’s productive potential towards new markets 
growing faster than average59 that were, relatively, left untouched by the 
global overproduction of T&C articles. Withthis strategy of specialisation 
aiming at capturing “virgin” markets, the government hoped to reconcile the 
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aim of stabilising the trade deficit and preserving certain jobs within the 
French territory. 
The rationally planned intervention of the CODIS stood in direct contrast 
with the political discourse attached to it which initially indicated the 
government’s intention to level up the totality of the T&C sector. Indeed, the 
MoI intended to discursively frame the plan as an attempt to indiscriminately 
aid the sector despite its strict selectivity criteria:  
with regards to the publicity of the CODIS’ decisions, it is not 
appropriate to publicly announce which clusters were retained; it 
should be simply announced that the CODIS is ready to examine the 
plans proposed by firms implementing innovations of a strategic 
character.60 
Thus, originally, the CODIS concealed its sub-sectoral selectivity from the 
public, the media and the industrialists by fear of being imputed of applying 
an arbitrary selection process and instead preferred to publicise its aids as 
being more generally available to all firms undertaking strategical and 
innovative investments.61  
The government was well aware of the limited scope of its industrial plans 
and its inaptitude to appease the growing social dissatisfaction over the 
proliferation of firms’ closures and most importantly the rapid progression of 
imports, popularly considered as ‘the source of all evils’.62 However, in the 
eve of the presidential elections and within the context of mounting 
dissatisfaction at the grassroots level and political pressures from the 
government’s main political antagonists, the Socialist Party (PS) and the 
Rally for the Republic (RPR), the cabinet of the MoI realised in the nick of 
time the necessity to adopt a new set of trade-related measures in order to 
show the government’s determination and prevent a social outburst.63 As 
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Eric André from the MoI cabinet put it: ‘Under these conditions it is expedient 
that measures with political and psychological scopes are implemented 
forthwith rather than in response to such an interpellation.’64 Ultimately, 
these considerations culminated in the adoption of the March 1981 
governmental measures regarding the reinforcement of import controls. 
These measures promised a more stringent supervision of imports (e.g. 
measures against fraud, exact respect of import quotas) and a stricter 
application of the GATT’s safeguard provisions – such as the article XIX or 
“escape clause”- permitting to hamper the rate of imports in sectors where 
domestic industry is highly vulnerable to soaring imports. 
Overall, within a politically and socially charged climate the government 
decided to adopt a more interventionist stance in T&C and politicise its 
affairs during the last year of VGE’s rule. However, with the trade deficit 
having further aggravated in 1980 plunging down to 3,400 million francs and 
the workforce having lost some 37,000 workers in only one year, labour 
failed to reap any benefits from the government’s measures. The 
government’s attempted strategy to orderly deindustrialise the sector 
through the selective promotion of key T&C clusters while simultaneously 
sending workers reassuring signals of a comprehensive plan failed to yield 
the expected political results. Combined with the wider distress and crisis 
prevailing in French industry, the way was paved for a shift in the country’s 
political landscape and a change in its elected representatives. The last-
minute efforts of the MoI to adopt a stricter stance towards imports failed to 
boost the morale of the regions and workers depended on the T&C sector 
and to ultimately halt Mitterrand’s march towards the presidency. The 
responsibility of industrial policy was now handed over to Mitterrand’s first 
socialist government of the Vth Republic. 
DEINDUSTRIALISATION DELAYED (1981-1984) 





With Mitterrand at the head of the Vth Republic, 
Pierre Mauroy's socialist government, which also featured four ministers 
from the French Communist Party (PCF), was committed to a radically 
demarcated economic policy to tackling the crisis. To remedy 
unemployment, which exceeded 1.5 million, the government proceeded to 
reducing working time by decreasing the official duration of the working 
week from 40 to 39 hours, granting a fifth week of paid leave and decreasing 
the retiring age from 65 to 60. These laws aimed at liberating enough 
working time in the economy so as to effectively permit the absorption of the 
excess workforce. Also, in a Keynesian-inspired vein, the government's 
economic policy sought to boost domestic demand to fuel domestic 
production. Thus, the SMIC- the minimum inteprofessional wage- was 
augmented by 10% as were other welfare payments such as family 
allowances and pensions.  
On the industrial side of things, the government promulgated its ambition to 
‘reconquer the domestic market’ by limiting import penetration and 
stimulating the substitution of imports by domestic production. To this end, 
the government launched a wave of nationalisations of both the 
major private banking institutions and some large industrial firms in 
electronics (Thomson-Brandt), chemicals (Rhone Poulenc), aluminium 
(PUK), construction material (Saint-Gobain), steel (Sacilor, Usinor). These 
policies allowed the state to take control of the restructuring agenda 
and dispose of the financial means necessary to implement it. The 
government also crafted a list of comprehensive sectoral plans in which the 
T&C featured prominently along with machine-tools, chemistry, electronics, 
furniture, toys and, the chronically ill, steel industry. In the case of T&C, 
Mauroy’s government initially endorsed a politicised management of the 
sector’s crisis consisting of a financial relief accorded to a great share of the 
sector’s firms. The plan sought to strengthen the popularity of the newly 
elected government and continue the strategy of selective disengagement 




politicisation of the sector clashed with the economic viability of this sectoral 
plan, the government switched to a market-led adjustment of the sector by 
putting the elimination of uncompetitive firms in the hands of international 
competition while providing state support only to the commercially most 
successful companies. 
According to Mitterrand, there were no condemned sectors, not even the 
so-called traditional sectors such as T&C, only sectors in need of 
modernisation; industrial policy was to be determined publicly rather than 
succumbing to the prerogatives of the international division of labour 
(Mitterrand, 1982). The objective to recover domestic industry by 
recapturing the domestic market gave a heavily politicised flavour to 
industrial policy and consequently raised the tension between the economic 
imperatives of restructuring and the social responsibilities of the recently 
elected government towards its electorate. Once again, the necessity for a 
politicised and top-down handling of T&C was the underlying trait of the of 
the socialists’ program for T&C. Indeed, the weakening financial situation of 
firms and the radical decrease of their internal cash flows along with the 
increase in interest rates on the market were affecting the totality of the 
sector from the smallest to the largest firms making public financial 
contributions an indispensable prerequisite for the resumption of 
investment. 65  Selectivity in the distribution of aids still permeated the 
socialists’ stance towards textiles but was significantly watered down 
compared to the CODIS procedures which were dismantled in 1982. 
Announced in November 1981, the principal novelty of the socialists’ Textile 
Plan was the introduction of a clause on the relief in firms’ social 
contributions. The latter, which was officially termed Contrats Emploi-
Investissement (CEI) and launched in March 1982, instituted a system of 
social contributions reduction of 12%, 10% and 8% with the aim of helping 
firms to liberate enough funds to finance their investments in new 
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technologies. The attribution of rates of relief obeyed to a hierarchical logic 
whereby the best-performing firms would be eligible for a 12% relief 
while those in a less healthy situation, but better than those not signing a 
contract at all, would receive the 10% rate.66 Attached to the CEIs were two 
conditions: firstly,  firms seeking to obtain a 12% or 10% deduction were to 
undertake investments reaching 1.5% of their revenues for textile and 1.4% 
for clothing firms and secondly, all participant firms were asked to seek the 
re-conversion of laid off workers. Finally, the 8% deduction was an 
exceptional clause as it was introduced mostly for struggling firms residing 
in regions which would have been acutely destabilised in social and 
economic terms if these firms where to shut down.67 As open and far-
reaching the plan was, the best performing firms and those less affected by 
the crisis constituted the fulcrum of the government's T&C policy. 68 
Retrospectively, the subsidised assistance of the textile plan served a 
double purpose: to delay the lay-offs in more marginal firms by temporarily 
enhancing their financial accounts and to simultaneously guarantee the 
modernisation of more dynamic and export-oriented conglomerates that 
had received the 12% discount. 
Nevertheless, the first year, of the CEI's application was 
rather undiscriminating as around 3,000 firms, or around 66% of the sector's 
firms, were able to sign such contracts. When it did discriminate it did so 
towards smaller firms while making sure that all big textile firms participated 
in the plan.69 However, its effects were more mitigated. As explained by the 
MoI in a letter to the Prime Minister: ‘The first results of a year-long 
application of this procedure were socially very satisfying but economically 
absolutely insufficient.’ 70  While from a ‘social perspective’ the CEIs 
managed to spectacularly refrain the surge of layoffs limiting them to 6,500 
in 1982, the economic effects were much less 
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pronounced. Investment did increase by 25%, but the sector's trade 
performance proved to be rather poor as the trade deficit doubled from 
4,000 million francs to 8,000 million francs the following 
year. Nevertheless, MoI congratulated itself on the plan given ‘its 
unanimous endorsement by elected representatives, the employers and 
trade unions’ and noted the net political gains for the government.71 
Despite the mediocre benefits of the CEIs on France's external commerce 
the MoI decided to push for a renewal of the contracts 
as was originally planned. Its insistence rested mainly on political/social 
considerations. Indeed, as 1983 was going to predictably be a harsh year 
for the sector, in the absence of CEIs, an increase in laying offs would have 
been blamed on the lack of government initiative72 given that the regional 
concentration of employment put industrial policy ‘in the public eye’.73 Given 
the little economic benefits of the CEIs, the government was, to speak with 
Streeck (2014), buying time- political time- by postponing the coming 
massive devaluation and extracting political support in the meanwhile.  
At the same time rampant inflation and the speculative pressures on the 
Franc which had been devalued twice since 1981 rendered budgetary rigour 
all the more pressing in order to restore credibility within international 
financial markets (Lordon 1998: 101). Thus, the Ministry of the Economy 
and the Ministry of the Budget disapproved the renewal of the CEIs 
defending a position of less assistance to the sector to consolidate 
budgetary restraint. 74  Similar concerns were expressed by state 
administrators working within the Commissariat Général du Plan. For 
instance, Jean Cheval had argued that the sectoral plan was setting ‘a 
dangerous precedent’ as the political motivations underpinning the plan 
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were privileging employment objectives over industrial ones.75 However, as 
noted by Mitterrand’s industrial advisor, Alain Boulbil, in essence the 
government’s plan was concerned with slowing down the rate of 
employment decrease as opposed to halt its overall decline: ‘In textiles, the 
government’s objective can only be to lower the ongoing decrease in the 
workforce; in no case should it be to maintain the current workforce.’76 In 
short, intra-state conflicts over the textile plan were mainly centred around 
its financial cost and the pace of implementation of selective disengagement 
as opposed to the latter’s necessity. Ultimately, following the inter-
ministerial councils of February 1983 the Prime Minister’s cabinet sided in 
favour of the MoI’s proposal to resume the CEIs.77 
This debate was however exported to the supranational level as the renewal 
of the CEIs was met with a juridical dispute between France and the EEC 
on the plan’s compliance with article 92 of the Treaty of Rome that forbids 
the implementation of state aids that distort competition in the common 
market. The European Commission (EC) too argued for an increased 
selectivity in the attribution of aids especially in sectors already known for 
their overcapacities at the European level such as wool. 78  For the 
Commission ‘there [were] too many people in the EEC’s textile for a few 
places in the sun’79.  
To abide by the accumulation imperatives echoed by the EEC while 
simultaneously reaping the domestic political benefits of the CEIs, the latter 
were reinvigorated in early 1983 but operated with greater selectivity. Thus, 
the conditions attached to CEIs became stricter. On the one hand, the 
exigencies on the re-employment of laid off workers were flexibilised as the 
government demanded from firms to simply avoid having recourse to brutal 
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layoffs without however compromising their competitiveness. 80  On the 
other, the minimum investments necessary for CEI eligibility increased by 
70% for textiles and by 40% for clothing with the UIT lamenting that a great 
number of firms that signed a contract in 1982 would not be able to do so in 
1983. 81  Overall, during the second year of the CEIs’ application, a 
somewhat greater degree of selectivity was applied but nevertheless the 
contracts englobed 2,500 firms or 50% of the sector.  
A few years later, a report of the MoI's statistical board presented in 1986 
showed that whatever beneficial effects might have been delivered by the 
plan in terms of investment growth and employment conservation during the 
first two years of its application, were cancelled out by 1984. 82  Even 
more strikingly, the report argued that during the whole period covered by 
CEIs signatory firms witnessed very little, if any, gains in terms of market 
share increases, investment growth and employment 
conservation compared to non-signatory ones.83 Well aware of the palliative 
nature of the plan, the MoI was at the time expecting a doubling of the rate 
of job losses from –2.8% in 1982 to -6% in 1985 since many firms had to 
maintain an excess workforce in order to abide by the CEIs' conditions on 
employment.84 The MoE went as far as to argue that up to 8,000 jobs were 
maintained artificially and would not be viable in the future.85  
In addition, the MoI had argued that both the protectionist stance against 
developing counties imports defended by French authorities in the EEC as 
well as the textile plan itself were of a transitory nature. Indeed, the 
protection of domestic producers through the concluded Multi Fibre 
Agreements were serving only as a breathing room for firms to modernise 
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and adapt to global market conditions.86 Similarly, in the MoI’s view, if the 
CEIs continued indefinitely firms ‘would never become competitive on their 
own’.87 Both the ending of the textile plan and the lifting of imports were 
considered by the socialist government as a precondition for the resumption 
of competitiveness by the sector’s firms. The underlying preference for a 
stricter adjustment of industry to market conditions was also testified by the 
government’s decision to remain in the European Monetary System in 1983. 
By doing so it relinquished its right to use devaluation to enhance 
competitiveness thereby enforcing a tighter market discipline on individual 
producers to maintain their price parities with competitors (Clift 2003: 
182).Therefore, the essential aim of the CEIs and the strict monitoring of 
imports was to temporarily refrain the urge of firms to proceed to mass 
layoffs in order to delay the negative political impact of an inevitable growth 
in unemployment. As Hayward (1986: 235) puts it, Mitterrand was simply 
delaying ‘the day of reckoning’. 
In 1984, amidst strident discontent from the UIT which was particularly 
attached to the CEIs,88 the government decided not to renew them and 
instead sought to accelerate the strategy of selective disengagement. The 
successor plan was already being devised in early 198389 and sought to 
obtain more tangible results in the competitiveness of firms than CEIs. Using 
an annual budget amounting to a yearly 150 million francs collected from 
the parafiscal T&C tax, the Committee for the Promotion of Textile and 
Clothing Products (CDPTH) - as the CIRITH’s successor was named in 
March 1983- was charged with subsidising loans for a limited number of 
firms planning investment in new technologies. In fact, the CDPTH 
procedure would constitute a mixture between the CIRITH-era intervention 
and the CODIS’s logic of strategic targeting: the resources for aids to the 
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sector would be collected from the firms themselves while the MoI would 
give the guidelines for the selection of recipient firms. In contrast to the 
CODIS procedure, this strategic targeting was not based on the selection of 
specific clusters within T&C but mostly on the types of technological 
investment proposed by firms such as in computer assisted processes, 
robotisation of spinning, automatization of knitting and weaving etc.90 
Another indispensable feature of the CDPTH’s plan of action consisted in 
the promotion of French products in domestic and foreign markets with 
fashion products gaining a newfound prominence in the MoI’s plans.91 
Again, the targeted promotion of the sector’s exports would not be 
indiscriminately accessible to all applicant firms but would involve a strict 
top-down selection process of the firms that are more susceptible to implant 
themselves in foreign markets.92 As it was understandably asked by an 
agency attached to the MoI and responsible for external commerce: 
Is it…desirable to continue subsidising firms…that after several years 
of marketing have never been able to penetrate the market and would, 
in all likelihood, never have any chance of success[?]93 
Thus, selective disengagement was to be carried out also by way of a 
selective promotion of T&C exports while allowing uncompetitive firms to 
fade away by way of unassisted exposure to foreign competition. 
However, the adoption of yet another aid package for the sector was met 
with resistance within the government. Indeed, the Ministry of the 
Economy, Finances and the Budget had consistently argued against the 
continuation of parafiscal methods of subsidisation as it believed that it 
would constitute an economically ‘dangerous choice’.94 Pierre Bérégovoy, 
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93 Ibid. 
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Minister of the Economy, explained to Edith Cresson, the minister of 
Industry, that his Ministry’s opposition to the subsidisation of T&C loans 
stood on a two-fold reasoning. Firstly, parafiscal methods of financing 
constituted an intrinsically inflationary factor and the continuous recourse to 
such methods could create a path-dependency that would encourage an-
ever increasing number of sectors across the economy to adopt them 
rendering the reduction of parafiscality impossible. Secondly, the 
proliferation of subsidised loans could only hinder the natural competition 
between industrial networks.95 The Ministry of the Economy, thus, stood for 
a stricter market-led adjustment of the textile industry and the abolition of 
the system of aids by fear that it would merely perpetuate financial 
assistance without any visible results in performance.  
Ultimately, the government chose to launch the CDPTH procedure in1985 
but after a prolonged juridical dispute with the EEC, the program of 
subsidised loans through the CDPTH was rejected by the European Court 
in 1987 as it was found to infringe article 92. At last, the French government 
adopted the initial prescriptions of the Ministry of the Economy and 
abandoned the idea of a comprehensive plan of financial assistance to T&C. 
Instead, the CDPTH’s actions were restricted to the second component of 
its project namely the targeted promotion of French T&C products. Industrial 
policy towards textiles became thus limited to a “state-backed marketing” of 
firms with the highest aptitude to capture foreign markets while the less 
successful firms were destined to decline. The latter was a core component 
of the government’s newfound attitude towards selective disengagement 
since the MoI itself ultimately became reluctant to distribute funds to 
uncompetitive firms only to avoid a degradation of employment levels.96 At 
last the MoI’s Textile directorate became convinced that ‘the attribution of 
financial aids to maintain firms artificially alive should be proscribed’.97  
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Under the socialists, the selective disengagement strategy of the previous 
governments was mitigated by their concern to build political backing within 
the sector’s agents. The strategy of selective disengagement did not 
disappear under their rule but was watered down for the first two years of 
Mitterrand’s presidency, before adopting the MoE’s proposal for a more 
brutal adaptation of the sector to foreign competition. While the legal 
constraints imposed by the EEC were a fundamental barrier to the 
continuation of a publicly financed modernisation of the sector, the 
abandonment of the aid package was at the same time a policy preference 
expressed by civil servants operating within the MoE and other agencies. 
Thus, the pressure to end textile assistance did not come solely from the 
pressures of the EEC or the exigencies of the International Division of 
Labour to abandon specialisation in labour-intensive activities but was 
endogenous to the state itself.  
Market competition was to determine the pace and intensity of 
disengagement from uncompetitive T&C activities. The industry's 
superfluous elements would fade away by way of exposure to foreign 
competition, while firms performing the best in foreign markets would benefit 
from the export promotion actions of the CDPTH. The market-led 
adjustment method preconised by the MoE entailed a more brutal and 
unmediated adjustment of textiles to global market conditions. Unlike the 
previous attempt to ‘humanise’ industrial restructuring (i.e. the CEIs) and 
undergo the sector through a ‘slow euthanasia’ in order to defuse social 
contestation, the government adopted a ‘surgical’ approach by exposing the 
sector to international competition without state arbitration and support (Hau 
2007: 35). As Cohen (1982: 25) had anticipated, market-led adjustments in 
lagging sectors were in fact state-controlled processes in which ‘laissez-






This chapter has argued that deindustrialisation in the T&C sector was a 
state-managed affair. In other words, the form that deindustrialisation took 
within the sector was shaped by the successive governments' industrial 
preferences. The key aspect of these consecutive industrial policies was the 
selectivity applied to the distribution of aids which in essence entailed a top-
down selection of the production units that would survive the crisis and 
constitute the hard core of domestic T&C production and a consequent 
marginalisation of firms less apt to figure in the sector's nucleus.  
Although the modalities of application of selective disengagement 
underwent through four distinct phases it was a consistent policy-preference 
of the successive governments, including the Socialists. Despite the latter’s 
attempt to mitigate the decline of certain T&C industries through the CEIs, 
industrial policy progressively embraced a stricter selective disengagement 
strategy by abandoning marginal firms to the fate of international 
competition. The early socialist promulgation that instead of condemned 
sectors there were only sectors in need of modernisation was not really 
abandoned, but after the economically poor results of the CEIs it was 
realised that this modernisation could not take place without important 
regional and social sacrifices. Enhancing the competitiveness within 
domestic industry could only be supported by a more selective industrial 
policy rather than an uncompromised support of commercially unviable 
firms (Bernard 2015: 123).  
While often considered as a typical example of a natural case of 
deindustrialisation given NICs comparative advantage in T&C production 
within the contemporary IDL, this chapter demonstrated that 
deindustrialisation of T&C cannot be conceptualised as the unfolding of 
structural market forces. The liquidation of segments of the industry was a 
policy pursued by the consecutive governments themselves in their effort to 





The chapter also shed light on the relationship between the French state 
and the EEC. While the successive legal disputes between French 
authorities and the EEC might at first sight betray a divergence of interests 
and ultimately the EC’s powers to subdue domestic policy by forbidding the 
implementation of domestic plans, such as the CDPTH, at the same time 
the EC’s proscriptions did not fundamentally alter the aims of the 
government. For the government, the CEIs were only an exceptional and 
temporary form of assistance as they served to merely delay the rate of 
employment decline rather than avoid it. Similarly, the plan to subsidise 
investments through the CDPTH was contested by civil servants within the 
government, especially the MoE, not only the EC. In fact, both intra-state 
conflicts and disagreements with the EEC concerned the pace of 
implementation of selective disengagement, not its necessity. As the state 
was finding it difficult to discipline itself in light of the regional implications of 
T&C decline, the EC thanks to  its unaccountability articulated in an 
uninhibited way, freed from democratic considerations, the rationalisation 
aims of the government. Without succumbing to regional or labour interests, 
the EC was able to reinforce the French state’s capitalist purpose. 






STEEL: BY WAY OF BRUSSELS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In many respects, the steel industry held a heavier political weight in 
France’s economic life than T&C. Firstly, the capital-intensive nature of steel 
production and the high cost of investments, rendered it particularly 
vulnerable in times of crisis as a great share of the industry could all at once 
become idle (Daley 1996: 121). Secondly, given the large-scale character 
of its manufacturing infrastructure the steel industry tended to be heavily 
regionally concentrated (Smith 1998: 154). Thirdly, the great levels of 
concentration and the very existence of large plants allowed for a better 
organisation of labour and a stronger capacity for mobilisation which in 
times of crisis gives labour the opportunity to make its presence stronger in 
the political scene (Daley 1996: 122). The high economic and social stakes 
of the steel industry came to the fore during the 1970s crisis. Indeed, the 
global crisis of overproduction in which French steel was caught 
necessitated a drastic disengagement from the sector’s unprofitable 
activities which entailed grave repercussions on employment and the 
economic development of mono-industrial regions. Selective 
disengagement in steel took the form of a policy of disinvestment from 
Lorraine’s blast furnaces and long product activities and the promotion of 
electric steelmaking and the more noble flat products. Thus, the tension that 
underpinned the crisis of steel during the decade under examination was 
one between state manager’s policy preference for an extensive 
rationalisation of the sector and the social implosion that such measures 
bred. This chapter shows that the high political visibility of the sector 




plant shutdowns that ensued the selective disengagement strategy to 
institutional bodies ostensibly lying beyond the reach of governmental 
authorities while retaining arm’s length control over the restructuring 
process. In particular, by transferring the responsibility for certain industrial 
measures to the European Commission’s supranational confines, the 
consecutive French governments were able to conceal their own 
predilections for an extended disengagement from the industry’s 
unprofitable activities and find a new source of legitimacy for its 
implementation. 
The chapter begins by tracing the historical development of the sector 
during the Glorious Thirty. Throughout the post-war era, the steel industry 
benefitted from extensive state assistance without however having recourse 
to the rationalisation and technological improvements necessary to achieve 
the competitiveness levels of its advanced commercial partners. Thus, once 
the worldwide rise of steel exports and the saturation of demand for steel 
resulted in a global overpdocution crisis, French steel found itself on the 
brink of bankruptcy as its lagging technological development prevented it 
from profitably selling on steel markets. Next, the chapter examines Barre’s 
government first attempt at a depoliticised approach to selective 
disengagement. Despite the massive public funds injected into the two main 
steel firms (Usinor and Sacilor), in 1978 the government sought to publicly 
distance itself from the formulation of the rationalisation plans necessary to 
restore profitability and instead transferred the plans’ responsibility to the 
firms’ shareholders and directing boards. However, as the following section 
shows the sector witnessed a deep social crisis as its workers began to 
fiercely revolt against the government’s plans. To further shield the state 
from popular backlash, French policymakers opted to deepen the 
depoliticisation of steel policy by advocating for a pan-European 
management of the steel crisis managed by the European Commission. The 
recourse to the latter’s disciplinary means (i.e. price orientations, production 




implement its own policy preference for a selective liquidation of the sector’s 
excess capacities. Finally, the advent of the Socialists did not dramatically 
alter the management of the steel crisis despite the nationalisation of Usinor 
and Sacilor. Indeed, while in 1982 the socialists implemented a more 
restrained form of selective disengagement by consciously relying on an 
inflated projection of the future growth of the steel market which limited the 
number of establishments that had to be shut down, by 1983 they decided 
to accelerate the industry’s rationalisation. Once again, the French state’s 
support for the Commission’s management of the crisis allowed the state to 
pursue its socially costly industrial strategies while at the same time 
presenting them as a necessary concomitant of the country’s obligations 
towards Brussels. 
A STATE-SPONSORED BOOM WITHOUT RATIONALISATION 
Like other French industries, steel was relatively backwards compared to its 
European partners in the wake of the Liberation. In terms of structures, 
French steel was dominated by family-controlled firms which had been 
reluctant to proceed to mergers that would have induced concentration 
within the industry (Stoffaes and Gaddoneix 1980: 411). In performance 
terms, the acquisition of iron-rich Loraine after WWI allowed France to raise 
itself to the 4th rank of world steel producers before WWII (Freyssenet 1979: 
13; Mioche 1999: 404). However, the impressive magnitude of French 
steel’s productive resources masked the relatively undeveloped character 
of its technological capacities and its low productivity levels (Mioche 1999: 
404). In other words, the strength of French steel lied in its abundant 
production volumes rather than its high productivity levels. In times of 
overproduction crises and falling world steel prices, its strength run the risk 
of turning to a weakness as lagging productivity would prevent French 
producers from selling profitably their tonnage in current market prices. 
While during the Trentes Glorieuses the state ensured the continuous flow 
of funds towards the sector and backed the undertaking of many important 




industrial partners was never closed due to the insufficient rationalisation of 
the sector which weakened the competitive potential of French steel in the 
wake of the 1973 crisis.       
The privileged position occupied by steel in French industrial policy can be 
traced back to Monnet’s 5-year plan for the reconstruction of the country 
after the war. As steel products constitute the primary material worked upon 
by other key sectors such as the automobile, naval, construction, machine-
tool or armament industries, the revitalisation of the sector in the immediate 
post-war period was necessary for the revival of a great share of the 
country’s industrial activities. In 1946 crude steel production had fallen down 
to half its 1930 levels of production (Table 8) which justified the rapid action 
taken in order to put steel industry back into motion. The period of 
reconstruction witnessed an impressive channelling of funds towards steel, 
the ‘keystone of the modernisation plan’ (CGP 1946: 146). For instance, 
from 1950 to 1953 public funds along with the funds of the Marshal aid 
represented 40% of the sector’s total financing (Mioche 1999: 407).  In 
addition, the government sought to accelerate its productivity by exposing it 
to the competitive pressures of the European steel industry after the 
ratification of the Treaty of Paris that instituted the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) (Stoffaes and Gadonneix 1980: 411).  
The state’s post-war efforts to revitalise the steel industry bore fruits both in 
terms of the sector’s production capacities and its industrial structures. 
Indeed, by 1955 French crude steel production had reached the highest 
levels of its history, almost tripling its 1946 levels. Furthermore, at the end 
of the Monnet Plan and after a series of important mergers, most of steel 
production was now undertaken by four big groups: the region of Lorraine 
was dominated by Lorraine-Escaut, De Wendel and Sidélor while Usinor 




Table 8: Crude and Rolled Steel Production in France from 1930 to 1977 
(in millions of tons) 
 1930 1946 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1974 
Crude 
Steel  
9.4 4.4 10.9 12.6 14.6 17.6 19.8 19.7 23.8 27 
Rolled 
Steel 
6.6 3 7.8 9.1 10.7 13.5 14.6 16.2 18 21 
Sources: Insee, Annuaire Statistique de la France, various years. 
The special attention given to steel under the framework of the Monnet Plan, 
rather than an exceptional set of measures necessitated by the immediate 
post-war conjuncture, was in fact the precursor of a wider pattern of state-
steel relations that characterised this industry’s development until the mid-
1970s. During the Trentes Glorieuses the state guaranteed the continuous 
flow of funds towards the industry and closely oversaw the expansion of its 
production structures (Hayward 1986: 71-75). To this end, the state and the 
Chambre Syndicale de la Siderurgie Française (CSSF), the steel trade 
association, joint hands in 1946 to create the Groupement de l’ Industrie 
Sidérurgique (GIS), the organisation responsible for the distribution of loans 
among steel firms (Daley 1996: 64). In addition to borrowing in the private 
market on behalf of all its members at low interest rates, the GIS also acted 
as a guarantor for low-interest public loans issued by the Credit National or 
the Fond de Dévelopement Economique et Social (FDES).98  The direct 
effect of this ‘business-state collaboration’ (Daley 1996: 64) was a 
significant lowering of the financial costs of investment and a consequent 
uninterrupted flow of money into the sector. Additionally, it allowed the state 
to enhance its supervising authority and influence over the direction of 
                                                          
98 The Fond de Development Economique et Social was a public fund that distributed loans 
at lower-than-market interest rates to firms based on their social and regional development 




investment as it held significant power to sanction firms’ investment 
decisions (McArthur and Scott 1969: 198-201; Hayward 1986: 74-75; Daley 
1996: 65).  
The propitious environment created by the state-steel partnership permitted 
the realisation of important projects in Northern and Eastern France. In the 
former, Usinor installed the first French strip mill in the commune of 
Montataire in 1950 and five years later the group’s productive capacities 
benefitted from a second strip mill in the city of Denain. Lorraine also 
acquired a strip mill in 1953 constructed at Sérémange by Sollac, a steel 
cooperative with De Wendel as its most important shareholder. 
Undoubtedly, the most important investment of the period was the 
construction of a coastal steel mill in Dunkirk in 1963 by Usinor.99 Overall, 
the intensification of investment in the 1950s permitted crude steel 
production to reach close to an annual 20 Million tonnes (Mt) in 1964, five 
times its 1946 tonnage. Similarly, the volume of finished rolled steel 
products almost doubled from 1952 to 1964 (Table 8).  
However, the euphoric growth of investment came at the cost of increasing 
indebtedness. In the early 1960s, the European steel industry experienced 
the first signs of its latent overcapacity tendencies. Indeed, the rise of steel 
exports from third countries, especially Eastern Europe and most 
importantly Japan whose shares of world exports increased by 56% and 
380% between 1957 and 1963 accordingly (Table 9), was accompanied in 
1963 by a negative growth of steel consumption in the ECSC that forced an 
important fall in prices threatening the bankruptcy of inefficient producers. 
For French steel, the crisis translated into a piling up of its financial burden. 
Its inability to sell above production costs made the cost of past investments 
weigh heavily on firms’ financial accounts. As a result, the debt to revenue 
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benefitted from the importation of ore from developing countries which had a higher density 
of iron than Lorraine’s ore deposits. Additionally, they entailed considerable productivity 
gains as the reception and processing of raw material as well as the shipping of finished 




ratio of the industry augmented from 46% in 1960 to 66% in 1962, while it 
remained at a yearly average of 72% until the end of the decade (INSEE 
1967: 341; INSEE 1972: 248). This meant that firms could not count on their 
revenues alone to undertake the investments necessary to increase their 
competitiveness (Freyssenet 1979: 60).  
Table 9: Share of World Exports in the EEC, Eastern Europe and Japan1 
 1957 1963 1967 1973 1977 
EEC2 60.3 46.6 45.8 34.7 31.1 
Eastern Europe 
and USSR3 
6.8 10.6 12 9.5 7 
Japan 4 19.2 20.9 32.5 37.3 
(1) Excluding intraregional trade (i.e. Intra-EEC and intra COMECON). 
(2)  The EEC includes the 9 member states that composed the community in 1973 (i.e. Belgium, France, West 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom). 
(3) Eastern Europe includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania. 
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute (1978) A Handbook of World Steel Statistics, Brussels. 
The importance of state support to the healthy performance of the sector 
was attested once again. Indeed, firms found themselves in a situation 
where while the investment effort was necessary to overcome growing 
competitive pressures, they could not make it without formal state support 
(Woronoff 1998: 559). To remedy the growing indebtedness of the sector, 
the state negotiated with the CSSF an injection of 2,7 Billion Francs (BF) in 
the form of FDES low interest-rate loans into the GIS’s fund in exchange for 
an extensive rationalisation and modernisation of the industry. The ‘State-
Steel Convention’, as the plan was called, was signed in 1966 and entailed 
a process of industrial concentration whose most characteristic mergers 
were the fusion of Usinor and Lorraine-Escaut to form Usinor in 1966 and 
the consolidation of a unique group named Wendel-Sidélor by the Lorraine-




and Wendel-Sidelor (renamed Sacilor in 1973) would constitute the two 
major poles of French steel production until the mid-1980s. Furthermore, 
the liberation of funds permitted the resumption of investment which, among 
others, culminated in the doubling of the productive capacities of Dunkirk’s 
complex and the construction of a new steel mill at Gandrange by Wendel-
Sidelor in 1969. More impressively, in 1971 Wendel-Sidelor joined hands 
with Usinor to create Solmer, France’s second coastal plant located in the 
southern region of Fos-sur-Mer. The agreement was made under the 
auspices of the government which designated the new plant’s location on 
political and regional development grounds (Hayward 1986: 75-77) and 
financed the project at 25%.  
The state’s aid package came in exchange for plans that firms would 
formulate themselves in order to rationalise production. Thus, the 1966 
convention required the shutting down of dilapidated units and the 
suppression of 15,000 jobs. Nevertheless, this early attempt at a selective 
disengagement from steel’s less productive units was not carried out to its 
full extent.  Despite the decisions to invest in modern coastal complexes, 
firms remained reluctant to eliminate the more obsolete facilities and 
proceeded to shutting down only a very limited number of units (Stoffaes 
1978: 494; Levy 1986: 66). Similarly, job cuts were implemented at an 
insufficient pace (Pouille 1978: 7; Stoffaes and Gaddoneix 1980: 412). By 
1970 the industry had decreased its workforce by only 8,000 (Figure 5), half 
than the objective set by the 1966 convention. Because of its insufficient 
rationalisation efforts, French steel continued to lag in productivity terms 
behind its European counterparts. Despite having made a 5.2 hour 
decrease in hours-per-tone productivity between 1965 and 1970–a higher 
rate than Germany, Belgium, Nerthelands or Italy - its productivity levels 
remained at levels significantly lower than the average ECSC levels (Table 
10). In light of another overproduction crisis French producers would be the 




lower-than-average productivity levels would render them unable to 
profitably sell at market prices. 
Table 10: Productivity in the ECSC Steel Industry (hours per tonne) 
 France W.Germany Belgium Netherlands Italy 
1965 17.7 13.1 13.5 11 10.1 
1970 12.5 9.9 9.5 7.7 8.1 
 Source: AN 19910818/16, Ministère de l’industrie, 1978. Le plan Professionnel de 1966. 
It can be argued that the moderate rate of rationalisation in steel was a direct 
result of the inflationary social compropmise that characterised French 
labour-capital relations in the post-war era. Indeed, the post-1968 
inflationary wave was accompanied by an upsurge in demand for steel 
products. As such the main preoccupation of firms became the expansion 
of production volumes to meet demand as opposed to rationalisation and 
productivity enhancement (Levy 1986: 67). As Freyssenet (1979: 87) 
observes, it all appeared as if the endeavour to proceed to employment 
reductions was cancelled out to now face rising demand. The post-1968 
inflationary expansion along with generous state aids allowed the steel 
industry to buoy obsolete units and postpone the necessary rationalisation 
measures (Alter and Steinberg 2007: 7). Regardless of the limited scope of 
the rationalisation measures, the contraction of the sector’s employment in 
the 1960s (Graph 5) was the consequential manifestation of a first attempt 
at a selective devaluation. Selective disengagement targeted the units that 
could not confront the ongoing price competition in order to align the 





Figure 5: Manufacturing employment in the steel industry from 1954 to 1973 
 
Source: Eurostat, 1983. Iron and Steel 1952-1982, Luxemburg. 
While certain restructuring efforts had been undertaken within the sector, 
the screening and elimination of unproductive units had not been fully 
implemented (Daley 1996: 122; Woronoff 1998: 560). Furthermore, despite 
the presence of certain impressive coastal plants, French steel suffered 
from a persistent technological disadvantage to its competitors as it was 
slower to adopt the most modern production techniques (Woronoff 1998: 
561). Indeed, France’s crude steel production relied heavily on plants 
producing with mid-19th century techniques, namely Thomas and Open-
Hearth processes. On the other hand, oxygen steelmaking processes, 
which were developed in the 1950s and are characterised by the high 
velocity of their operations, penetrated French production units at an 
insufficient pace. In the 1970s, 60% of crude steel production was done with 


























































































oxygen steelmaking processes (Table 11).  Despite the attempt to catch up 
on the technological delay vis-à-vis its European partners, in the wake of 
the 1974 steel crisis, the share of Thomas and Open-Hearth production to 
total crude steel production was still higher than the EC average and 10% 
higher that Western Germany’s share. Continuous casting, an automatable 
technique that reduces by four the number of steps necessary to convert 
molten metal into solid material, was equally slow to conquer French 
production. As Table 12 shows, throughout the early 1970s the share of 
continuous casting production to total crude steel production was 
consistently lower than its main EEC competitors as well as the Western 
World’s average. The technological gap between France and its competitors 
became a great handicap for Steel once the 1970s crisis erupted.  
Table 11: Share of different steel making processes in total steel 
production (in %) 
(1) Open-Hearth 
Source: Eurostat, 1983. Iron and Steel 1952-1982, Luxemburg. 
 
 FRANCE W. GERMANY EEC 
 Thomas 
and O-H1  
Oxygen  Thomas 
and O-H  
Oxygen  Thomas 
and O-H  
Oxygen  
1960 91 >1 91 3 87 2 
1970 60 29 34 56 40 46 




Table 12: Continuous Casting as a share of total crude steel production 
 1971 1972 1973 1974 
France 1.9 3.4 7.3 10.2 
Italy 6.7 12.7 18.1 21.7 
W. Germany 10.2 13.9 16.3 19.4 
Japan 11.2 17 20.7 25.1 
World1 7 9.6 11.9 14.7 
(1)  Excluding communist countries 
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute, 1978. A Handbook of World Steel Statistics, Brussels. 
 
Mény and Wright (1987: 10-11) describe the crisis that hit Western steel 
between 1974 and 1984 as the unfolding of three simultaneous processes: 
the declining trend of global demand for steel, the geographical re-
orientation of production towards Japan, Eastern Europe and other 
industrialising countries such as Brazil and India and finally, the general 
recession that followed the oil shock which hit the steel industry particularly 
hard given the dependence of its output on a wide variety of consuming 
goods sectors that were experiencing falling sales. Within a context of 
stagnating demand, the growing production capacities on a world scale 
contributed to the decoupling of supply and demand (Hudson and Sadler 
1989; Alter and Steinberg 2007: 95). The Western steel industry became 
burdened with excess capacities as the failure to sell profitably led to a 
dramatic under-utilisation of existing plants (Mény and Wright 1987; 
Tsoukalis and Strauss 1987: 195). The overabundance of steel products in 
the context of a shrinking market brought a downwards pressure on prices, 
which only in 1975 fell by 40% to 50% (Freyssenet 1979: 166), rendering 
French producers unable to cover the costs of past investments. In other 
words, the overabundance of producers in a shrinking market threatened to 
render idle a great share of France’s production capacities given their lower 




Nevertheless, France was able to maintain a positive balance of trade in 
steel products and cover its persistent deficit with the EEC thanks to its 
surplus in trade with third countries (Table 13). Rather, the crisis of 
overproduction hit French steel in the form of an increasing indebtedness 
stemming from the decline of selling prices as they could hardly cover the 
high production costs bequeathed by the firms’ past investments. Indeed, 
French producers never recovered from their debt crisis of the 1960s: at the 
end of 1977 debt had reached 112% of revenues (Pouille 1978: 26). Unlike 
the case of the T&C sector the overproduction crisis in Steel did not translate 
into a growing trade deficit but a debt crisis that ‘threatened the existence’ 
of the sector itself (MoI 1979: 7). 
Already in 1971, the VIth plan had warned that the excessive development 
of steel’s productive capacities could lead to a severe crisis as the global 
steel industry had already shown in the past its tendencies towards the 
creation of excess capacities (CGP 1971: 212). Despite existing reserves, 
the strategy chosen by both the state and the sector was to induce ‘further 
debt to ease indebtedness’ (Freyssenet 1979: 72). The extensive 
rationalisation necessitated by the sector in order to confront international 
competition with its most productive units was postponed. The restructuring 
measures that accompanied the 1966 Convention were ultimately 
insufficient and gave birth to a dimorphic industrial landscape in which the 
impressive coastal units of Dunkirk and Fos-sur-Mer as well as the oxygen 
steel mill of Gandrange coexisted with the more archaic industries of 
Lorraine. As a 1979 report of the Ministry of Industry succinctly concluded: 
Despite State aid the situation did not improve. There was not any real 
and sustainable lightening of the debt load. Nor was there a reduction 
of the workforce in accordance with the plan, as it was implemented 
during the deceitful recovery of 1968-1971. Thus, the simultaneous 
conservation of obsolete and modern facilities provoked French steel’s 




The historical development of the steel industry until the onset of the 1973 
oil crisis shows that the sector was not foreign to overproduction tendencies 
nor was it unfamiliar with state involvement in its affairs. Indeed, the pivotal 
role of the state consisted in prompting the development of the sector by 
securing the flow of funds towards the latter’s trade association and 
stepping in more decisively in times of crisis in order to exchange aid 
packages for restructuring measures. Ultimately, this state-sponsored boom 
allowed the development and expansion of steel capacities, but the 
expected rationalisation never occurred to the levels necessary to render 
domestic steel sustainably profitable on global markets. State support 
temporary shielded firms from bankruptcy and eliminated the pressure to 
undertake a drastic rationalisation of production. By 1974 however, 
disengagement from the sector’s obsolete units to foster production around 
the most modern facilities became a precondition for the sector to get back 




Table 13: Volume of Trade in Steel Products in France from 1950 to 1977 








Exports to third 
countries 
1952 72 435 34 2371 
1955 777 1858 59 3498 
1960 3034 2327 166 3381 
1965 3778 2846 181 3809 
1970 6421 3737 1140 3901 
1975 6182 4142 815 4626 
1977 7361 4597 1281 5720 
Source: Eurostat, 1983. Iron and Steel 1952-1982, Luxemburg. 
A NEW DIVISION OF LABOUR IN STEEL POLICY-MAKING (1975-1979) 
Hayward (1986: 504) came to characterise the post-war pattern of state-
steel relations as a form of ‘public control without public ownership’ given 
the state’s close oversight of steel finances and its role in coordinating 
certain investments such as Fos. Nevertheless, the government never 
overtly participated in devising the firms’ restructuring plans of 1966 nor it 
assumed the responsibility for the ensuing job suppressions.  This led the 
communist deputy Jacques Duclos to argue that, despite the looming 
unemployment that threatened Lorraine’s steelworkers following Wendel-
Sidelor’s restructuring plans, the government played the role of ‘Pontius 
Pilate’ given its disinclination to enter into negotiations with the unions 
regarding plant shutdowns.100 Instead, Minister of Industry Francois Ortoli 
counterargued that the rationalisation plans were the firm’s responsibility 
and any interference in its affairs would compromise the firm’s own 
                                                          




survival.101 However, as the crisis progressed in the late 1970s the ‘strong 
arm of the state was needed’ more urgently to remedy the sector’s heavy 
indebtedness (Zysman 1983: 160). Essentially, the challenge faced by 
French policy makers throughout the period was the reconciliation of the 
need for an active state-induced liquidation of steel’s obsolete units and the 
government’s need to resist the workers opposition to selective 
disengagement. The Pontius Pilate role ascribed to the state by Duclos 
would in fact aptly characterise the form of state interventionism after 1978 
as the state sought to depoliticise steel policy by ostensibly transferring the 
responsibilities for restructuring to the creditors of the two main steel 
companies (i.e. Usinor and Sacilor). 
Initially, in the face of the deepening crisis of the mid-1970s, the response 
of the government reproduced the previous logic of injecting further funds 
into the sector in order to accrue investment without rationalising its 
production capacities. In 1975, Giscard d’Estaing launched the Programme 
de dévelopement de l’Economie, an economic stimulus package aiming at 
enhancing domestic demand and providing fiscal aid to firms to allow the 
resumption of investment. Steel figured as one of the main beneficiaries of 
this program. Indeed, as part of the 1975 recovery program, the government 
planned to distribute 3BF in loans from the FDES of which 1.5 billion were 
destined to steel.  In addition, in order to avoid potentially disastrous political 
consequences in the coming cantonal electoral confrontation with the left, 
the government dissuaded the sector’s employers from having recourse to 
mass layoffs and encouraged recipient firms to resume their planned 
investments (Freyssenet 1979: 182-184; Daley 1996: 124).  
It is only in 1977 when firms' debt levels skyrocketed that the government 
incited firms to undertake more important rationalisation measures. The 
1977 Plan Acier granted steel firms a moratorium for existing loans as well 
as an additional FDES package of 1.3 billion Francs to redress their own 
funds. In addition, the plan included several shut downs of Thomas steel 
                                                          




mills which required the suppression of 16,200 jobs by 1980. Accompanying 
the plan was the Convention Generale de Protection Sociale de la 
Siderurgie (CGPS), a scheme funded by both the state and the firms to 
financially support the early retirements, job transfers from closed to active 
plants and compensations for dismissals made necessary by the 
restructuring process. However, once again the plan intervened too late. 
Within the context of dropping demand for steel products, the rationalisation 
measures did too little derail steel firms from their path towards bankruptcy 
(MoI 1979: 19). Indeed, as the MoI later acknowledged, the 1977 plan was 
too timid in its scope as it had underestimated the long-lasting nature of the 
crisis.102  
In fact, France had accumulated a backlog of restructuring measures as it 
was much slower to react to the crisis than its competitors. As the MoI 
observed, the latter had ceased seeking the mere augmentation of their 
productive capacities and had instead chose to preserve units and 
investment programs that ameliorated their productivity.103 For instance, 
between 1974 and 1977 Germany had had recourse to redundancies 
amounting to 10,000 jobs, while France had maintained a practically stable 
workforce.104 Therefore, French steel had to emulate the practices of its 
competitors by engaging in a process of qualitative selection of its most 
efficient elements and centre the country’s total production around them. 
The government had to initiate a strict selective disengagement strategy 
instead of encouraging firms to keep on relentlessly augmenting tonnage.  
In 1978 the government demanded from CSSF to present a new plan which 
would prompt even higher capacity reductions than the 1977 plan. However, 
the propositions submitted by the CSSF on the 6th of April were judged too 
optimistic by the MoI given the breadth of the crisis. Instead, the MoI argued 
that increasing competitiveness should be the focal point of the restructuring 
                                                          
102 AN 19910818/15, Note pour le Ministre, 11 April 1978. 
103 AN 19910445/9, Note d’Information, 20 September 1978. 




process. To operationalise the selective disengagement strategy, it set a 
productivity rate of 6 hours per ton as the industry’s objective and proposed 
the elimination of units that could not reach this rate.105 The sole drawback 
to this goal was the seeming unwillingness of employers to accelerate the 
reduction of existing capacities and assume its responsibilities.106 As Prime 
Minister, Raymond Barre explained in an inter-ministerial committee: 
our steel industry is largely oversized, and we cannot impose on the 
national community a burden which consists of propping up heavy 
weights with indulgence…We must face the problem and draw the 
consequences without succumbing to the pressures of the Ironmakers 
whose behaviour is deplorable. We must aim for a hard core that is 
useful and competitive.107 
The government could not rely as in the past solely on the steelmakers’ 
commitments to implement the desired rationalisation measures and raise 
their productivity levels. In effect, Pierre Gaddoneix from the MoI’s 
Metallurgical directorate (DIMME) further observed that the Ironmakers 
were particularly vulnerable to workers’ pressures. They would not be able 
to resist trade union demands for a reduction in working hours and wage 
increases in compensation for plant shutdowns which if conceded would 
ultimately undermine any effort to increase productivity. 108  Given the 
employers’ unreliability, the government had to step in more decisively to 
reorient the objectives of the industry and propel the development of steel’s 
most promising units while prompting the dismantlement of uncompetitive 
ones.  
However, a deeper involvement of the state in steel’s affairs run the risk of 
increasing the politicisation of the sector’s situation and limiting the 
government’s much needed ‘political space for manoeuvre’ (Daley 1996: 
126). In the aforementioned inter-ministerial committee, Raymond Barre 
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had dismissed the option to nationalise the sector ‘not only for reasons of 
doctrine…but above all because nationalisation would prevent [the 
government] from implementing the necessary reforms.’ 109  Indeed, the 
Minister of Industrial affairs’ (André Giraud) technical advisor, Christian 
Stoffaes, noted that the public mining and transport companies in France or 
British Steel in the UK, had demonstrated the political difficulties met by a 
nationalised industry in laying off its personnel and shutting down obsolete 
units in times of crisis given the ‘complex set of pressures received from 
both trade unions and the political world.’110 In contrast to its initial aim, a 
nationalised company would become ‘a shield against unemployment’ and 
a growing burden on the state’s budget.111 Nevertheless, the urgency of 
action demanded by the near-bankruptcy situation of steel firms and the 
apparent inaction of the Ironmakers necessitated an adjustment of the 
managerial structures of the sector’s firms without taking the form of overt 
public ownership. Thus, the government needed to find an intermediate 
solution that could simultaneously avert the two extreme scenarios of either 
nationalisation or the official insolvency of Usinor and Sacilor. 
To come out of this impasse, the government devised the 1978/79 Plan de 
Sauvetage. The latter, while allowing the government to implement a more 
drastic strategy of selective disengagement would ostensibly transfer the 
responsibilities for plant shut downs and layoffs to firms themselves and 
their creditors. It unfolded in two stages. Firstly, it involved a reorganisation 
of the firms’ financial structures and secondly, a change in the firms’ 
managerial personnel. 
In the spring of 1978, the government engaged in a series of consultations 
with steel’s creditors from the private sector (Paris Bas, BNP), the 
nationalised banking sector (Crédit Lyonnais, Société Générale) as well as 
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parapublic financial institutions (Crédit National, Caisse de Depots et 
Consignations). 112  For the government the ultimate aim of these 
consultations was to reorganise the financial structures of Sacilor, Usinor 
and their subsidiaries by inciting banks to participate in the firms’ capital. 
More precisely, this process entailed a conversion of the debts held by 
banks (and public financial institutions) into capital, a 600MF reduction of 
the firms’ financial charges and consequently a recovery of firms’ own funds.  
Banks were however initially reluctant to take on a managerial role within 
the firms. Even more so, they were weary of carrying the financial weight of 
steel and allow a decrease in the interest rates perceived on steel loans.113 
As it was communicated to Giraud: 
Given that all the other negotiating partners are obsessed with the 
State taking over the finances of French steel, we should avoid at all 
costs any deviation from our initial aim which is to put steel in the hands 
of its creditors, among which the Treasury is minoritary.114  
The main struggle of the government thus consisted in refraining from 
exerting direct political control over the firms and instead render the latter 
accountable to their creditors rather than the state.  
The state’s insistence to transfer the managerial responsibilities over steel 
to its creditors culminated in an agreement between the two sides towards 
the end of the 1978 summer. Ratified on the 10th of October 1978, the final 
plan entailed the creation of two financial holding companies, Société 
Financière Usinor-Chatillons and Société Financière Sacilor, which took 
charge of around 55% of Usinor and Sacilor’s capital accordingly. On 
average, the state through the medium of the Treasury acquired 15% of 
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each holding’s shares, the GIS 15%, the Caisse de Depots et Consignations 
(CDC) 30%, the Crédit National 10% and the banks 28%. (A simplified 
illustration of the post-1978 financial structures of Usinor and Sacilor is 
presented in Figure 6). To assuage the banks’ fears and guarantee the 
security of private savings, the 1978 plan entailed the creation of the CAPA, 
a fund through which the state would ensure the prompt servicing of debt 
when and if companies failed to do so.  
Overall, this manoeuvre has been characterised as a virtual nationalisation 
given that the public sector became de facto the majority shareholder of 
steel (Dahmani 1983: 136; Hayward 1986: 522; Godelier 2006: 9). This 
‘mock-nationalisation’ was not a mere technical financial procedure, but a 
political strategy allowing the state to discipline steel firms by making them 
accountable to their respective financial proprietors rather than directly to 
elected officials. Indeed, given the formal independence of public and 
parapublic financial institutions from the government, the latter managed to 
both ensure the solvency of firms while avoiding directly taking responsibility 
over the rationalisation process. 
In addition to changing the financial ownership structures of firms the state 
demanded the replacement of Usinor’s and Sacilor’s current managerial 
boards. As part of the second act of the 1978 ‘Rescue Plan’, the financial 
holdings would demand a restructuring proposal that would permit the firms’ 
return to equilibrium in 5 years.115  If however, the state was to assist the 
restructuring of steel from behind-the-scenes, the substitution of the current 
direction was inevitable. Indeed, the restructuring plans proposed by the 
firms’ current managers in April 1978 had been judged insufficient by the 
government. According to the MoI the plans did not go far enough in terms 
of excess capacity reductions while their cost for the state was too 
excessive as they would not be able to yield the profits necessary to 
                                                          




reimburse their ongoing loans.116 In the case that the current boards were 
maintained, the government would either have to accept an unviable plan 
or publicly justify why the plans proposed by the firms were expensive and 
ineffectual. In this latter case the state would be forced to step in more 
decisively and set itself the quantitative objectives of the plan.117  
In other words, the change in the firms’ managerial personnel was 
necessitated to both assure that the future plan would be more austere than 
the current one118 and to avoid drawing contestation on the government by 
overtly participating in the delineation of the restructuring plans. In 
contradiction with its depoliticising aims, this choice did come with certain 
risks. By placing new personalities at the head of Usinor and Sacilor, 
(Etchegaray in the former and Mayoux in the latter), this move could be 
interpreted as the state nominating ‘new managers in order to enforce a 
painful policy.’ 119  Nevertheless, the government chose to prioritise the 
insertion of new managers. In fact, the substitution of the current board of 
directors would be presented not as a governmental preference ‘nor as ad 
hominem choice but as the necessary consequence of the newly decided 
financial restructuring measures.’120 The changes in the direction of Usinor 
and Sacilor reflected the central strategy of the government during the 
period of application of the 1978-1979 plan which essentially rested on 
transferring the ownership of the devaluation plans to firms themselves.  
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Figure 6: The 1978 Financial Restructuring 



















In spite of the responsibilisation of firms, the state retained a significant say 
in industrial affairs. For instance, the plan announced by the new directors 
in December 1978 entailed some tough dilemmas regarding the choice of 
units that should be modernised and those that should be eliminated. Such 
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were for instance Usinor’s choice between implanting a new oxygen steel 
mill in the region of Neuves-Maisons or Longwy or even the choice between 
keeping or dismantling the Denain mill as part of the program for capacity 
reductions. With regards to these industrial options the MoI had expressed 
its strong preference for implanting the new steel mill at Neuves-Maisons 
and the shutting down of the Denain rolling mill. 121  Both of the MoI’s 
inclinations ended up being adopted. The Neuves-Maison investment had 
a higher impact on regional equilibrium and public opinion and its non-
implementation would ‘engender very vivid reactions in the region.’ 122 
Concerning the Denain mill, the MoI had already judged, in early 1978, that 
the site was made redundant by the more modern Dunkirk and Fos 
complexes 123  and thus constituted an unjustifiable cost on the state’s 
budget.124 While the government had opted for these options prior to the 
1978 plan, Raymond Barre decided ‘to let Mr. Etchegaray announce this 
decision under his responsibility’125 in order to strengthen the association of 
the coming drastic measures with the decisions made by the new board of 
directors itself rather than the government. All in all, delegating the formal 
responsibility for the implementation of the plans to firms themselves did not 
prevent the preferences of state managers themselves from shaping the 
content of the selective disengagement program.   
At the same time the government was careful to keep its industrial leanings 
and orientations confidentially disclosed solely to managers126 in order to 
sidestep the heavy pressures of steel’s combative unions. Indeed, the 
delegation of responsibility towards the micro-level of the firms gave the 
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government enough leeway to continue the selective devaluation strategy 
while keeping unions ostracised from the negotiations table (Vigna 2009). 
The government refused to hold tripartite negotiations between its 
responsible ministries, firms and the unions on the grounds that it was not 
a ‘CEO of firms.’127 Given that the 1978 financial restructuring consisted of 
a quasi-nationalisation, trade unions like the CGT expected of the state to 
negotiate with them both the industrial and social aspects of the plan in order 
to mitigate its consequences on employment. In response, Pierre 
Gaddoneix countered that:  
…the state did not become steel’s boss. Its intervention can be 
considered as a sort of debt agreement since its participation in the 
financial holdings can be discontinued at a later stage if the 
circumstances permit it.128  
Trade union demands for nation-wide negotiations over the new steel plans 
were thus dismissed by the MoI as it did not consider that industrial matters 
fell under its authority. 129 Instead, it held that concertation should take place 
exclusively within the firms, between unions and employers, as the 
restructuring plans were the latter’s sole responsibility.130  
Alternatively, the state ascribed to its own liabilities the management of the 
social and regional consequences that accompanied the plan to cut down 
excess capacities.131 Thus, in 1979 the CGPS procedure was signed for the 
second time to attenuate the programmed 20,000 job cuts through early 
retirements, voluntary leaves and reconversions. In addition, the 
government announced a 3 Billion Francs loan package to encourage 
investment in the hardly hit Northern and North-Eastern regions. This 
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financial assistance would be distributed by public funds such as the FSAI132 
and aimed at creating 12,000 jobs in hardly hit regions - largely by 
investments of the car industry (see Chapter 6). It was furthermore decided 
that the social and regional palliative measures would be announced only 
once the new heads of Usinor and Sacilor had officially announced their 
restructuring programs. 133  Strategically speaking, this could only 
consolidate the view that the government only acted in reaction to the firms’ 
plans and did not participate in their formulation.  
In sum, it is only in 1978 that the government decided to accelerate the 
selective disengagement from unproductive units in order to rescue steel 
from a state of near-bankruptcy. Indeed, the 1975 and 1977 plans to remedy 
the steel industry’s ills proved to be insufficient in raising the firms’ 
productivity and profitability. However, the government sought to publicly 
distance itself from the industrial affairs of steel as its deeper involvement 
in the conception of the restructuring plans would necessarily draw 
contestation back on to itself and delay the implementation of the much-
needed rationalisation measures. Ultimately, the 1978-1979 Rescue Plan 
was devised by the government as a way to advocate a particular division 
of labour in industrial policy whereby financial firms would exercise pressure 
upon their industrial subsidiaries to increase their profitability, the latter 
would devise and implement the required restructuring plans and finally, the 
state would take care of the social and regional collateral damage that 
ensued. Minister of Industry André Giraud squarely described the new 
stance of the government to the unions in a meeting of the Economic and 
Social Council in the following words:  
The rule that the government has instituted is thus, that the 
Government governs, that the ministers take their responsibilities, that 
the administrations undertake their supervisory tasks, but that the 
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personalities placed at the head of industrial firms by choice of the 
shareholders are rendered fully responsible for their industrial 
decisions once the prerequisites for financial stability are set.134  
Through this straightforward allocation of responsibilities among different 
economic and political actors, the state successfully sidestepped trade 
union pressures for negotiations over the planned shutdowns and de-
manning. In fact, the newly instituted division of tasks allowed the 
government to preserve control over the selective disengagement 
strategies of the steel industry while formally transferring the responsibilities 
for plant shutdowns and rising job cuts to the heads of the firms themselves.    
ALL ROADS LEAD TO BRUSSELS 
With the implementation of the 1978/1979 plan, the government managed 
to successfully circumvent consultations with unions on the industrial 
component of the plan. Instead it restricted their bargaining functions to a 
negotiation over the plan’s social aspects and the modalities of application 
of the CGPS (Vigna 2009: 160-161). However, this strategy did not translate 
into a legitimation of the state within the process of industrial restructuring 
nor it prevented it from becoming the target of social contestation, forcing it 
to devise alternative strategies of depoliticising steel. Within this socially 
tense context, Barre’s government sought recourse to the European 
Commission’s disciplining powers in order to firmly consolidate the process 
of depoliticisation of steel policy and legitimate the coming plant shutdowns 
accompanying the process of selective disengagement. 
Already in 1977, the Recovery Plan was met with localised resistance 
especially at the plant of Thionville in Lorraine, while the CGPS was 
boycotted by the CGT and the CFDT leaving FO as the only signatory union 
of the Convention (Freyssent 1979: 136). Workers’ resistance peaked at the 
time of the 1978 Rescue plan when labour opposition to restructuring 
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acquired national dimensions. During the 1978/1979 winter, in Longwy and 
Denain, two cities in Lorraine, more than 20,000 thousand workers gathered 
in protest to the plant shutdowns threatening their regions. Strikes, 
clandestine radio broadcasts, road blockades, violent confrontations with 
law enforcement and the pillage of administrative buildings became 
commonplace in Longwy and Denain while contestation also moved to Paris 
where a 100,000 strong CGT-led national protest in solidarity with Lorraine’s 
steelworkers took place on the 23rd of March. A leaflet of the regional CFDT 
organisation of Longwy argued that the worker’s strategy should ‘confront 
the structure of the state which has resolved to destroy us’ (quoted in Vigna 
2004: 131) demonstrating the increasing attention drawn on the role of the 
state in steel restructuring. Despite its strategic intentions, the state was 
increasingly perceived as the originating source of worker’s distress and 
became the locus of union contestation (Cohen 1989: 278; Daley 1996: 
145).  
Even further, the avowed independence of the state from the firm’s industrial 
plans was increasingly questioned. For instance, in a meeting between 
Giraud and trade union delegates soon after the announcement of the 
plans, the CFDT had demanded further clarifications over the extent of the 
firms’ alleged autonomy from the state, while, even more interestingly the 
CGC 135  (a union generally unhostile to the restructuring measures) 
pondered whether any ‘hidden modalities of connection existed between 
governmental policy and the decisions adopted by the firms.’136  Despite the 
renewal of the CGPS on the 24th of July 1979, from which only the CGT 
refrained, there was a clear rupture in labour-state relations. The growing 
frailty of the state-unions relationship betrayed a legitimacy deficit in the way 
the devaluation process was carried out and laid out the necessity for a 
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deeper depoliticisation of steel restructuring which would shield the 
government from labour’s growing pressures. 
In addition to the political crisis looming over the state, labour revolt also 
threatened the proper application of the plan in economic terms. In 1979 the 
regular recourse to strikes contributed to a drop-down of production of more 
than 1Mt, leading to the worsening of firms’ financial results.137 In addition, 
regional concerns from both unions and local politicians over the future of 
their regions’ plants put a barrier to the industry’s smooth disengagement 
from its less efficient mills. With regards to the future of the Denain site, 
Etchegaray responded to the pressures of RPR deputy Georges Tranchant 
to safeguard the site for local development purposes by arguing that: ‘if the 
social situation in France evolved in such a manner that every production 
unit must be doubled, then it is the whole economy that would be 
condemned, and with it the future of France.’138   
Concomitantly, the mounting social dissatisfaction coincided with the 
increasing involvement of the European commission in the management of 
member states’ steel policy.  Since the signature of the Treaty of Paris in 
1951, the healthy functioning of the steel market featured among the 
regulatory priorities of the High Authority (the predecessor of the European 
Commission). While before 1974 its supervisory means were seldom 
needed, the onset of the crisis called for greater interventionism (Tsoukalis 
and Strauss 1985: 215; Bain 1992: 38-39). In December 1976, European 
Commissioner for Industrial affairs, Henri Simonet, introduced a plan to 
tackle the European steel crisis through a system of voluntary production 
quotas concluded between the Commission and the European firms and the 
introduction of recommended prices on steel products. After the succession 
of Simonet by Etienne Davignon, the Commission’s management of the 
crisis gradually acquired a more interventionist character (Grunert 1987: 
232-234) and implemented a system of mandatory minimum prices for 
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certain products or fixed orientation prices for others. It is only in February 
1980 that the Commission fully took advantage of its coercive powers as it 
installed a code of aids which allowed it to supervise domestic subsidy 
programs and reject them in case they distorted competition or if the 
recipient firms did not engage in extensive rationalisation plans. More 
importantly, in October of the same year, the Commission, by appealing to 
article 58 of the Paris Treaty, officially declared that the European steel 
industry was in a situation of ‘manifest crisis’ and enacted a system of 
mandatory production quotas on member state’s firms. In turn, the quotas 
were distributed among European producers based on their average 
production shares between 1977 and 1980. 
However, the French were initially reluctant about the prospects of 
transferring the responsibilities over steel policy to the supranational level. 
Indeed, Haberer, director of the Treasury, put the dilemma in the following 
way: 
Should we accept this evolution, when the Government assumes all 
the political responsibility of the difficulties involved in front of the 
Parliament and public opinion? It is doubtful. Without denying the role 
that the Community could play in coordinating the future of sectors 
which are very often subject to capacity reductions, it is right to think 
that the government has every advantage in maintaining enough 
freedom of manoeuvre in managing the so delicate operations of 
restructuring and reconversion.139  
Indeed, there was a fear in aligning French steel policy with the prerogatives 
of the Commission as it entailed the danger of compromising domestic 
industrial reform. For instance, Haberer explained that in accordance with 
the New Community Instrument, 140  the commission could approve the 
subsidisation of projects that the French government did not support. In this 
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case the state ‘being subject to the simultaneous pressure of the 
industrialists and the Commission, would find it difficult to resist the 
temptation to aid a project from the moment that the Community would be 
ready to do so.’141  Put simply, one of the French authorities’ concern was 
that the Commission could induce a milder approach to steel restructuring 
at a time where France was impelled to implement a drastic rationalisation 
program. Additionally, in the absence of a strict rule on subsidies it was 
feared that certain countries, such as Italy, would make an excessive use of 
public aids without undertaking the necessary cut-downs in production 
capacities thereby increasing their market shares at the expense of 
countries undergoing drastic capacity reductions, such as France.142    
At the same time the Commission offered the government a politically 
secure route to carry out the implementation of its selective disengagement 
strategy. Given the fragile situation of state-labour relations, the 
transnational depoliticisation of steel policy could allow the government to 
politically distance itself from the restructuring measures. Indeed, the 
enactment of article 1958 and the attribution of production quotas to 
member states would give the French state an external impetus to 
disengage from unproductive units and in a way conceal its own preference 
for a drastic rationalisation of the sector. To wed both depoliticisation 
objectives and ensure the austerity of the Commission’s approach, the 
government chose to side with the adoption of a pan-European plan for 
capacity reductions on the condition that the Commission installed a strict 
supervisory mechanism over member states’ distribution of subsidies to 
their respective steel industries. This would allow ‘to control more seriously 
all projects of capacity extension and to practically render them financially 
unrealisable.’143  
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Overall, there were three main economic aims that the government was 
thriving to achieve through the Davignon plan. Firstly, to secure price 
increases large enough to guarantee the profitability of Usinor and Sacilor, 
secondly to ensure that France was competing on an equal footing with its 
common market partners by sharing the cost of capacity reductions and 
finally to alleviate the budgetary burden induced by steel. Figure 7 provides 
a summary of the legitimation and accumulation objectives that inclined the 
French government to support the transnational depoliticisation of steel 
policy between 1979 and 1984. 
Figure 7: The accumulation and legitimation imperatives pursued by the 
state through the Davignon Plan, 1979-1984 
Accumulation Imperatives – Industrial objectives 
a) Secure price increases for steel products in order to restore profitability 
of French steel firms, 
b) Ensure that cut-downs in production capacities will be fairly shared 
among member states and that French steel would not lose its current 
market shares, 
c) Induce budgetary restraint through strict controls on public subsidies. 
Legitimation Imperatives – Domestic politics objectives 
a) Gain tacit acceptance of the restructuring measures by trade unions as 
none contested France’s membership, 
b) Signal public opinion on the inevitability of plant shutdowns and layoffs 
as such measures were taken across the EEC, 
c) Transfer the responsibility for the socially and regionally painful 
measures to the EEC, 
d) Create an alliance with trade unions by fighting on a common front for 
a higher share of production quotas at the EEC level. 
 
As far as the first objective is concerned, the French government was well 




September 1980, it was acknowledged that French firms could not profitably 
sell their finished steel products: long products were sold below and flat 
products144  at factory cost.145 Thus, the Simonet plan had been judged too 
weak to impose a hard-lined discipline on the community’s producers since 
within four months of its application average steel prices on the French 
market fell from 1,270 Francs per ton (F/t) in January 1977 to 1,220 F/t in 
April.146 The Commission’s approach towards price control was too diffident 
for the French. 147  In contrast, the plan Davignon initially permitted an 
elevation of prices to 1,370 F/t in August 1977, but similarly to the Simonet 
plan, its disciplinary mechanisms were soon exhausted as price increases 
were cancelled out by December.148 It, too, proved powerless to adjust 
prices in the face of erratic market developments.149  Thus, the system of 
orientation prices was considered deceptive as ‘it seemed illusory to expect 
of producers to spontaneously respect these prices.’150 Instead, the MoI 
argued that ‘It belongs to the Commission to employ the means for a serious 
control of these prices.’151 Recourse to article 58 and the official declaration 
of a ‘manifest crisis’ was thus for French authorities the best course of 
action. The imposition of mandatory production quotas would in theory bring 
about a supply and demand balance for steel products: prices would rise 
again enabling French firms to sell their products at profitable levels on 
European markets.  
In fact, the pan-European adoption of downsizing plans was a precondition 
for the effective implementation of the French selective disengagement 
strategy as it would ensure that French producers would not suffer a 
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disproportionate share of the total European capacity reduction. Such 
became the attachment of the French government to article 58 that in the 
case of rejection of the plan by member states, the MoI had prepared in 
advance an emergency protectionist disposition which included a unilateral 
imposition of import barriers for products from the members of the common 
market regardless of its legality vis-à-vis the Treaty of Paris.152  Indeed, in 
case of rejection of article 58, the free flow of community products would 
seriously inhibit the capacity of French producers to supply the domestic 
market given that a drastic capacity reduction program was already on 
course at home. 153  In fact, the major concern of the MoI during the 
negotiations of the application of article 58 was that in the absence of a 
generalised Commission-imposed discipline on the European market, the 
internal plan would be compromised. 154  Manifestly, the success of the 
French domestic measures depended upon the implementation of 
homogeneous rules on production reductions across the ECSC market. 
This was confirmed by the council of the financial holding of Usinor which 
lamented to Monory, the Minister of Economic affairs, that despite the fruits 
borne by the 1978 Rescue plan, the latter’s results were jeopardised by the 
‘fall in the selling price of steel stemming from the undisciplined competition 
in which certain European producers engage.’155  
The third, financial, objective of an ECSC-led adjustment was to ensure 
budgetary discipline at home. In fact, the call for budgetary restraint 
constituted the rallying point around which the French government managed 
to coalesce the rest of member states. Indeed, during the negotiations in 
Brussels, the French representative approached other members by 
claiming that on this front all governments were in the same boat:  
                                                          
152 AN 19910446/1, Note pour le Ministre: mesures nationales en cas de rejet de l’art 58, 1 
October 1980. 
153 AN 19910446/1, Note pour le Ministre: mesures nationales en cas de rejet de l’art 58, 1 
October 1980. 
154 AN 19910446/1, Note pour le Ministre, 12 September 1980; AN 19910446/1, Giraud to 
Ortoli, 24 September 1980. 




It would be illusory to believe that benefitting from the crisis certain 
producers could suffer less than others. From then on, at risk of seeing 
the governments of all member states confronted to demands for 
massive financial aids, a precautionary approach is needed. This is the 
reasons for which the Commission is duty-bound to act and France 
shares its point of view on the necessity of Article 58.156  
More specifically, in its negotiations with Italy, which under domestic political 
pressures had used a substantial aid package to augment the productive 
capacities of the Bagnoli steel complex, the MoI attempted to convince its 
interlocutor on the necessity of  further ECSC discipline by arguing that the 
solicitation of national governments for further industrial subsidies will 
continue indefinitely as the crisis worsened and thus further expenses would 
be incurred on their budget. 157  Common ground with Germany, which 
constituted the major opposition to the renewal of the Davignon plan as 
price controls did not constitute an equally high priority given their superior 
competitiveness, 158  was also found on the necessity to reduce state 
subsidies to the sector. Germany had traditionally been weary of the 
Commission’s dirigisme and had proposed a return to ‘free competition’ in 
order to re-equilibrate the market as it feared that the imposition of 
production quotas would encourage German industries to seek further state 
aids.159 However, an agreement between the member states during the 
council of the 25th October on the revision and stricter application of the 
code of aids helped to attenuate German fears.160 
On the level of domestic politics, the European-wide harmonisation of 
restructuring measures was necessary to convince labour of the inevitability 
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of job cuts. Referring to the Italian government’s aid package to Bagnoli, 
Giraud in a letter to Davignon explained that:  
in the dramatic context that characterises once again this vital sector 
for the economy and for employment, public opinion would not 
understand why the Community authorities favour by aids or other 
incitements the creation of new capacities and that the disciplines 
necessitated in periods of overproduction are not applied.161  
Thus, the non-homogenisation of downsizing measures could domestically 
discredit the French plan as it would signal that drastic cuts in production 
capacities were not the sole alternative to the steel crisis. More precisely, it 
run the risk of implying that these measures were not exogenously imposed 
but constituted a conscious policy preference of French state elites. Hence, 
the urgent necessity of the French government to come to a rapid 
agreement with the European partners in order ‘to dissipate the impression 
of grave divergences between the member states of the Community.’162 
At a time when French authorities were domestically accused by trade 
unions of implementing stricter plans that other European countries,163 the 
adoption of a common set of measures at the supranational level could help 
the government to secure a tacit, at least, acceptance of the necessity of 
restructuring at home. The government could in this way circumvent firms’ 
pressures for further funds or trade union demands to reconsider the 
shutting down of plants, as the anathema of the measures would be brought 
upon the Commission. As Davignon succinctly explained, with the 
application of article 58: 
the Commission knew that it would engage its authority and that of the 
community. Equally it knew that, in the eyes of the public, it would bear 
the responsibility on a social level of the measures it preconised. And 
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which would foment lay-offs and possibly the shutdown of production 
units. It was ready to take its responsibilities…164 
Given the supranational quality of its authority and its lack of democratic 
accountability, the Commission could comfortably assume the 
responsibilities of the coming social disaster in contrast to national 
governments. 
To reiterate, in 1978 the ‘division of labour’ strategy to steel policy-making 
begun showing its first cracks as the state progressively became the primary 
target of labour contestation. Faced with a deepening crisis that put French 
producers in an unfavourable competitive position, the government’s 
objectives to secure the profitability of French firms as well as to politically 
shield its commitment to production cut-downs from labour’s costly material 
demands to safeguard Lorraine’s capacities interweaved as grounds to 
engage in a process of transnational depoliticisation. By allowing the 
Commission’s takeover of steel policy, the government sought to carry out 
its own preference for the liquidation of obsolete activities by appealing to 
the Commission’s ‘supranational economic rule of law’ (Warlouzet and 
Witschke 2012) and in this way secure a tacit acceptance of capacity 
reductions by the sector’s unions. However, these measures came at high 
social and political cost. Socially, employment in the steel industry 
decreased from 183,000 at the beginning of 1977 to 110,000 in 1980 with 
44% of these losses concerning Lorraine (INSEE 1983: 23). As for the 
political backlash, it came in the electoral confrontation of May 1981 and 
Mitterrand’s ascendancy to presidency. 
THE PLAN JUDET (1981-1982) 
The steel crisis played a prominent role in the victory of the Socialists as 
their commitment to the nationalisation of Usinor and Sacilor allowed them 
to gain the support of the PCF and the CGT as well as to construct a rhetoric 
concerned with the defence of French production against the upsetting 
                                                          




forces of the international division of labour (Smith 1990: 77-80). However 
as argued here, both prior to and after its so-called U-turn from a Keynesian 
to a neoliberal-inspired economic policy in 1983 (Clift 2002: 327) the 
government had formulated like its predecessor a definite industrial 
preference for a targeted disengagement from steel’s unproductive units.165 
Similarly, it early on demonstrated its commitment to a Commission-led 
management of the steel crisis.  
Nevertheless, shortly after its victory Mitterrand was quick to re-assure the 
people of Longwy that they would not have to bear the hardships caused by 
a ‘savage capitalism’ as the nationalisation of steel would spearhead the 
socialists’ endeavour to reconquer the domestic market and safeguard 
employment (Mitterrand 1981). Usinor and Sacilor were nationalised in 
October 1981 and the process involved a dissolution of the financial 
holdings of the industries and a transfer of firms’ capital to the state, notably, 
by converting public loans into state-held capital. 
Once in power however, the socialist government’s reading of the crisis was 
not dissimilar to that of its predecessor. Despite the efforts of the 1977 and 
the 1978-9 plans, it was acknowledged that overcapacities persisted in 
French steel.166 While the country had on average reached the productivity 
levels of Germany (at 7 hours per tonne of steel), there were great 
discrepancies between on the one hand the more competitive production of 
flat products in the modern coastal plants of Dunkirk and Fos and the 
insufficiently rationalised production of long products in Lorraine and 
Normandy. 167  Since it was widely recognised that French steel was 
overstaffed and suffered from an excess presence of antiquated production 
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units, especially in Lorraine, Gaddoneix explained to the new minister of 
Industry, Dreyfus, that ‘it would be illusory to reconstitute a competitive 
French steel industry on the basis of existing capacities, or even worse in a 
perspective of augmenting capacities’.168 As early as June it was realised 
that rationalisation was essential for the survival of the firms as their 
financial situation had significantly degraded in the last months of 1980 with 
Usinor and Sacilor recording 1.23 BF (7% of revenue) and 1.95 BF (18% of 
revenue) in losses accordingly.169 in spite of the necessary reductions in the 
workforce, the government had to resume the previous government’s 
selective disengagement from the elements inhibiting French steel’s 
profitable operations namely the least efficient long products facilities in 
continental France. 170  Nationalisation was forthwith considered as an 
instrumental element for the further rationalisation of the sector. 
However, to minimise the political backlash that could emanate from the 
conflict between the government’s decision to continue the devaluation 
effort and its pre-electoral commitments, the government decided to 
outsource the design of the grand orientations of the new plan to Pierre 
Judet an academic researcher at the Institut de Recherches Economiques 
et de Planification. Judet was asked to provide a report sketching the mid-
term evolutions of the steel market. The report would then constitute the 
basis around which the national-level consultation with the industrial and 
social partners would take place. 171  Judet’s report was submitted in 
January 1982 and provided three scenarios estimating the future volume of 
French steel production taking into account the evolution of different 
macroeconomic variables such as variations in demand, the growth of GDP 
and the evolution of France's external commerce. The ‘optimistic’ scenario 
predicted a production of 24 Mt of crude steel for 1986, a more reserved 
scenario predicted 21.8 Mt, while the ‘pessimistic’ scenario predicted 19 Mt. 
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Indicatively, French crude steel production stood at around 23.2 Mt in 1980 
and 21 Mt in 1981.  
The report’s results were flexible enough to allow the state sufficient 
manoeuvrability to incorporate employment concerns within its new plans 
and loose the criteria for the dismantling of antiquated units. At the same 
time, in the face of inevitable union protests over the programmed job 
cutbacks, the government could claim that its hands were tied by the 
objective predictions of the report. In this way, as argued within the Ministry 
of Labour, the government could simultaneously show its determination to 
save steel as well as to  
make trade unions accept (at least tacitly) certain principles that would 
allow…the justification of certain painful choices and the obtention a 
less hostile attitude on the part of the representatives of the firms’ 
personnel.172  
To mitigate contestation, the government opted to retain the optimistic 
hypothesis of Judet and as Smith (1998: 162) argues ‘the politically driven 
nature of this decision becomes obvious when we consider that French steel 
production had never attained such high levels of growth except in 1972-
1974.’ In a sense the government hoped to temper the new plans’ impact 
on employment as much as permitted by the predictions of the report. 
Nevertheless, the plans presented in late March 1982 by the firms’ directing 
boards on the basis of Judet’s 24Mt thesis, necessitated the suppression of 
12,000 jobs. Despite the optimistic choice of the government, the latter was 
aware that even the 24Mt scenario would entail serious employment 
reductions since part of the steel workforce would be rendered redundant 
by the productivity gains to be realised through the modernisation 
investments inscribed in the firms’ plans. 173  Job shedding was to be 
accompanied by a renewal of the CGPS’ generous social compensations 
                                                          
172 AN 19870344/2, Note pour Mr Mandil, 3 April 1982. 




(i.e. early retirements,  severance pays for voluntary redundancies) which 
were extended throughout the 1980s. In fact, the CGPS reflected a wider 
pattern of the French state’s social management of deindustrialisation in the 
1980s as it sought to temper workers’ hostility to restructuring by offering 
generous welfare compensation in place of straight layoffs (Daley 1996: 
179-183; Levy 1999: 251;).  
At the same time, it had been agreed that the shutting down of all loss-
generating activities was ‘socially unacceptable.’174 Therefore, in order not 
to further amplify employment losses it was decided to postpone certain 
modernisation investments whose deferral would not drastically affect the 
firms’ financial result in the immediate future. 175  The modernisation 
investments that were adjourned as a result of the government’s 
deliberations included for instance Usinor’s and Sacilor’s plan to implement 
an electric steel mill at Neuves-Maisons and Gandrange accordingly. Given 
that electric steelmaking process are supplied by scrap steel, both 
investments would have substantially decreased French steel’s 
dependency on Lorraine’s iron cast production.176  
As it was later argued by the MoI, the 1982 plans constituted the ‘best 
possible compromise considering the promises made, the outcomes of the 
social concertation and the possible rhythm of reconversion of steel 
regions.’ 177  Thus, as in the textile sector, the government while in full 
knowledge of the extent of the capital devaluations necessary to restore the 
industry’s profitability, chose to initially adopt a milder approach to selective 
disengagement in order to find a temporal balance between its legitimation 
and accumulation imperatives. In other words, to appease the workers’ and 
regions’ concerns without compromising the overarching long-term 
objective to eliminate the uncompetitive elements of the steel industry. 
                                                          
174 AN 19910445/8, Note: Les plans industriels et leurs conséquences, 26 April 1982. 
175 AN 19910445/8, Note: Les plans industriels et leurs conséquences, 26 April 1982. 
176 AN 19870344/2, DIMME notes, 26 May 1982. 




It was precisely the elasticity allowed by the Judet Report that at the same 
time constituted the nemesis of the 1982 plan. By March 1983, less than a 
year into the plan, both the government and the firms recognised the steel 
market’s incapacity to absorb France’s projected 24Mt production. Usinor’s 
new president, Raymond Levy, deplored that the government contradictorily 
claimed ‘to build upon the strengths of our industry and at the same time 
save Lorraine…to settle the firms’ financial situation without actually dealing 
with certain insoluble social issues.’ 178  Indeed, while the different 
predictions of the Judet Report, ultimately, authorised a more cautionary 
policy, the government chose to defend certain ‘costly industrial objectives 
whose inanity was concealed.’179 As a result, USINOR continued finding 
itself overstaffed and carrying the weight of fragile units in a situation of 
ongoing overcapacities.180 
The MoI too became aware of the burden that the plan brought upon firms. 
Indeed, at the end of 1982 the respective losses of Usinor and Sacilor 
combined reached 19% of their revenues and they were expected to, only, 
minorly decrease to 15.8% in 1983.181 It equally became evident that the 
formulation of an umpteenth, more austere, devaluation plan amounting to 
up to 20,000 job cuts was unavoidable since Judet’s hypothesis was 
replaced by a production goal of 17.6Mt for 1983. In its orientations for the 
new plans, the DIMME called for a complete substitution of steel production 
relying on (Lorraine’s) iron ore and cast iron by the cheaper steel scrap-
based production. Similarly, it demanded the elimination of existing 
overcapacities in all categories of steel products, especially in long products 
where oxygen steel mills needed to be replaced by electric ones.182 
Arguably, the incompleteness of the 1982 plans was a consequence of the 
tension between the socialist’s government decision to carry out 
                                                          
178 AN 19910818/27, Raymond Levy to Chevénement, 8 March 1983. 
179 AN 19910818/27, Raymond Levy to Chevénement, 8 March 1983. 
180 AN 19910818/27, Raymond Levy to Chevénement, 8 March 1983. 
181 AN 19910818/15, Dimme: L’évolution de la sidérurgie française, 10 March 1983. 




disengagement by nationalising/politicising steel and the political backlash 
that could be redirected at it given its newfound responsibilities towards this 
industry. This tension was to be dealt once again by way of the EC.  
THE SOCIALISTS IN BRUSSELS (1982-1984) 
While France’s commitment to the Davignon plan was bequeathed by 
Barre’s government, its continuation was not the result of the Socialists’ 
confrontation with a fait accompli but the outcome of a carefully weighted 
deliberation within the government. In fact, the transnational depoliticisation 
of steel policy gave the socialist government enough room for manoeuvre 
to carry out a more effective liquidation of excess capacities. 
As early as July 1981, Mauroy’s government acknowledged that the 
preservation of the European market’s coordination through the ECSC was 
needed in order to pare the losses of Usinor and Sacilor.183 In addition, 
despite France’s deficit with the ECSC a protectionist fallback was 
inconceivable economically since half of France’s exports went to the 
common market and such a solution would jeopardise the objective to 
conserve the country’s global surplus in steel products.184 The government 
thus did not show any opposition to the already existing powers given to the 
Commission and a Council of Ministers of summer 1981 gave its approval 
to the prolongation of the quota regime and a reinforcement of the code of 
aids.  
By reinstating its commitment to a European-level management of the crisis, 
the government created a buffer against domestic political backlash once 
the unviability of the 1982 plans was realised. Indeed, while labour reactions 
to the 1982 plan were mostly regionally localised rather than nation-wide 
(Smith 1998: 162), a revision of the 1982 plan would arouse wider social 
discontent, and possibly ‘engender violent reactions’,185 as it would intensify 
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the austerity of the initial restructuring measures. As the director of the MoI’s 
cabinet, Louis Gallois explained: 
We are torn between the risk of trapping ourselves in the 
implementation of the rationalisation plan of September 1982 which 
would be overtaken by the evolution of the conjuncture, and the risk of 
calling into question, some months after their adoption – and only to 
amplify them- certain decisions that were already difficultly accepted 
by the social partners.186 
There was thus a real political difficulty in revoking the 1982 plan for which 
the government had already very laboriously obtained consent from the 
unions.187 Concurrently, the current plans would be disapproved by the 
Commission and other member states who would ask for further capacity 
reductions. 188  Therefore, the final arbitration over the domestic plans’ 
soundness was transferred to Brussels. The renewal of the Commission 
code of aids posed the end of 1985 (later adjusted to 1987) as the limit after 
which the attribution of aids to the steel industry of member states would be 
forbid. As a result, in its consultations with the unions, the MoI was able to 
advance the urgency of the new plan’s restructuring measures by invoking 
the time limit externally imposed to it by the Commission.189  
The Davignon plan was indeed crucial to the politically unbridled realisation 
of the new plans. France’s membership to the EEC was uncontested 
domestically seeing that none of the unions or the parties envisaged a 
withdrawal from the community. In a sense, the continuation of devaluation 
measures was understood as a binding condition of, or the price to pay for, 
France’s undisputed participation in the common market. Consequently, the 
government was able to build a sort of a ‘common front’ with labour’s 
representatives at the European level (see Figure 7). Indeed, the latter were 
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resolved to the maintenance of France in the EEC while urging the 
government to achieve a re-equilibration of quota distribution in France’s 
favour190 in order to avoid the shutting down of further units. Since the 
Commission-imposed quota regime, and by extension the necessity for a 
disengagement from certain production units, was not in itself challenged, 
French representatives were able to perform the role of the hard bargainer 
within the Ministerial Councils of the EEC.  
For instance, the French delegation repeatedly expressed its reserves over 
the prolongation of article 58 on the grounds that its share of production in 
the Community did not represent the production share of French firms 
during the reference years used by the commission (i.e. 1977-1980).191 By 
toughening its positions within the councils, the French government was 
trying to get the most out of the bargaining process and ensure a favourable 
quota distribution. Similarly, it was in the trade unions’ interest to support 
the French delegation as a higher quota share for France would reduce the 
volume of capacity reductions and by extension total layoffs. The alignment 
of workers’ representatives with the French delegation allowed the state to 
in a sense become the ‘sovereign embodiment of the national interest’ 
(Bonefeld, 2017: 125) without compromising its selective disengagement 
strategy.  
Yet, despite their combative attitude at the EEC level, French policy-makers 
were conscious of the benefits of the current regime to the country. Its 
criticisms were deliberately limited to the quantitative aspects of the regime, 
and more specifically on its effects on the French production share of the 
more profitable flat products, while tactically avoiding any judgement on the 
Commission’s management of the process.192 In fact, the Davignon plan 
was crucial to the success of the new 1983 plans. As explained by the 
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Ministry of the Economy, Finances and the Budget, Jacques Delors, at the 
time, France was actually, 
protected by the community system of quotas and orientation prices. 
Once this protection disappeared, on principle in two years, our 
industry will not be able to resist its competitors if it fails to adapt and 
re-establish its competitiveness.193  
Even further, it had been found that in fact France had not been especially 
penalised by the application of the quota regime. Its production of rolled 
products dropped by 18% from 1980 to 1982, just a little over the average 
EEC production drop which stood at around 16.74%, and had managed to 
maintain almost the entirety of its market shares, losing only 0.47% of them 
with respect to the reference years.194 
The supranational authority of the Commission over steel matters was not 
a mere external constraint on French industrial policy-makers since 
modernisation and the replacement of obsolete capacities figured as a 
priority of French policy-makers regardless of the Commission’s directives 
Rather its interference in domestic steel affairs constituted the Trojan horse 
through which the government was able to implement its policy preference 
for a selective disengagement from Lorraine’s iron ores and long product 
facilities while circumventing the burden of ‘excessive democratic meddling’ 
(Bonefeld 2017: 120).  
The case of Gandrange’s ‘Universal Train’ (UT), arguably the most singular 
episode of the steel crisis under the Socialists, clearly attests the 
smokescreen effects of the Davignon plan. As mentioned earlier, French 
steel’s inefficiency largely stemmed from its long products sector which was 
responsible for 60% of the two nationalised firms’ losses.195 More strikingly, 
it was argued by the MoI that within the sector’s structure certain units were 
maintained ‘against any industrial logic’ and some investments planned in 
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1982 had an ‘essentially symbolic dimension.’ 196  Indeed, certain of 
Lorraine’s long product activities were maintained out of the political 
necessity to safeguard the siderurgical vocation of a mono-industrial region 
heavily depended upon iron ore extraction and casting and whose decline 
bred the danger of an imminent ‘social implosion’. 197  However, in its 
orientations for the new plans the MoI aimed at breaking with this 
conservatism as they envisioned the shutting down of several of SACILOR’s 
oxygen steel mills (e.g. Neuves-maisons, Longwy) and called for a complete 
substitution of steel production relying on Lorraine’s iron ore and cast iron 
by electric steel-making processes198 relying on steel scrap.199 
However, the governmental blueprint clashed with the industrial proposal 
already made by Sacilor in 1982. The firm had proposed the construction of 
a universal rolling mill at the site of Gandrange which would essentially 
concentrate the fabrication of the major share of France’s long products by 
fusing the long product activities of nearby cities (Villerupt, Hayange, 
Rombas). The UT project- which was approved by Chevénement in 1982- 
had obtained the support of all the metallurgical unions and the local 
population as it had given a glimpse of hope to a region torn by the 
deindustrialisation of its steel activities (Smith 1996b: 102). Ambitious as it 
was, the project was criticised on many fronts. For instance, the UT project 
increasingly took the form of a clash between USINOR and SACILOR as 
the former was weary of the UT’s repercussions on its own long product 
activities (Smith 1996: 164). Likewise, the MoI’s cabinet expressed its lack 
of enthusiasm for the UT as it had been judged financially unsound in the 
context of the new production goals set by the government while it was 
estimated to have null effects on the country’s trade balance.200 Finally, the 
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Brussels authorities had communicated an equally reserved position as the 
UT was inconsistent with the volume of capacity reductions imposed on the 
French state.201 Although, the UT option was the socially more popular, it 
also run the risk of joining the category of ‘symbolic’ investments as it was 
too reliant on the casting of Lorraine’s iron ore thereby delaying the 
industry’s transition to electrical steel-making. 
While the dicey nature of the UT was made clear, for the government the 
main problem was the capacity to politically assume this choice. 202 
However, as Gallois had noted the reservations expressed in Brussels 
‘could tactically speaking be used to put the Commission in a position of 
having to take the responsibility of questioning the investment at 
Gandrange.’ 203  Indeed, confronted with the tough choice between 
undertaking a socially popular but industrially hazardous investment and 
abandoning it altogether, the Commission appeared Deus ex Machina to 
cut the Gordian knot. In a letter worth quoting in length, an (anonymous) 
member of the MoI’s cabinet dealing with the possible ways to handle the 
cancellation of Gandrange suggested that: 
An argumentation centred on the lack of profitability of the project is 
not very convincing in light of the uncertainties and the social and 
regional stakes… I am wondering whether we could officially postpone 
Gandrange before we have a clear knowledge of the results of the 
negotiations between on the one hand the unions and the firms and on 
the other the negotiations between Usinor and Sacilor regarding the 
coordination of their long product plans. We could give solemnity to this 
decision. Gandrange should progressively weaken like a bird with lead 
in the wing after receiving the knockdown blows of the Commission.204 
This stance allowed the government to open-mindendly keep the 
negotiations on Gandrange going while awaiting an unfavourable feedback 
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from Brussels. Indeed, Laurent Fabius had already warned the unions that 
the Commission was asking for a 0.6Mt reduction in long products.205 The 
final cancellation of the UT was announced after a ministerial council on the 
29th of March, and shortly after it Mitterand explained that decisions taken 
in the council were constrained by their obligations towards the 
Commission.’206 While Fabius assumed the government’s choice to abort 
the project in the French Senate, the depoliticising effects of the 
Commission proved more useful in the negotiations with the unions. During 
an Administrative council of Sacilor in which the unions were being 
consulted over the council’s decisions and the 1984 plans, Pierre 
Gadonneix, explained that the ‘most acute problem of steel policy lies in 
Brussels’ and it is the Commission’s dissatisfaction with Sacilor’s overall 
plan for long products that had necessitated its revision207 leading to the 
abandonment of the UT.   
With the UT project being dismissed, the MoI found the breathing space to 
implement a more austere devaluation plan with regards to long products. 
The latter took the form of a new subsidiary of the two public firms, Unimetal, 
which assembled all their long product units. By creating Unimetal in 1984 
the MoI intended to further discipline the long product sector and alleviate a 
great part of the social and regional concerns that had been inhibiting its 
modernisation. Simultaneously, it limited the necessity of state arbitration 
for socially tough industrial decisions.208 Indeed, the traditional association 
of Usinor with the North and Sacilor with Lorraine being eliminated, regional 
concerns would cease to play a determinant role in (dis)investment 
decisions within the sector. As a result, along with the 20,000 redundancies 
(half of which in Lorraine) entailed by the 1984 plans the way was paved for 
the shutting down of the inefficient oxygen mills of Neuves-maisons, 
Pompey and Longwy in Lorraine. The prioritisation of industrial efficiency 
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over regional concerns ultimately facilitated the selective disengagement 
from the so-called ‘symbolic’ activities that had been a thorn in the side of 
French steel since the onset of the crisis. 
Overall, the socialist management of the steel crisis did not significantly 
differ from the one pursued by its predecessor. Despite its relatively more 
reserved approach to steel restructuring in 1982 (which still required 12,000 
job cuts), the government soon realised the extent of the rationalisation 
measures necessitated to set the industry back on a profitable track. In its 
attempt to entice a more austere plan for steel, the Commission played once 
again a crucial role in ostensibly tying the government’s hands and forcing 
it to accelerate the elimination of its industry’s excess capacities. Through 
the Commission’s disciplinary mechanisms, the government was able to 
realise its own policy preference for a drastic disengagement from the 
sector’s less profitable activities namely, Lorraine’s casting and long product 
units. The nationalisation of Usinor and Sacilor iwas, ironically, followed by 
an increased reluctance of the government to assume the political 
responsibility of steel’s much needed rationalisation. Instead, the state 
sought to gain the tacit acceptance of the measures by the unions by 
displaying its limited room for manoeuvre in the face of the Commissions’ 
mounting pressures for capacity reductions. 
CONCLUSION 
The global overproduction crisis in the steel industry hit French firms in the 
form of a growing indebtedness stemming from their inability to profitably 
sell their products at current market prices given the comparatively low 
productivity levels achieved by the industry during its postwar development. 
To restore the viability of French steel, between 1978 and 1984 the state 
sought to eliminate the sector’s excess capacities by inciting the shutting 
down of unprofitable units and their replacement by more modern ones. 
More precisely the strategy of selective disengagement pursued by the 




low-end long products and the concentration of national production around 
the most ‘noble’ flat steel in the country’s coastal plants.  
As a prime example of a sunset industry, the steel industry constituted fertile 
ground to examine the different strategies deployed by states to manage 
the retreat from declining activities and the promotion of expanding ones. 
The partiality inherent in the management of selective disengagement 
threatens the capitalist state’s proclaimed neutrality. It can put it in the 
position of having to assume the discriminatory character of its industrial 
policies and become the target of contestation by the affected agents as 
happened in 1978 during the Longwy riots. Strategies to depoliticise 
industrial policy appear as tantalising options in such cases. The mock 
nationalisations of 1978, the recourse to the Judet report in 1982 and most 
importantly, the push for a Commission-led management of the crisis all 
illustrate the manners through which the successive governments sought 
pursue the strategy of selective disengagement by transferring its 
responsibility to non-state actors.  
The French state’s legal obligations towards the EC rules on capacity 
reductions and state aids served as a legitimation device for the 
government’s own preference for an extensive elimination of uncompetitive 
activities. Steel’s case demonstrates that in an era of heightened 
globalisation, the diffused powers of transnational institutions such as the 
European Commission should not be associated with the demise of the 
state’s economic sovereignty. Rather, such institutions can work in 
complementarity with nation states in the latter’s effort to reproduce effective 
conditions for capital accumulation while removing the social obstacles to 
their realisation. The appeal to supranational institutions’ ‘sector-neutral’ 
rules can provide governments with a powerful arsenal of measures to resist 
the pressures of displaced workers and firms for greater protection all while 
demonstrating the impartiality of their industrial policies. In this vein, 




involve the retreat from certain sectoral activities in a supranational 
economic rule of law. 
On the other hand, neither was policy simply structurally determined by 
market forces. For instance, the socialist government had the possibility to 
carry on a different policy, but was equally aware that a failure to raise the 
profitability of steel by rationalising it would lead to a complete decline of the 
industry and along with it the totality of the jobs depended on it. Its retreat 
from the pre-electoral pledge to save the Lorraine industry stemmed from 
its own objective to modernise steel as a whole, a goal that could not be 
achieved by maintaining Lorraine’s outmoded blast furnaces and expensive 
iron ore. As the political form of valorisation, the state’s reproduction relies 
on the capitalist dynamics of industrial production according to which 
economic survival depends on increasing productivity rather than on the 
absorptive capacity of the market. Steel policy was shaped by the 
deliberations within the state and the consecutive governments’ choice to 
secure the competitiveness and survival of steel in the long run by 










The last sector to be studied by this thesis is the automobile industry. The 
main difference between automobiles and the industries previously studied 
is that due to its impressive export performance the former was in a sense 
forced to support the weight of the general crisis of French industry since 
the mid-1970s. Due to its net surplus contribution to the balance of trade, 
car performance was crucial in mitigating the crises experienced in other 
sectors and their effects on the country’s trade equilibrium. However, just 
like textiles and steel, in the 1970s the global automobile industry entered a 
crisis of overproduction. This crisis was marked by the discrepancy between 
the flattening of demand growth and the expansion of productive capacities 
at a global level, to a great extent stimulated by the impressive growth of 
Japanese car production since the 1960s. Thus, the survival of automakers 
depended upon their ability to increase their productivity in order to continue 
selling profitably in a shrinking market and to outpace their competitors. 
Domestic producers responded to the crisis by engaging in a process of 
rationalisation, automation and disengagement from obsolete production 
units. Deindustrialisation in the automobile industry took the form of a 
liquidation of the ageing and inefficient industrial capital situated in the Paris 
area and the transference of production towards more automated plants in 
provincial France that necessitated fewer workers to function. According to 
the archival findings of this chapter, this industrial reorganisation and 
devaluation of Parisian automobile capital was promoted and endorsed by 




productivity of the sector and allow it to continue figuring among the world’s 
top producers. 
In addition, the state, while a fundamental actor of the selective devaluation 
process, tried to politically distance itself from restructuring. It attempted to 
retain arm’s length control of the process in order to simultaneously ensure 
that carmakers abided by its industrial objectives and that it remained 
insulated from growing contestation from the industry’s workers. Despite the 
successive governments’ preference for this strategy, the dismantlement of 
Parisian units was justified as an inevitable market-led process over which 
the state had no control. This was the case in the state’s treatment of both 
France’s major automakers namely Peugeot and the nationalised- but 
autonomous- Renault. As a result, just like the steel industry, industrial 
policy towards cars was subject to a degree of depoliticisation. Car policy 
became a delicate balancing between on the one hand the successive 
governments’ imperious necessity to maintain the competitiveness of an 
economically vital industry, and thus influence to a certain degree the 
constructors’ strategies, and on the other their endeavour to avoid a formal 
responsibility over the growing job cuts in the Paris area. 
The chapter begins by examining the evolution of the car industry and its 
relationship with the state from 1945 until the second oil shock. Car 
constructors, including the nationalised Renault, enjoyed considerable 
autonomy from governmental orientations. As it is argued the non-
interference of the state during this era was conditional upon the 
coincidence of the privately conceived strategies of automakers and the 
state’s industrial objectives. As the crisis progressed and threatened to 
undermine French automobiles’ performance, the industry required more 
important public assistance.  
As the next section shows, from the mid-1970s until 1981 the government, 
without assuming overt political control over the sector, supported the 
‘decapitalisation of Paris’ strategy by distributing regional development 




it permitted the sector to increase its productivity and maintain its export 
competitiveness while on the other, it allowed to mitigate the destruction of 
jobs in the Paris area with the creation of industrial jobs in other 
deindustrialising regions such as the Nord. While endorsing this strategy 
and providing funds for its realisation, the state endeavoured to decline the 
political responsibilities of job cuts and discursively attributed the shutdown 
and dismantlement of Parisian plants market forces over which it had no 
control.  
In the subsequent three sections it is shown that the Socialists’ policy 
towards cars and especially Peugeot, was also guided by a desire to avoid 
the assumption of responsibilities for plant shutdowns and growing 
unemployment. During the first two years of their ascendance to power, the 
socialists abandoned their pre-electoral objective to halt employment 
decline and endorsed the ‘Paris disengagement’ strategy. However, as of 
1982 the government was faced with two main political issues. Firstly, PSA’s 
investment plans threatened to deviate from the government’s objectives. 
Secondly, the sector became subject to growing labour contestation which 
saw the birth of a strike movement that further aggravated the sector’s crisis 
and inhibited its effective modernisation. Thus, the government was striving 
to achieve arm’s length control over the restructuring process to both ensure 
the conformity of PSA’s plans with its own industrial ambitions and avoid 
drawing workers’ contestation upon itself. Indeed, in 1983 after Peugeot’s 
announcement of a mass layoff, which was met by violent reactions from 
workers, the government by virtue of domestic labor law, was forced to 
intervene and approve a somewhat milder version of the firm’s plan. By 
extension, the state’s intervention led to an increased politicisation of car 
policy as it was pressured to overtly take a stance over the course of the 
sector’s restructuring and enter negotiations with labour’s representatives.  
As the ultimate section argues, the disruptive mobilisation of Parisian 
autoworkers was at the source of the Socialists’ decision to install a rule-




while sidestepping lengthy negotiations with the unions. To this end, in 1984 
the government sought to depoliticise industrial policy by delegating the 
formulation of the objectives of automobile policy to an expert committee, 
the CNI. The latter’s recommendations regarding productivity and job 
shedding became the rules guiding the government’s industrial policy and 
the constructors’ strategies as their ostensibly neutral character provided 
incontestable justification for the cut down of the excess capacities located 
in the Parisian area. 
AN AUTONOMOUS INDUSTRY 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the automobile industry was one of the few 
sectors in which France developed a definite advantage and held a net 
surplus trade vis-a-vis its Western commercial partners until the 1970s. 
While the sector’s development benefitted from the policy instruments used 
by the state to tackle the inflationary social compromise (e.g. inflationary 
redistribution, currency devaluations etc.), unlike other industries it did not 
witness any significant technological gap compared to its advanced 
competitors (Stoffaes 1978: 139). Thus, the sector was to play a particular 
role within the general crisis experienced by French industry in the wake of 
the first oil shock as its commercial performance had to compensate for the 
growing deficits incurred in other industries and allow the servicing of the 
growing energy bill. The commercial strategies of France’s two main 
constructors, Renault and Peugeot, were able to serve the industrial 
objectives of the state, namely large trade surpluses, during the Trentes 
glorieuses without substantial public intervention. However, in the context 
of cut-throat competition that characterised the global automobile industry 
after the two oil shocks, the state had to intervene more decisively in the 
sector’s affairs in order to guarantee its continuous competitiveness in world 
markets. 
Soon after the liberation of the country, French authorities assigned a pillar 
role to the car industry which it would ultimately maintain until today.  Within 




Paul-Marie Pons, a civil servant responsible for the Ministry of Industry’s 
(MoI) department of mechanical industries, proposed a 5-year plan for the 
automobile industry to remedy the ills that characterised the sector at the 
end of the war. Indeed, the war had left a significant mark on French 
constructors. During the occupation, the sector’s firms were forced to almost 
abandon their traditional car production and orientate their activities towards 
the production of vehicles necessitated by the German war effort (Boldorf 
2016:156). In addition, during the occupation several important industrial 
sites, including Renault’s plant at Billancourt and Simca’s plant at Poissy, 
suffered heavy casualties from the Royal Air Force’s bombings while 
towards the end of the occupation the car industry was also subject to the 
requisitioning of its industrial equipment by the occupying forces. More 
importantly, at a structural level, like most French sectors, cars were 
characterised by their uneven development. With 22 constructors in 1945, 
car production was undertaken at the same time by small artisans as well 
as larger firms (Loubet 1999a: 291).  
In order to set the industry back on track, the Pons plan explicitly 
encouraged a reorganisation of the sector leading to the consolidation of its 
various producers in 7 companies which included the recently nationalised 
Renault, Citroen, Peugeot, Simca, Berliet, Panhard and Ford’s French 
subsidiary, Ford SFA. In addition, the plan assigned to each car group a 
market niche for which they would produce, with for example Simca and 
Panhard specialising in popular cars, Peugeot and Renault in middle-range 
ones and Citroen in higher-end vehicles. At the same time, the acceleration 
of the industry’s growth was seen as a key to the reconstruction effort since 
the sector’s exports could generate the foreign currencies necessary to 
import the material resources for which there was shortage domestically 
(Chatelain 1950: 107; Meot 2009: 113).   
While the industrial concentration pursued by governmental authorities was 
successfully implemented, the second component of the plan was arguably 




orientations imposed. Indeed, both Renault and Citroen deviated from their 
assigned markets with the commercialisation of the popularly accessible 
4CV and the legendary 2CV models respectively. This initial discordance 
between the planning objectives of the state and the trajectory actually 
followed by car constructors presaged the state-industry relations that would 
characterise the sector's post-war development. Indeed, in contrast to the 
steel industry, cars enjoyed considerable political and financial autonomy 
from the state (Smith 1995: 8). In other words, after the Pons plan's initial 
stimulus to the concentration of the industry, the sector was able to develop 
autonomously following its own independently formulated industrial 
strategies.  
Political independence was the rule for the car industry; even for the state-
owned Renault. Non-overt state interference in the affairs of Renault was 
underpinned by the coincidence between the firm's industrial expansion 
plans and the governments’ social and economic objectives (Dreyfus 1980: 
201; Loubet 1999b: 428; Sheahan 1963: 122). As Dreyfus (1980), former 
Director of Renault, argues, the public firm ultimately benefitted the 'national 
interest' as its partial implantation in French provinces helped the creation 
of jobs in economically deprived regions while its commercial plans 
significantly enhanced the country's export effort. In addition, the autonomy 
granted to Renault further stimulated competition within the sector as the 
firm operated according to the same market pressures as its competitors 
and its survival ultimately rested on the accumulation of profits (Sheahan 
1963: 120-124) rather than state subsidies. Thus, public authorities 
attached a strategical role to the firm (Loubet 1999b: 428) as its competitive 
presence within the sector allowed it to act as pilot and as pace-setter that 
domestic rivals sought to imitate (Dreyfus 1980: 202). 
The particular political and market configuration of the car sector bore fruits. 
By 1949, with a yearly production of 188,000 cars France had already 
surpassed its 1938 record production levels (Figure 8). The car industry's 




shock. Between 1950 and 1972 car production augmented at a average 
yearly rate of 11.4% reaching an annual production of 2,719 thousand cars 
in 1972. The growth of the industry was supported by the steady increase 
of demand for automobiles. Household equipment rate increased from 21% 
in 1953 to 30.2% in 1960. Growth in demand was even more important 
during the 1960s and early 1970s with equipment rate augmenting by a 
yearly average of 2.6% and reaching 61.3% in 1972 (INSEE 1990: 153).  
In addition to the expansion of the domestic market, the sector's dynamism 
also owed to its competitive export performance. By 1972, 59% of the 
country's production was exported outside of the franc zone (INSEE 1974: 
245). Cars also fully took advantage of the common market (de Mautort 
1983: 203) in which they were able to direct the great majority of their 
exports. From 1960 to 1972 the number of vehicles exported towards the 
common market augmented by 286% and were able to secure a steadily 
growing surplus in France's external commerce. Thanks to the vigorous 
international performance of its major constructors, in the 1970s France 
established its position as Europe's second largest automobile producer 
and was able to consistently score fourth in the ranking of the world's top 
car manufacturers behind the US, Japan and Germany. In contrast to both 
the textile and steel industry, French cars could comfortably compete in the 




Figure 8: Volume of car production (1938-1979) 
 
Source: INSEE, 1990. Annuaire Rétrospectif de la France, 1948-1988. 
As the industry was growing, the sector became progressively dominated 
by four big brands. After a series of mergers that saw the taking over of 
Ford's French activities by Simca in 1954, and Citroen's absorption of 
Panhard and Berliet in 1955 and 1967 accordingly, car production became 
dominated by four main companies: PSA – as was Peugeot renamed in 
1966 -, Citroen, Renault and Simca.  
The first oil shock gave a further boost to the concentration tendencies of 
the sector. Renault and Peugeot were able to surmount the energy crisis 
and the accompanying slowing down of car consumption by introducing an 
innovative new range of vehicles (Loubet 1996: 67). For the former, the 
crisis was resisted through the commercialisation of the small and 
economical R5 vehicle while for the latter it is the increasing development 
of diesel motors that allowed the immediate resumption of sales. In contrast, 
Simca and Citroen proved to be unable to respond as promptly to the 
mounting crisis. By failing to renew their product range and adapt it to 
demand for low-consumption cars, Citroen and Simca – which was 






















important drop in their sales which brought them on the brink of bankruptcy. 
PSA saw the crisis of its domestic competitors as an opportunity to increase 
its economies of scale and in 1976 acquired Citroen's production tool. In 
addition, in 1978 PSA bought Chrysler's European activities, along with 
Simca, which was later renamed Talbot, and forthwith became the largest 
European automobile manufacturer. Progressively, Renault and PSA 
consolidated their position as France's two major constructors and in 1976 
both figured in the top ten world producers (in the 7th and 8th rank 
accordingly).209  
Thanks to Renault’s good performance and Peugeot’s new acquisitions the 
industry was overall able to circumvent the first oil shock and get out of the 
crisis relatively intact without having recourse to massive public financial 
assistance. Indeed, French car production had the highest growth in Europe 
between 1973 and 1979 as it augmented its total volume of production by 
12.4% compared to 7.7% in Germany and the negative growth of production 
in the UK and Italy (based on Philips 1982: 30).  
However, at the same time the first oil shock also revealed the underlying 
difficulties experienced by the global car industry. As Kale (2014: 309) 
notes: ‘a major problem for the industry was the tendency for the growth of 
production capacity to outstrip the growth in demand for cars’. On the one 
hand, the overall drop in demand and the shift in consumption patterns 
towards economical vehicles (amplified by the hike in oil prices) demanded 
an increased innovation effort on the part of producers. On the other, 
Japan's impressive advance into foreign markets intensified competition for 
world market shares and existing constructors’ fight for survival (Jurgens et 
al. 1993: 23-24). Indeed, in 1981 Japanese car production reached 25.4% 
of world production from 14% in 1970, while the volume of its exports to 
Western Europe and the US increased ninefold and fourfold accordingly 
from 1970 to 1980 (Altshuler et al. 1984: 28). For European producers, the 
                                                          





simultaneous stagnation of demand and the hyper-productivity of the 
Japanese industry translated into an issue of excess capacities and 
(relatively) low productivity (McLaughlin and Maloney 1999: 72). French and 
Western producers had to modernise their equipment and reach the 
productivity levels set by Japan in order to circumvent the threat of 
liquidation. 
Within the literature on the automobile industry, it has been often suggested 
that from the 1970s on changing consumer preferences and the introduction 
of flexible just-in-time production methods pioneered in Japanese car plants 
began a structural transformation of the car industry (Bloomfield 1991; Law 
1991). In this post-Fordist phase, competition among automobile firms is 
quality-based and rests on their capacity to propose innovative and 
differentiated products to consumers as opposed to simply aiming at 
increasing productivity gains through standardised mass production 
techniques (Abernathy 1978).  
However, the pressures stemming from changing consumption norms and 
Japanese exports did not merely signal a structural transformation within 
the sector's form of competition but essentially, its overproduction 
tendencies. Indeed, the 1973 oil shock showed on the one hand the limits 
of a market close to saturation as most consumers were already equipped 
with at least one car (Loubet 1996: 66), and on the other the presence of 
too many producers competing relentlessly for a market growing only very 
slowly. The expansion of the sector's productive capacities regardless of the 
market's absorptive capacity led to an accelerated competitive struggle 
between producers as the limited prospects for sales growth meant that only 
a few producers could continue producing profitably. As it has been noted, 
‘the single most difficult problem facing the automobile industry is 
overcapacity. There are simply too many producers that can produce far too 
much’ (Marchak 1991: 171). The phenomenon of demand saturation and 




through which the global overaccumulation crisis manifested itself within the 
automobile industry.  
While the French market remained less penetrated by Japanese cars than 
that of its European counterparts, the main threat that they posed to French 
constructors was in the competition for foreign markets shares (de Mautort 
1983: 209). Throughout the post-war era and even after the two oil shocks 
France’s balance of trade in automobiles was positive as the exporting 
capacity of the sector was comfortably able to cover for imports (Table 14). 
Instead, the main challenge facing French firms was to maintain their world 
leading positions in spite of the increased competition and the oversupply 
of the market. In other words, global overaccumulation was not experienced 
in terms of a prospective decline of the sector, unlike T&C and Steel, as 
automobiles arguably held the potential to adapt to the new competitive 
settings of the global market (Gros 1980). 
Table 14: Foreign trade coverage in cars (1955-1980) 
 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Foreign Trade Coverage 
Ratio (%) 
464 139 264 206 246 180 
Source: INSEE, various years. Annuaire Statistique de La France. 
However, it is only in the years following of the second oil shock that French 
automobiles would experience the full-blown consequences of the sector's 
underlying overproduction tendencies. Despite its largely positive foreign 
trade coverage ratio, as of 1979 France began losing both its domestic as 
well as European market shares (Table 15). Between 1979 and 1983 the 
former decreased by 10.6 % and the latter by 5.8%. The loss of market 
shares triggered important financial losses which discouraged the pursuit of 
further investments. Indeed, the investment effort was almost halved for 
PSA between 1979 and 1983 while Renault’s remained stagnant between 
1981 and 1983 (Table 16). Furthermore, investment growth was 




(except 1983) and Volkswagen which remained in double digits even after 
the second oil shock.  
The weak investment capacity of French constructors was significant in two 
ways. Firstly, investment growth was necessary for renewing and 
diversifying their product range and thereby increase the reach of their 
markets. Secondly, investment in automated production sites was a 
prerequisite for increasing their productivity and hence their price-
competitiveness. In effect, the industry’s productivity was lagging behind 
certain Western carmakers. As Table 17 indicates between 1980 and 1983 
the growth of labour productivity quasi-stagnated for both constructors as it 
increased by only 0.1% for Peugeot and 0.5% for Renault. During these four 
years the labour productivity of France’s main competitors (General Motors, 
Ford and Fiat) grew consistently faster, by an average 2%. This is 
disregarding the ‘Japanese hyper-competitiveness’ which in 1980 allowed 
a Nippon worker to produce two and a half as many cars as a French worker 
(Gros 1980: 41). As the figures indicate the weaknesses in French 
automobiles’ economic performance largely stemmed from PSA. At the 
same time however, Renault was unable to on its own redress the national 
performance of French cars.  
The weakening commercial performance of the industry and the decreasing 
investment effort meant that principal difficulty of the industry was the 
obtaining the funds necessary to maintain their competitiveness and leading 
positions in a market characterised by intensely accrued competition. It is 
precisely the constructors’ lack of sufficient funds that elicited state 
intervention. With public money PSA and Renault would be able to resume 
investment into new modern plants thereby and, in the process, eliminate 
the excess workforce and disinvest from the ageing production units that 




Table 15: European and domestic market shares of French cars, 1979-
1983 (in %) 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
EU FR EU FR EU FR EU FR EU FR 
Peugeot 17.2 42.9 14.9 36.6 13.3 33.1 12.7 30.2 1 2 32.2 
Renault 12.9 3 5 14.4 4 0 13.7 38.9 14.5 39.2 12.3  35.1 
T o t a l  30.1 77.9 29.3 76.6 2 7 7 2 27.2 69.4 24.3  67.3 
Source: AN 19890617/555, Commission National de l’Industrie, Rapport sur l’Industrie Française, 29 October 
1984.  
 
Table 16: Evolution of the investment to turnover ratio, 1979-1983 (in %) 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Renault 5.1 7 8.3 7.1 8.3 
Peugeot 8 7 6.4 6.7 4.3 
General 
Motors (US) 
8.1 13.4 15.5 10.3 5.4 
Volkswagen-
Audi 
10.1 12.8 12.8 13.1 12.1 











Table 17: Labour productivity (Volume of output to labour input in %) 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Renault 8.5 9.2 8.4 9.1 9.7 
Peugeot 9 8.2 8.2 7.9 8.3 
General 
Motors 
- 9.5 9.1 9.5 11.2 
Ford - 10.4 10.9 11.4 13.2 
Fiat - 9.9 9.9 11.3 11.8 
Source: AN 19890617/555, Commission National de l’Industrie, Rapport sur l’Industrie Française, 29 October 
1984. 
Overall, Public authorities adopted an arm’s length stance towards 
automobiles according to which intervention in the sector's affairs was 
rendered superfluous as long as the overall economic performance was 
satisfactory and as long as the constructors' own strategies embodied the 
government's industrial policy objectives, namely regional employment 
creation and a sustained trade surplus. Thus, the formal autonomy granted 
to automobiles was conditional. As it will be subsequently shown, once the 
balance between the government's objectives and the firms' strategies was 
destabilised by the second oil shock and the appearance of excess 
capacities, the autonomy granted to firms was replaced by a covert but 
nevertheless decisive state intervention to rationalise the sector.  In fact, in 
its effort to eliminate the superfluous capital weighing upon the sector, the 
state would play on the apparent independence of the firms and pursue its 
rationalisation aims without drawing contestation upon it.  
THE PROVINCIALISATION OF PRODUCTION (1978-1981) 
Generally, the restructuring of the French automobile industry during the 
1970s and 1980s, and most notably Peugeot, has not been studied with 
reference to the state's influence given the traditional independence of the 
firms from political influence (Marklew 1995: 113). Indeed, the autonomy 
experienced by car constructors could misleadingly suggest that the cut 




with the state having the capability to play only a secondary role (Smith 
1996: 104).  However, after the oil shock even in the case of PSA, the 
frontiers between public interference and private management became 
increasingly murky (Marklew 1995: 134). Under Giscard d’Estaing’s 
presidency, the state endorsed and even influenced the constructor’s 
strategy of progressive liquidation of Parisian assembly lines and the 
transference of production towards provincial areas. This strategy of 
selective disengagement sought the elimination of the industry’s ageing 
capacities and the relocation of production in automated provincial units. At 
the same time, to decrease the visibility of its influence on the constructors’ 
strategy, the government attributed the responsibility over job cuts and plant 
closures to the constructors’ own discretion. To use Krippner’s (2007: 479-
480) formulation, industrial policy-makers attempted to refute their 
implication in the constructors’ strategy ‘by redefining economic events as 
the product of “market forces” rather than the activities of state officials’. 
This pattern of industrial management was even testified at the time of the 
Peugeot-Citroen merger of 1974. The merger was itself a realisation of the 
state's industrial policy preferences. PSA was ultimately able to finance its 
acquisition of Citroen through a 1 Billion Franc (BF) loan made by the FDES 
as the government had strongly sided with this scenario (Hodge 1991: 56).  
On the level of industrial strategy, the government's preference for a 
Peugeot takeover of Citroen, instead of a Renault-Citroen merger, was 
justified by the MoI on the basis that the first solution could allow Peugeot's 
production apparatus to reach greater dimensions and become the world's 
8th biggest car constructor, just one rank behind Renault. 210  Indeed, 
according to the MoI, Renault aside, the size of French constructors was 
not large enough to effectively face the exacerbated international 
competition in the automobile market unless Peugeot could take over 
Citroen's activities and effectively become the second French group to 
                                                          




figure among the greatest European producers.211 For the government, the 
fusion of the two constructors was essential in realising the country's 
industrial objectives.212  
Not least, the Peugeot-Citroen merger also offered considerable political 
advantages. Indeed, the merger was to be accompanied by a progressive 
liquidation of Citroen's obsolete units, such as its legendary Quai de Javel 
site in Paris, which would overall entail the elimination of 8,000 jobs in 2 
years.213   By declining to push for Renault's absorption of Citroen, the 
government avoided the creation of an overdimensioned nationalised sector 
and simultaneously transferred the responsibilities associated with this 
operation to the private sector. As it was anonymously stated in a MoI note: 
…the intervention of public powers in the Peugeot and Citroen Merger 
must meet the double objective of letting the groups bear the complete 
responsibility of this operation at the same time as allowing the 
realisation of important industrial policy objectives214  
Indeed, the state’s reliance on the formal independence of car constructors 
allowed it to pursue its own policy preferences without being accountable 
for their impact on the labour market.  
The state's behind-the-scenes encouragement for a selective liquidation of 
unproductive automobile capital would prove most important in the 
aftermath of the second oil shock and the cut-throat competition 
accompanying it. French constructors sought to rationalise their industrial 
apparatus by disengaging from their ageing plants and transferring 
production in fewer and more efficient ones. As Jean-Paul Parayre, 
president of PSA, declared in 1979, 'we have 45 plants, there is one half too 
many.'215 Such concerns were shared by the MoI which noted that while 
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French cars were undergoing a period of relative health, without a massive 
effort to increase productivity in the face of increasing international 
competition and growing ‘global overcapacities’, nothing could guarantee 
that French producers would not suffer the same fate as their British 
counterparts, who had incurred the most drastic production cut downs in 
Europe.216 Since Peugeot’s market shares were acutely affected by the 
crisis, the MoI expected that the group’s rationalisation effort would 
accelerate, especially in  Talbot section, and bring about a sped-up closure 
of plants.217  
Rationalisation and the disengagement from obsolescent units took the form 
of a progressive decentralisation of the sector's industrial apparatus from 
the ile-de-France Region towards the provinces. Traditionally, the Parisian 
region had been the most important location for car plants and in 1977 still 
absorbed one third of the sector's worforce or 132,000 workers. 
Decentralisation towards provincial regions had already started in the 1960s 
as the Parisian region was overpopulated with antiquated assembly lines 
(Oberhauser 1987: 449) which could hardly be modernised given the 
condensed space of Paris' urban landscape. It is in the late 1970s however 
that this process accelerated as the industry sought to reduce the 
production capacities of their Parisian firms and expand investment in their 
provincial ones.  
In the case of Talbot, its direction announced in the Autumn of 1980 the 
suppression of 1,550 jobs through an early retirement scheme while, in 
January 1981, the firm also put the plant's workers on technical 
unemployment as they were allowed to work only one day out of two to 
adapt the firm's capacities to decreasing demand for the Talbot cars.218 
Indeed, the firm was marked by its excess capacities as its optimal 
production levels were around 2,200 vehicles per day but given the 
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decreasing orders received by the firm it was now producing only 1,450.219 
Talbot's counterparts were also engaged in a process of curtailment of their 
Parisian activities. Renault planned to make cuts in its largest Parisian site 
of Boulogne-Billancourt and eliminate 2,500 jobs through similar early 
retirement schemes and natural departures.220 At the same, time Renault 
intended to expand its productive activities in Nord-Pas-De-Calais in the 
North by augmenting the capacities of its assembly line at Douai and the 
creation of a saddlery production unit at Denain. 221  Similarly, Citroen 
envisaged to transfer a substantial number of its activities in the Hauts-de-
Seine, such as its assembly lines, foundries and engine machining units, to 
provincial industrial sites in Lorraine and Aulnay.222 By early 1980, Parisian 
units had lost 7,000 jobs and would predictably shed another 8% of its 
workforce by 1984.223  
Government support for the constructors' strategy of selective 
disengagement from their Parisian activities came in the form of regional 
development premiums for investments undertaken in the Northern and 
Eastern provinces. Just like during the Trentes Glorieuses, the post-oil 
shock rationalisation effort of domestic constructors was in full accordance 
with the government's own industrial objectives. The state's support for this 
strategic disinvestment derived from a twofold reasoning: to maintain the 
industry’s commercial dynamism and to create new jobs in the provinces. 
On the one hand, the government's interpretation of the crisis as one 
characterised by 'overcapacities at the global level' suggested that the 
constructors' efforts should ‘adapt to a demand that will grow less greatly 
and more irregularly than in the past’.224 More precisely, if the country was 
to maintain its high rankings in world automobile production in a context of 
stagnating demand, domestic constructors had to 'achieve the level of 
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competitiveness of the best' which would be inevitably accompanied by a 
productivity-led employment decline. 225  Even further, the state showed 
support for the disinvestment of the Paris region as it was acknowledged 
that often the modernisation of production facilities could not be undertaken 
on site. Indeed, as explained by the MoI there was 
…a necessity to create more competitive production units in order to 
replace units that are not very functional since they are located in old 
plants characterised by their impracticality given their insertion in the 
Parisian Region’s urban space.226 
In a context of decelerating demand growth, it was thus quintessential for 
the sector to increase its productivity through the ongoing decentralisation 
strategy and hold onto its top world rankings. For the MoI, raising the 
productivity of the sector and maintaining its commercial dynamism was 
even more important considering that it was by far the most net contributor 
to the country's balance of trade.227 Keeping the net surplus in car trade was 
essential for mitigating the deficit experienced in other sectors (e.g. textiles). 
As a result, many of the regional investments undertaken by the 
constructors were initiated by the DATAR,228 the interministerial delegation 
responsible for the economic and industrial development of France's 
territories. Similarly, Renault's and Peugeot's investments in Nord-pas-de-
Calais were to a great extent made possible thanks to the grants and 
subsidised loans distributed by the FSAI, yet another interministerial 
committee responsible for the attribution of financial aids for investments in 
regions experiencing industrial decline. Thus, the state held a crucial role in 
encouraging the constructor's selective disengagement from the Paris 
region. With regards to the Nord-pas-de-Calais area, Dormard (2001: 96) 
even argues that the state often went as far as to wholly alter the 
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constructors' initial plans in order to orientate their investments towards the 
region. 
However, the state’s role within the process came under political attack. 
Deputies from the ile-de-France argued that, despite Western Paris being a 
region hardly hit by the automobile crisis, the DATAR held an 'intransigent' 
position and declined to consider it under its regional development 
programs.229  The partiality of the state was also brought up in the Senate 
as Communist deputy, Guy Schmaus, went on arguing that there was a 
concerted effort between the government and the constructors to 
completely 'liquidate' the car industry of the Paris region. 230  Thus, the 
second reason behind the government's support for the decentralisation of 
the industry obeyed mostly to legitimation imperatives. Indeed, the 
implantation of new plants or the extension of existing ones in provincial 
regions allowed the government to show its determination to induce an 
industrial reconversion of regions hardly hit by the retrenchment of their 
steel industry such as Lorraine. 
Capitalising on the formally autonomous character of French automakers, 
the government advertised its regional development premiums as an a 
posteriori management of the decisions taken privately by constructors. As 
Minister of Industry André Giraud explained in the Senate: in the current 
competitive environment ‘it did not belong to the government to specifically 
act upon this or that firm by influencing the decisions that each of them has 
to make’.231 Given the government’s discursive disengagement from the 
firms’ decision-making process, the government could justify its support for 
the provincialisation of car production as an attempt to mitigate the 
deindustrialisation of the Paris region by recovering employment growth in 
other industrially declining regions. As squarely explained by Giraud in 
response to the critiques of the decentralisation tendency inthe car industry:  
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it is indispensable that our constructors, just like their great 
competitors, modernise their industrial apparatus... It is not always 
possible to modernise on site; equally, it is in conformity with national 
solidarity that the implantation of new units takes place in priority in 
regions that are the most affected by the employment crisis.232 
The government's industrial policy preference for disinvestment in the Paris 
region was thus christened a national solidarity effort. By supporting the 
provincialisation of the car industry and the disengagement from the ageing 
Parisian plants, the government endeavoured to pursue its industrial policy 
objectives and reap the political benefits of its regional development 
programs in one fell swoop. 
Overall, the particular pattern of governance within the car sector permitted 
the embodiment of the government's industrial aspirations in the privately 
conceived strategies of domestic constructors. By attributing the liquidation 
of Parisian units to the constructors’ own discretion, the government was 
able to ensure the modernisation of the industry and pursue its trade surplus 
objectives without overtly asserting political control over the process. At the 
same time by rhetorically framing its support for the provincialisation of car 
production as a national solidarity effort to create job opportunities in the 
provinces, the government was attempting to legitimate its role within the 
selective disengagement process.  
Ultimately, the government was able to politically distance itself from the 
constructors’ rationalisation plans because, unlike firms in the steel sector, 
carmakers were able to surmount their initial difficulties without massive 
state aid. As it was noted by the MoI at the end of 1979, despite the 
important market losses of Talbot, PSA was still able to finance its 
rationalisation measures given the good profitability of its two other affiliates, 
Peugeot and Citroen.233 However, the picture became bleaker in the first 
months of 1981. It was realised that in order to achieve the level of 
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competitiveness of its greatest competitors, French constructors had to 
invest 10 BF per year. However, as Gaddoneix, director of the MoI’s 
metallurgical division noted: 
Until today, our constructors could finance this effort without public aid; 
it is probable that they will not be able to pursue this policy without 
external support given the increasing degradation of Peugeot's 
financial results, which force it to make a strong downward adjustment 
of its 1981 investments, and the limited debt servicing capacity of 
Renault.234 
It was realised that, while in the previous years cars were able to 
independently finance their productivity-enhancing investments, they could 
not continue to do so without massive public financial assistance.  Indeed, 
it was calculated that, not only public funding for R&D in economic vehicles 
had to increase sevenfold in the coming years, but publicly subsidised loans 
also had to substantially increase in order to double the rate of automation 
of industrial plants. 235  As a result, a more extensive round of excess 
capacities was expected. In Smith's (1998) words this task would become 
the 'Left's dirty job' given that the realisation of the deepening crisis of 
automobiles took hold of the MoI only months prior to the socialists’ electoral 
victory. 
SOCIALIST DISILLUSIONMENT (JUNE 1981 - JUNE 1983) 
Pre-electorally, the Socialist Party' reading of the automobile crisis 
suggested that the latter's main cause, laid in Giscard d'Estaing's 
deflationary economic policy which decreased the purchasing power of 
households and hence domestic demand for automobiles.236 As a result, 
the socialists condemned the employer's drive to automation which 
privileged productivity gains over the conservation of employment. Equally, 
they denounced the state's support for the disinvestment of Paris and its 
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feigned attempt at compensating Parisian job losses with new jobs in 
peripheral areas.237 Instead, the socialists’ plan for automobiles proposed 
to resume car consumption by decreasing taxation (i.e. circulation taxes) 
and enhancing workers' revenues.238  However, as soon as the Socialists 
took office, they were confronted with the economic reality exposed by the 
civil servants working within the state apparatus and shortly decided to 
abandon their pre-electoral solution to the crisis. The recognition of the 
extent of the constructors’ financial degradation, forced them to encourage 
the resumption of the provincialisation strategy with public money. In 
addition to the bleak financial situation of French constructors, the 
government was also confronted to the mounting social tensions that 
threatened to disrupt the implementation of the planned 
automation/rationalisation programs. The Socialists were increasingly 
called to financially intervene in the sector’s affairs as well as mediate social 
conflict. Their enmeshment in the sector’s affairs run the risk of politicising 
restructuring and thereby compromising industrial efficiency concerns. 
As early as June 1981, the first short-lived Minister of Industry Pierre Joxe 
was informed of the urgency to maintain the car sector's competitiveness by 
increasing its productivity. Indeed, for Gaddoneix, the diagnostic remained 
unchanged: the sector, with the financial assistance of the state, had to 
increase its efforts to introduce labour-saving automation processes.239 
Indeed, domestic producers' productivity levels were still lagging behind 
their American and Japanese competitors. Indicatively, the yearly number 
of cars produced per worker was 8 in France whereas the Japanese were 
able to raise that number to 12 or even 13.240 Undeniably, the Socialists' 
rise to power did not alter the fact that the sector was overwhelmed by an 
excess workforce when compared to its international rivals. Similarly, within 
the Planning Committee it was acknowledged that the automobile crisis was 
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in essence one of excess productive capacity at the global level. As it was 
argued: 'The world automobile market is characterised by very sharp 
competition, which would result to a selection of a limited number of 
constructors that alone could remain in the market'. 241   It became the 
Socialists’ task to make sure that French autos would avoid the threat of 
outright liquidation and keep figuring in the chosen few world producers.  
Regardless of the Socialists’ pre-electoral commitments, the sector's 
survival still depended on the constructors' disengagement from their 
ageing industrial units and their replacement by labour-saving ones. Even 
more importantly for the newly elected government, this process was to be 
publicly financed. It was noted that given the poor financial conditions of 
PSA and Renault, the continuation of automation would necessitate a 
substantial increase in the state's financial participation in restructuring. 
Compared to the 1977-1980 period where the state poured on average 300 
Million Franc (MF) per year in the sector, as of 1981 the state was planning 
to inject 1 BF per year for each constructor.242 By autumn 1982 the MoI 
eventually grasped the depth of the sector's crisis. As it was explained by 
Gaddoneix:  
Today the financial situation of constructors…is very preoccupying and 
casts doubt on the level of investments for the coming years. This risks 
to be fatal in the long term given that the other big constructors 
(General Motors, Volkswagen, FORD, the Japanese) conduct a 
particularly dynamic investment policy.243 
A massive public injection of liquidity in the sector was ultimately necessary 
in order for both Renault and Peugeot to maintain a competitive presence in 
international markets.244  
                                                          
241 AN 19890617-380, Eléments de réponse aux questions posées, 26 May 1982. 
242 AN 19910818/53, Note: Plan a deux ans, 17 July 1981. 
243 AN 19910436/1, Note pour le Ministre, 6 October 1982. 




Restoring the competitiveness of the industry was rendered even more 
important by the fact that cars were considered one of the economy's 
leading sectors thanks to its employment contributions, its commercial 
surpluses and the stimulus exercised upon other important sectors such as 
steel or electronics.245 As the MoI’s cabinet had informed the Prime Minister 
with regards to PSA, in the absence of public assistance 'its collapse, even 
if it was progressive, would create an unprecedented economic and social 
problem and would be very harmful for Renault'.246 Public financing was 
regarded as an urgent precondition for the resumption of investments to 
rationalise and modernise the sector's productive apparatus and ultimately 
relieve it from its superfluous industrial equipment. On the downside, public 
financing run the risk of deeply enmeshing the state in the sector's 
retrenchment from Parisian units and the ensuing cut downs in the excess 
workforce thereby raising the tension between its pre-electoral 
commitments and its intended policies. 
Nevertheless, it was now widely acknowledged that the country's two 
constructors were suffering the consequences of their accumulated 
overcapacities rather than the stagnation of demand. As far as Renault was 
concerned, in a reunion of the board of directors held in September 1982, 
Hanon, Renault's President, argued that the firm's  
past prosperity led [managers] to overlook the elementary relation 
between the means held and their yield at all levels. In the future, this 
should be our first preoccupation, as it is the only way to know what 
should kept and what should be eliminated.247 
Even further, in the same meeting, it was stated that the firm needed to be 
in a state of alertness as it was not possible anymore to have production 
means working at only 50%, 30% or even 20% of their capacities.248  
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A similar diagnosis was established with regards to PSA. Indeed, PSA's 
acquisition of Chrysler's European activities in 1978 was now considered a 
'strategic error as it led the company to take charge of financial bottomless 
pits' given the ageing character of Chrysler's plants in Spain, the UK and 
France.249 As a result, according to Philippe Humbert, technical councillor 
to the MoI, Peugeot’s principal weakness lied in 'the general problem of 
production volumes and its oversized industrial apparatus.'250 In a context 
of flattening demand growth, the nominal production capacity of the two 
French constructors was too great compared to the demand for them. This 
meant that their industrial facilities were burdened with idle or partly idle 
units which could not function at their full potential given the limited 
absorptive capacity of the market and whose cost of maintenance further 
depressed the firms' returns. As an example, in 1982 the production costs 
for French constructors augmented by 12-13% in contrast to only 5-6% in 
Germany. 251  As such the recovery of the industry depended upon a 
selective disengagement form such idle units that prohibited it from raising 
its productivity to international standards. 
To remedy the fragile situation of cars, the government decided to subsidise 
the constructors' future investment plans on the condition that they fulfilled 
the industrial priorities set by the state. Following a ministerial committee 
held on the 31st of January 1983, the MoI and the Treasury informed 
Renault and PSA that their programs were eligible for public aid as long as 
they ascribed to the government's objectives namely energy conservation, 
regionalisation and robotization. 252  Ultimately, the industrial policy 
preferences of socialists were in line with those of their predecessors. 
Indeed, within the MoI it was now widely accepted that the provincialisation 
of production was to continue and bring about  
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a progressive and foreseeable desertion of production units which by 
way of their dilapidation and the organisation of the urban tissue are 
not prone to modernisation or extension.253  
The socialists pre-electoral promise to halt employment decline was 
replaced by the objective to automate the industry which could come about 
only at the cost of Parisan jobs. 
As a result, the plans presented at the MoI's request 254  by the two 
constructors in 1983 contained all the previous patterns of industrial re-
organisation (i.e. rationalisation, automation, provincialisation). Renault’s 
plan entailed a reduction of the different types of car platforms, automotive 
systems and components produced by the firm, the modernisation of 
existing assembly lines and a 'downsizing of the Paris area plants to the 
benefit of the provinces.'255 Overall, the program required a 10,000 jobs 
reduction concentrated mainly in Renault's largest Parisian plants in 
Billancourt and Flins.256 Similarly, Peugeot had communicated to the MoI its 
planned reduction of 10,000 to 12,000 jobs. De-manning affected its Citroen 
(Clichy, Levallois, Nanterre) and Talbot (Poissy) plants in the Paris area and 
would be accompanied by the concentration of production in its more 
modern plants in Valenciennes and Charlevilles in the North and at Tremery 
in the North-East. 257  By June 1983, the plans devised by the two 
constructors had abided by the state's overall industrial and regional 
development objectives. 
However, in addition, to the confrontation with the deepening automobile 
crisis, the government was called to manage the mounting social tensions 
within the sector. In the spring of 1982, the government was faced with one 
of the most important industrial disputes to take place in the post-1968 era 
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in any economic sector. Labour dissatisfaction started building up in autumn 
1981 which marked the begining a 3-year cycle of struggles (Gay 2015: 27). 
Various highly mediatised and lengthy strikes – each lasted around five 
weeks- took place among the semiskilled and largely immigrant workforce 
at Renault's and Peugeot's Parisian plants (Kronenberger 2016: 45; Richter 
2008: 49). The first major episode of this series of conflicts took place in the 
spring of 1982. The 1982 strikes  significantly marked the sector for the 
coming years and presaged the intensity of industrial conflict until 1984. The 
strikes started in April at Aulnay-sous-Bois, Citroen's largest plant in Ile-de-
France, and were then exported to Talbot's Poissy plant in June where the 
clashes between the strikers, non-strikers and police forces escalated to 
violent proportions. In both cases, the strikes ended with the intervention of 
a government-named mediator pressuring management to cede to the 
workers’ demands258 and the CGT gaining increased popularity within the 
striking plants (Hatzfeld and Loubet 2004: 153-154). These strikes presaged 
the political obstacles that would inevitably accompany the plans to cut 
down the excess workforce. 
Indeed, the strikes demonstrated the capacity of workers to disturb both the 
business cycle and social peace within individual firms. In purely economic 
terms, productivity and production levels were inflicted significant blows. 
During the strike period 90,000 cars failed to be produced due to the work 
stoppages while in October the sector was still unable to recover its pre-
spring productivity levels as they dropped from 800 vehicles a day to 600.259 
For PSA's management, the 'spring movement' featured among the 
principal causes behind its recent financial losses260 and pleaded to the 
government that the restoration of ‘social peace’ was a prerequisite for a 
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return to profitability.261 There had been a real shift of power within the firm 
and according to the management of Peugeot, ‘the goal pursued by the 
CGT was to install a new authority' and 'dictate its own law' inside the firms 
by for instance spontaneously ordering the interruption of work in the 
assembly lines at the slightest pretext.262  
In a PSA report that circulated confidentially within the MoI, management 
clearly explained the spill over effects of this new social environment: 
production rhythms were very irregular, the personnel was disheartened, 
absenteeism was on the rise, the quality of produced cars was deteriorating 
while the consequences also affected the  public image of the brand.263 In 
the medium term, PSA's management explained that the tense atmosphere 
reigning within the firm would ineluctably pose problems in its restructuring 
strategies. As it was explained more precisely by the director of PSA’s 
external relations, Tristan d’ Albis:  
On the one hand the general policy of decentralisation to the benefit of 
more modern firms set up in the provinces; on the other the progressive 
robotisation of assembly lines which, while it creates specialised jobs, 
also affect less skilled labour on the other, risk to quickly lead to tough 
choices [sic].264  
Clearly, labour revolt threatened to destabilise the car sector's strategy of 
disengagement from outdated production units. This can be observed from 
the rate of cut down of its excess workforce: while in 1980 and 1981 
automobile employment decreased by 24,200 and 27,300 respectively, in 
1982 it fell only by 7,230. 265  As the Minister of Industry, Jean-Pierre 
Chevenement explained to Mitterrand the labour revolt raised a major 
political puzzle regarding the government’s rationalisation plans:  
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The social conflicts of the 1982 spring brought about an overthrow of 
power within the Parisian plants of Peugeot-Talbot… This 
phenomenon must be associated with the immigrant workers’… 
realisation of their power of influence. Certain orientations are currently 
being discussed in liaison with M. Autain.266 They concern technical 
and social changes of great depth…Nothing could be undertaken 
without the, at least tacit, consent of the most influential unions which 
will inevitably pose their own conditions’267 
In other words, the rising power of the industry’s trade unions run the risk of 
rendering industrial policy-making increasingly subject to workers’ 
grievances thus compromising its rationalisation objectives. Allowing 
labour’s representatives in the negotiations’ table could turn the 
rationalisation plans from a technical matter to a highly politicised one. 
All in all, the socialists inherited a deepening automobile crisis which 
clashed with their pre-electoral pledge to maintain employment and revive 
the sector's growth through a resumption of demand. Indeed, the 
recognition of the substantial excess capacities characterising the sector 
rendered the intensification of its rationalisation urgent. Arguably, industrial 
policy makers found themselves in a cumbersome situation. The limited 
investment capacity of constructors required a considerable injection of 
public funds while an overt intervention of the state run the risk of politicising 
the rationalisation process and compromising industrial efficiency concerns. 
THE 1983 STRIKES (JULY 1983 – JANUARY 1984) 
The tension between the need for state intervention in a traditionally 
autonomous sector and the risks of politicising the selective disengagement 
strategy grew stronger between July 1983 and January 1984. On the one 
hand PSA’s industrial plans threatened to deviate from the government’s 
objectives as it planned to cut back its modernisation investments. On the 
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other, the summer of 1983 witnessed the peak of the autoworkers’ 
mobilisation forcing the state to intervene more decisively to maintain social 
peace. While the Mauroy government managed to convince PSA to carry 
out the state’s preferred industrial strategies by financing its projects without 
exercising direct control over the firm, the workers’ revolt after the 
announcement of PSA’s dismissals plan forced the government to intervene 
in favour of PSA’s proposal. This de facto politicisation of PSA’s 
restructuring plans threatened to inhibit the modernisation of the industry 
and the resumption of the Paris disengagement strategy. 
In 1981 socialist program for automobiles proposed that the state buy 
shares in PSA's capital, and if it saw fit become the majority shareholder, in 
order to assure the conformity of the latter's industrial strategies with the 
national interest.268 Since Renault was already nationalised, their program 
entailed an extension of public control over a habitually autonomous and 
independent firm. Ironically however, soon after their election the Socialists’ 
main struggle consisted in finding a way to encourage restructuring without 
overtly asserting control over the process. In a context of deepening 
automobile crisis both economic and political considerations intervened to 
prevent an overt public control of the firm or even a manifest intervention in 
its affairs.  
On an economic level, nationalisation and the creation of one big public car 
sector integrating Renault and PSA had been forthwith dismissed as an 
option as it was crucial for the country's commercial performance to 
maintain two completely separate world-sized groups with differentiated 
product ranges and brands.269 Additionally, the MoI even feared that direct 
financial assistance to the sector could publicly reveal the extent of PSA's 
crisis and detrimentally affect sales as consumer's loyalty to the brand 
dropped.270  
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Even more important were the political problems posed by state intervention 
in the affairs of PSA. While in the case of Renault state-firm relations were 
more straightforward as the company could continue to benefit from public 
capital injections as part of its 1983 plan, the case of PSA was more 
perplexing given the traditionally distant relations between the state and the 
firm. 271  Indeed, as Louis Gallois, director of Chevenement’s cabinet, 
explained after a meeting with Parayre certain executives at PSA were 
weary of greater state interference and the guarantees that the state would 
demand in exchange for funds.272  Indeed, it was widely acknowledged 
within the MoI that ‘massive and direct public assistance would quickly raise 
the issue of the group's public control'273.  
State-PSA relations were complicated on yet another level since the scope 
of public intervention bore important consequences on the firm's industrial 
trajectory. Indeed, PSA's management was faced with two financial choices:  
a) either the firm would undertake its projected yearly 4.5 BF 
investment program -which was the minimum necessary for the firm to 
maintain its current world position- with one third of the investments 
being funded by a mixture of public loans and subsidies or,  
b) PSA would engage in a much more conservative plan amounting to 
a 3 to 3.5 BF yearly investment program that would not require any 
substantial assistance from the government.274 
The MoI had clearly sided with the first option as it would allow Peugeot to 
augment its sales volume by 8% and contribute a yearly 3 BF to the 
country's balance of trade.275 Alternatively, the 3.5 BF program would, as 
Gallois noted, force PSA 'to reduce its industrial ambitions at the risk of 
losing touch with the world's big constructors.'276 The state's political puzzle 
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consisted in finding a way to encourage PSA to adopt the 4.5BF program 
given its net commercial benefits without taking political control of the group. 
In a letter to Mitterrand, Chevenement exposed the situation in the following 
words: 
A large-scale intervention of the State towards Peugeot S.A. 
uncontestably poses a political problem. It appears necessary: 
indeed various clues show that the Peugeot family prepares a 
strategy of industrial retreat, that could either take an insidious 
form (discrete divestiture of the assets detained by the Peugeot 
family, weakening of the industrial group by a slackening of 
investments as it can be already observed today) or either the 
form of a showdown with the state (mass redundancies, 
important foreign disinvestments)… It is in the country's interest 
to avoid such a situation.277 
Faced with the necessity to financially intervene without challenging the 
ownership structures of the company, the government had to opt for a more 
'oblique' way, as Chevenement argued, to fund PSA's 4.5 BF program.278 
Indeed, it was decided that PSA's program, and to an extent Renault, should 
be funded through ordinary law procedures for the procurement of industrial 
aids which were formally open to all industrial firms. Such aids were to be 
granted through the Fonds Industriel de Modernisation,279 the Fonds des 
grands travaux,280 the Fonds de Development Economique et Social281 or 
even the National Energy Fund which could eventually mobilise funds for 
automobile constructors by virtue of their energy-saving car projects.282 
Since it was to an extent prearranged that these institutions’ funds would 
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prioritarily be channelled into the automobile industry, the state could 
persuade PSA to proceed with the 4.5 BF program and ensure that it 
possessed the necessary funds to carry it out. At the same time, the 
government was avoiding exercising direct political control over the group 
as the latter could operate as an ordinary private-sector firm seeking funds 
through schemes formally accessible to all eligible enterprises. 
Nevertheless, due to its reliance on state funds, PSA progressively moved 
'from a position of high autonomy to one of intense dependence' (Hart 1992: 
118). Without nationalising or buying PSA shares, the government was able 
to exert arm's length control over the investment choices of the group. 
However, the government's decision to avoid exercising overt public control 
over the firm did not prevent it from direct intervention in its affairs when the 
violent confrontations of 1982 were reignited the following year. As part of 
its 'Paris disengagement' strategy, PSA announced in July 1983 a first 
round of job cuts concerning its plants in Ile-de-France. More precisely, the 
announcement involved 7,535 redundancies 4,632 of which would be 
executed through the early retirement of part of the personnel aged 56 or 
more, while the rest (2,903) would be accomplished through pure layoffs.283 
The straight dismissals exclusively concerned the Talbot plant at Poissy and 
the decision was met with a series of violent protests by the factory’s 
workers that lasted until January 1984. On the 7th of December the conflict 
reached its peak with workers occupying the factory for a month before 
being removed by police forces at the government's request.  
With the conflict increasingly gaining wide media coverage and leading to 
'the near total breakdown of labor relations at the Talbot plant' (Milner 1984: 
379), the government was forced into negotiations with PSA's management 
and the involved unions, the CGT and CFDT. The tripartite negotiations 
culminated in a decision to decrease straight layoffs from 2,903 down to 
1,909 and to finance early retirements through the Fond National de l’ 
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Emploi (FNE).284 Just as in steel, restructuring was accompanied by an 
expensive social programme to mollify the auto-workers’ disruptive 
mobilisation. While the FNE procedure, constituted according to the 
Treasury an important burden on the state’s budget it was equally 
indispensable for obtaining ‘social peace’.285 At the same time given the 
increasing need to modernise the industry ‘it was important to show the 
country that the government meant business, even if this aggravated the 
climb in unemployment’ (Morray 1997: 119). 
In fact, the dismissal plan was regarded as necessary by the MoI. As it was 
explained in a note assessing Peugeot’s proposed reductions: 
[PSA’s management] considers that it has realised important 
economies in its general expenses thanks to a tight management of its 
finances; it attempts to slow down the rise of financial charges by 
limiting stocks, reducing the payment extensions accorded to the 
concessionaires and extending those granted to suppliers. But today it 
does not seem possible to be limited to such actions. A reduction in the 
wage burden is indispensable for the group as its value added consists 
to a great extent in labour costs. In this context, the reductions in the 
workforce announced by management is no surprise.286 
In other words, the decisions privately taken by PSA were in conformity with 
the MoI’s roadmap for exiting the crisis. In fact, as the MoI had noted: 'If this 
mass layoff plan entails a risk, perhaps it is precisely because it is only 
partial...'287 Given that the actual excess workforce at PSA itself stood at 
around 9,300 as opposed to the 7,535 job cuts announced publicly, the 
initial layoff plan had already been adjusted downwards by PSA in order to 
                                                          
284 The FNE is a public organism created in 1963 set to finance employment assistance 
programs such as early retirements, partial unemployment or professional reconversion 
especially for industrial workers in firms undergoing restructuring. 
285 AN 19870344/28, Note pour le Ministre, 16 September 1983. 
286 AN 19910818/68, Note sure le dossier de licenciement collectif envisagé par la société 
Automobile Peugeot, 21 September 1983. 
287 AN 19910818/68, Note sure le dossier de licenciement collectif envisagé par la société 




limit social contestation.288  As such, the main issue was that the mere 
climate of fear reigning in Parisian plants since 1982 prevented the 
implementation of a plan austere enough to address the totality of the firm's 
excess workforce. Even at Renault, management was reluctant to 
announce its planned 8,000 job cust at Flins and Billancourt289 given the 
tense social climate reigning in the Paris area. 
While the government, except perhaps for the communists,290 was overall 
‘sympathetic’ to the industry’s delicate financial situation (Smith, 1998: 189), 
the sudden announcement of the dismissals plan by Peugeot put the 
government in an awkward position as it had to assume political 
responsibilities over the plan. As the Minister of Employment Ralite 
explained: 
Because of its social repercussions, because of the political stakes that 
it represents, this case evidently takes on a national importance. 
Consequently, it requires decisions and choices at a governmental 
level whose responsibility cannot be bore solely by the concerned 
departmental civil servants.291 
The Talbot dismissals turned from a private sector affair into a highly 
political one. Following the workers’ upheaval, the negotiations in which 
the government was forced to enter lead to an increased politicisation of 
PSA's restructuring plans (Smith, 1998: 189). Inadvertently, the socialists 
were forced to face exactly what they sought to avoid by not nationalising 
PSA: a far-reaching politicisation of car policy. Given that mass layoffs 
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required government approval according to the domestic Labour Code 
(Milner 1984:  370), the state did not have the option of not pronouncing 
itself on the issue. Nor could it simply delay taking positions since the MoI 
was aware that 'the social partners, having become enemies would [in the 
meanwhile] prepare for war.'292 Public intervention was the only possible 
response to a conflict that threatened the recovery of one of the country’s 
most critical industries. 
While the government was able to exercise arm’s length control over 
PSA’s modernisation strategies without taking public control of the firm, 
the mounting social tensions within the firm spurred a crisis of national 
dimensions forcing the state to overtly intervene in the restructuring 
process and mediate the conflict. At the same time, the growing 
politicisation of the plans forced the government to accept a more 
mitigated rationalisation plan which did not allow the full elimination of the 
industry’s excess capacities. The intervention of the state during the 1983 
strikes appeared as a trade-off between the need to pacify labour 
relations and the urgency to liquidate all the ageing production sites of the 
Parisian era. The urgency to resume the rationalisation effort without 
allowing labour contestation to undermine it gave the government an 
impetus to find an alternative way to politically manage the sector's 
industrial restructuring. 
TOWARDS A RULE-BASED STRATEGY (1984 -) 
To remedy the tension between its commitment to the ‘Paris 
disengagement’ strategy and the increasing politicisation of car policy, the 
government opted for a rule-based mode of governance in automobiles. A 
rule-based approach would allow the state to withdraw from direct political 
intervention in the firms’ affairs and simultaneously gain the tacit at least 
acceptance of the unions over the necessity of an extensive rationalisation 
of the Parisian industry. Indeed, following the political trauma of the 1983 
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strikes, in 1984 the Mauroy government opted to give discretion to craft the 
measures necessary to restore the industry’s competitiveness to a 
technocratic committee attached to the CGP rather than elected authorities 
or car constructors themselves. The committee would set up the targets 
necessary for the competitive survival of the industry while the government 
and the firms would undertake the measures necessary to achieve them. 
An essential controversy underpinning the tripartite negotiations between 
the government, the unions and PSA's management concerned the 
soundness and credibility of the arguments advanced to justify the necessity 
of the redundancies plan. Indeed, the CGT had repeatedly argued that 
PSA's arguments based on the worsening economic conjecture and 
decreasing sales trend of Talbot's cars was irrational. As CGT's Peugeot 
branch had noted:  
It is the first time that, in our knowledge, an industrial group manages 
layoffs in a prospective manner by anticipating on yet unknown 
operating results and by integrating the future failure of its commercial 
policy as a justification for redundancies.293  
There was thus a difficulty in discursively justifying the layoff plan on the 
part of PSA as the urgency of rationalisation was not convincingly 
communicated to workers. 
In fact, a widespread fear among workers was that PSA's direction was 
planning to progressively downsize Talbot's place within the group and 
ultimately halt the production of cars under this brand.294 For the CGT it was 
unclear why management decided to shut down half of the production lines 
of Talbot-Poissy instead of putting them back to work to produce more cars 
and increase the commercial performance of the brand.295 It was even 
                                                          
293 AN 19870344/28, Sommer to the Departmental Director of Labour of Doubs, 28 July 
1983. 
294 AN 19910818/68, Note sure le dossier de licenciement collectif envisage par la société 
Automobile Peugeot, 21 September 1983. 
295 AN 19870344/28, Taillandier to Rymery, 10 November 1983; AN 19870344/28, CGT-




argued that the Talbot operation was in fact a political manoeuvre on the 
part of PSA aiming at undermining the strength of unions.296 During the 
1983 negotiations, even the Treasury had communicated to the MoI that the 
'conjuncture argument' held by PSA to justify dismissal was difficult to 
defend in such a socially and politically tense climate. 297  According to 
workers, the liquidation of the firm’s Parisian capital was based on arbitrary 
criteria. As a result, the possibilities to obtain the cooperation of unions for 
the restructuring of the firm were severely narrowed down as the mere 
existence of an excess workforce was not accepted as a matter of fact by 
the latter.298  
Instead, a programmed reduction of the excess workforce needed to be 
grounded on incontestable facts regarding the automobile crisis. As it was 
argued, by Didier Floquet, director of the Treasury, during the Talbot crisis: 
‘It seems indispensable to me that a comprehensive stance is adopted vis-
à-vis Peugeot SA rather than reacting in a dispersed order to each of the 
actions or attitudes of Peugeot SA.’ 299  Indeed, as the 1983 strikes 
demonstrated the lack of a systematic, rule-based, treatment of the sector’s 
restructuring could unexpectedly lead to a deep political crisis.  
To this end the government set up in February the Comité National de 
l'Industrie (CNI) whose role was to examine the prospects of French industry 
and to make recommendations for industrial policy. The CNI was composed 
of its president, two reporters, fifteen members of the government's 
administration, fifteen representatives of employers and fifteen trade union 
delegates. In its first mission, the president Dalle, was given the mandate to 
lead a working group on automobiles outlining the future of the sector and 
the actions to be taken in order to face international competitive pressures.  
At a time where the growing turmoil of the sector overtly implicated the state 
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in the affairs of the sector, the CNI served as a way to delegate the 
deliberation over the rationalisation measures to an external technocratic 
committee set up to inform social partners of the current state of the 
industry. Indeed, shortly after the CNI was set up, Pierre Gaddoneix 
explained in the Conseil Economique et Social that: 
A great part of the decisions does not belong to public authorities. 
It really must be understood that they belong to these two 
constructors. Thus, what Public authorities wish is that there is at 
least a concertation at the national level...There is a certain 
anxiety in public opinion regarding the future of the automobile 
industry. Thus, if Public authorities proposed to urgently create 
this commission, it is to respond to this expectation.300 
With the state having clarified its formal non-engagement in the sector’s 
restructuring, the CNI’s aim was to provide the discursive framework to 
legitimise the ongoing industrial mutations of the car industry. 
Official negotiations within the CNI were planned to be based on 
homogenised set of economic indicators (e.g. excess workforce, global 
productivity levels) tracking the lagging behind of French automobiles vis-a-
vis foreign constructors.301 Instead of negotiations occurring haphazardly 
whenever one of the constructors announced a redundancies plan, the CNI 
was to serve as a single national platform where the official discussions over 
the future of French automobile employment could take place based on an 
'objective' exposition of the weaknesses of French cars and the necessary 
steps to alleviate them. More importantly, the technical and incontestable 
findings of the CNI could provide a legitimate source of justification for the 
reduction of employment.  
In the first meeting of the CNI, Dalle outright explained the current impasse 
of the sector:  
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Either productivity does not augment faster than production, which runs 
the risk of not being competitive in French and global markets, or the 
efforts to augment productivity permits us to remain competitive but 
with consequences on employment.302 
The situation exposed by Dalle to the unions, policymakers and constructors 
was straightforward as productivity increases and employment 
maintenance were incompatible objectives: the failure to adjust the 
workforce downwards would force the whole sector into a path of decline.303  
Indeed, the picture painted by Dalle's group was particularly bleak as French 
automobiles fell behind their Japanese, American and even European 
competitors: 'The French automobile industry has ceased being competitive 
nowadays.'304 Indeed, from 1979 to 1984 the rate of market penetration of 
French cars had fallen from 78.3% to 65.1% in the domestic market and 
from 30.1% to 21.6% in the European one. 305  French constructors 
underperformed in almost every respect vis-a-vis the competition. 306 
Financially, virtually every carmaker was making profits except for PSA and 
Renault while the failure to decrease the workforce in accordance with the 
drop in sales led to a decrease in productivity at a time where foreign 
constructors registered 6 to 7% yearly productivity gains. 307  Given the 
deteriorating competitiveness of French cars, Dalle urged the necessity to 
immediately proceed to a first round of 18,000 redundancies, to be equally 
distributed among Peugeot, Citroen and Renault, and argued that the 
reduction of the rest of the excess workforce (around 52,000) could be 
spread in time and eliminated by 1989.308 
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These guidelines forthwith became the goals pursued by the government's 
industrial policy towards cars.309 Indeed, the committee’s works coincided 
with the worsening financial situation of PSA’s Citroen branch which had 
communicated to Mauroy its need to urgently proceed to mass layoffs in its 
Parisian plants.310  After a consultation with Dalle, Mauroy reportedly 
congratulated the Commission’s active work on the adequate 
modalities for resolving the problem of the excess workforce. He 
wanted to situate the works of the Commission within the context of the 
current negotiations at Citroen. He wishes that the measures that will 
be retained in Citroen’s case anticipate on those that could be adopted 
in the future in order to resolve the problems of the automobile 
industry.311 
In addition to providing support for the Citroen layoffs, the government 
showed its willingness to consolidate the Dalle report as the main blueprint 
for the implementation of rationalisation measures across the industry. 
Ultimately, the verdict of Dalle's investigation was crystallised in a report 
made public in October 1984. Dalle's report culminated in two essential and 
interdependent policy recommendations for the sector. Firstly, to maintain a 
competitive international presence the sector had to realise at least a 7% 
yearly increase in productivity. Secondly, productivity gains had to be 
compensated by a reduction of 80,000 jobs by 1988.312 In accordance with 
the government’s original plans, the report’s findings were inscribed into the 
constructors' own strategies. Characteristically, Bernard Hanon, the 
president of Renault, stressed in a press conference in early October: 'What 
underpins all of our objectives is this productivity figure of 7%.’313 In a sense, 
the Dalle report served as a green light for implementing the socially painful 
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workforce adjustments and plant shutdowns in the sector (Loubet 2009: 
146). 
For the government, the Dalle commission served a double depoliticising 
purpose. On the one hand, it provided a grounded justification for the 
downsizing of the sector. Discussing the strengths of the report, the MoI 
noted:  
One positive aspect [is] the pedagogical value of illustrating a reality: 
faced with markets that grow only by 1% or 2% by year, the imperious 
necessity for productivity gains at annual rhythm of 6 or 7%, 
necessarily leads to adjustments in the workforce.314  
The requirement to cut down the excess workforce was thus presented not 
as the arbitrarily drawn decision of constructors but as a structural condition 
imposed by changes in the global automobile market. In a sense, the CNI 
served to discursively outline the objective constraints weighing on industrial 
strategy and ‘limit expectations of what is possible’ (Burnham 2011a: 464). 
On the other, by delegating the negotiations on workforce reductions to the 
CNI, the government was able to shield itself from labour contestation and 
avoid direct bargaining with the unions. In view of the public announcement 
of Dalle's report, the MoI recommended that CNI's automobile group be 
transformed into an Industrial Strategy Group (GIS) - that is a technocratic 
agency attached to the democratically non-accountable Plan Committee- 
that would immediately devise the concrete measures necessary for the 
restoration of the industry’s health.315 As discussed within the MoI 
the works of the newly founded GIS would be concluded by a report 
that would seek a consensus around “positive” themes (without starting 
again the discussion on the excess workforce) and would eventually 
allow the expression of diverging positions by the social 
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partners…[This] would not delay…the adoption of corrective or 
restructuring measures in the automobile industry.316 
In this vein, the rationalisation of automobiles could resume with minimal 
opposition from the trade unions. Given the technocratic nature of the GIS 
the concertation with social partners would merely take a consultative 
character as the necessity to cut down the excess workforce would not be 
laid on the table. As such the firms’ disengagement from their obsolete 
Parisian units could resume unobstructedly. Indeed, the alternative, that is 
the concertation with the unions at a governmental level,  
'was an evidently perilous exercise as it would lead to precise 
orientations and decisions on which public authorities would be 
expected [to pronounce themselves] by the social partners and public 
opinion.317 
The constitution of a GIS signalled the government’s willingness to retain 
only an arm’s length control over the restructuring process by resisting the 
pressures to enter into direct negotiations with the unions and declining any 
formal responsibility over job cuts.  
Even further, the MoI insisted that the 'paternity of the report’ was made 
clear to the public.318 By asking Dalle to assume the report's conclusions, 
the government could signal public opinion that industrial policy was itself 
hamstrung by the technocratic expertise of the committee. In this vein, the 
MoI could avoid giving a political character to the committee's conclusions 
regarding the necessity to cutdown the excess workforce.  
By adopting the recommendations of the Dalle report, the government 
allowed the double objective of achieving a 7% yearly productivity growth 
and eliminating the 80,000 excess workforce to pilot industrial policy 
towards the sector and to orientate the rationalisation strategies of the 
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constructors. Drawing on the ostensibly non-political and unbiased 
character of the 'rules' instituted by the Dalle report, the government was 
aiming at minimising the political contestation that could be directly directed 
at it. Social contestation within the sector did decrease in the subsequent 
years and while the rationalisation of Renault was accompanied by certain 
clashes between management and the CGT in 1985, workers' mobilisation 
never reached the proportions of the 1982-1984 cycle of struggles. More 
importantly, the Dalle report had a long-lasting impact on the industry's 
development. As communist deputy Brunhes argued in the National 
Assembly in 1990, the Dalle report still constituted Renault's 'bible.'319 By 
1990 the objectives set out by the report regarding the excess workforce 
had largely been accomplished as automobile construction employment 
decreased from 250,000 in 1984 to 131,000. Similarly, the systematic 
decrease of the workforce allowed the continuation of the selective 
disengagement from Parisian industry. Indeed, the 1980s witnessed the 
shutdown of certain iconic industrial sites of Ile-de-France such as Citroen's 
plants at Clichy and Nanterre and Renault's dismantling of its legendary 
Billancourt plant.   
In a way, the CNI allowed the government to take on a seemingly politically 
neutral stance with regards to the devaluation of Parisian plants. The setting 
up of the CNI was a direct response to the 1983 strikes and allowed the 
government to avoid intervening in issues of mass layoffs as it was forced 
to do during the Talbot strikes. By allowing the report’s conclusion to pilot 
industrial strategy in the sector, the government could ensure that the firms 
would modernise sufficiently without either having to exercise direct public 
control over them or having recourse to lengthy negotiations with trade 
unions regarding the issue of the excess workforce. In essence, the report 
constituted the ‘political cover it needed’ (Smith 1998: 195) to discursively 
justify the necessity to eliminate the superfluous labour and infrastructural 
capacities of the Parisian area. 
                                                          





The deindustrialisation of France’s automobile sector between 1974 and 
1984 might have as well corresponded to a typical naturalist explanation: 
employment losses were largely the result of French producers’ efforts to 
increase productivity. Equally, within the IDL, the country maintained its 
trade specialisation in cars as PSA and Renault continued to figure in the 
ranks of the world’s top producers. Yet, it is impossible to analyse this 
phenomenon as a purely market-led one. If domestic industry’s adaptation 
had been left to market forces it is doubtful that PSA would have maintained 
its world rankings. In the absence of state funds for the development of 
automated plants, PSA would have carried out its planned 3BF investment 
program which would have significantly decreased its size and commercial 
potential.  
At the same time, the regeneration of the sector was largely depended on 
the decline of its financially unviable Parisian plants such as Talbot. Again, 
without the state’s effort to depoliticise car policy and insulate it from the 
Parisian workers’ upheaval, the sector’s restructuring would not have 
resembled the ‘positive deindustrialisation’ scheme of naturalist 
interpretations. Assigning the design of the blueprint for the sector’s 
recovery to a technocratic committee, the CNI, was key to the smooth 
unfolding of selective disengagement. By virtue of the CNI’s technocratic 
nature, the government was able to discursively demonstrate the necessity 
of employment reductions and sidestep the need to engage in lengthy 
negotiations with trade unions. 
The experience of the automobile industry during this decade illustrates well 
the claim that deindustrialisation consists of a double-sided phenomenon 
which is mediated by the state. It is the arm’s length control exercised by 
the state on the selective disengagement strategy that allowed 
deindustrialisation to take the form of a progressive dismantling and decline 
of Parisian assembly lines and the transference of production in automated 




The chapter offers equally important insights as to the governing dillemmas 
inherent to the capitalist state form. In addition to seeking autonomy from 
workers’ interests, the state also opposed PSA’s plans to decelerate 
investment rates after 1982. Its effort to administer a rule-based form of 
industrial management was both a means to ostracise labour from the 
negotiation tables as well as to ‘shake up’ the firms’ managers (Smith 1998: 
115).  The policy recommendations of the CNI regarding productivity 
increases constituted a disciplinary tool over capital too. Industrial policy 
was not geared to functionally adapt to the ‘needs’ of capital or the market, 
but to pursue measures that state managers deemed necessary to enhance 







This thesis intended to provide an account of the political economy of 
deindustrialisation in France between 1974 and 1984 through an analysis 
of the historical experience of the T&C, steel and automobile industries. The 
theoretical and archival findings provided in this thesis have attempted to 
offer a fresh understanding of deindustrialisation which considers firstly, its 
double-sided character as a movement simultaneously involving industrial 
decline and industrial modernisation and secondly, the role of the state in 
mediating it and promoting it in a strategic manner. At the level of IPE 
debates this thesis has attempted to give support to claims that the state 
and the market rather than independent and externally related spheres of 
social organisation are in fact different forms of the underlying capitalist 
relations and essential moments in the process of capitalist wealth 
production. 
A REDEFINITION OF DEINDUSTRIALISATION 
Today the marks of deindustrialisation are still stamped on the regions that 
were studied in this thesis. The social and economic crisis reigning in the 
banlieues, the poor suburbs of Paris, has been linked to the 
deindustrialisation of the ile-de-France region– in which the restructuring of 
the automobile industry significantly participated - and the elimination of 
previously existing industrial jobs (Beaud and Mauger 2017). Equally, the 
effects of deindustrialisation are still visible in the regions of Northern 
Eastern France where one can still notice an array of abandoned coal mines 
or steel plants. The former regions of Lorraine and Nord-pas-de-Calais are 
still affected by high unemployment and poverty levels. In addition, a strong 
correlation is being established between the electoral rise of the Front 
National and the industrial destitution of these regions where the party’s 
most robust strongholds are (Aisch et al 2017). The economic and social 




the same time though, in 2007, on the eve of the 2008 financial crisis, the 
volume of French manufacturing production was at an all-time high and was 
close to 50% higher than in 1980 (Nesta 2010: 300). Despite the 
disappearance of certain (regional) manufacturing activities, in absolute 
terms the manufacturing sector has not ceased to grow! As Roustan (2004: 
45) explained in a report for the French national assembly, 
deindustrialisation constitutes a myth at the national level but a reality at the 
local level.  
Existing approaches to deindustrialisation in developed economies have 
however defined deindustrialisation with exclusive reference to either its 
‘positive’ or ‘negative’ facet. Naturalist approaches have analysed 
deindustrialisation as the natural unfolding of the market’s logics since it 
constitutes a manifestation of the rising productivity of the manufacturing 
sector which renders industrial labour progressively redundant. Equally, it 
reveals developed countries’ natural ability to capture the capital-intensive 
and high-end technological segments of the manufacturing chain thereby 
bestowing labour-intensive industrial activities to the developing world. On 
the other hand, the industriocratic approach, which sees the manufacturing 
sector as inherently conductive to permanent economic growth and 
employment creation, proposes a gloomier understanding of 
deindustrialisation. It sees it as the erosion of domestic manufacturing and 
its weakening position in the world market. The debate on the nature of 
deindustrialisation has thus witnessed the confrontation of a largely positive 
and progressive view of deindustrialisation and one which sees it as a 
process of economic decline. However, deindustrialisation has 
paradoxically led to both the increased manufacturing capacity of France 
and to the decline of certain regional activities. Deindustrialisation as this 
thesis has attempted to demonstrate is not an ‘either-or process’. It is 
essentially a contradictory phenomenon which involves both the 
modernisation and the regression of certain manufacturing activities across 




In addition, this thesis has endeavoured to analyse the role of the state in 
this process and has argued that the aforementioned tension between the 
concurrent modernisation and erosion of industrial capacities occurs 
transcends the state itself. Naturalists and Industriocrats have understood 
the role of policy-making within this process only in functional terms. More 
precisely, for the former, the state’s function, rather than obsessing over the 
preservation of industrial jobs, is to smooth the transition of the domestic 
society to a service-based economy (Baldwin 2017). In other words, policy-
making must abide to the requirements of a mature deindustrialised 
economy by, for example, implementing the appropriate labour training and 
human capital development policies that correspond to the needs of a 
technologically advanced and R&D intensive industrial sector. The role of 
the state is thus assessed in terms of the functional adaptation of its policies 
to a deindustrialised setting. For the industriocrats, the state’s function 
consists in its capacity to sustain the economy’s industrial tissue through 
the formulation of ambitious long-term industrial strategies adapted to world 
market conditions. Deindustrialisation, according to them, manifests the 
state’s failure to consolidate such a policy framework and avert industrial 
decline. In both cases, deindustrialisation appears as a phenomenon 
escaping the control of the state. Indeed, in the first case deindustrialsiation 
appears as the product of structural, market-led processes and in the 
second as a failure of the state to intervene in a timely fashion to prevent 
the erosion of domestic manufacturing.   
In contrast, the experiences of the sectors studied in this thesis have shown 
that rather than being a mere passive observer of deindustrialisation, the 
state has been fundamental in strategically promoting it. Thus, the thesis 
has claimed that deindustrialisation is not a mere description of domestic 
economic trends but constitutes a politically configurated process and an 
industrial policy-preference in its own right. Deindustrialisation was in fact 
revealed to be a form of industrial statecraft and a fundamentally political 




purports that the latter can essentially be conceived as a state-endorsed 
strategy of selective disengagement from specific manufacturing activities 
that transpires across and within sectors. Indeed, in response to capital’s 
global overaccumulation crisis following the first oil shock, which in France 
manifested itself as a growing uncompetitiveness of its industrial sector vis-
à-vis its major industrial partners, the French state endorsed a strategy of 
selective disengagement in order to facilitate the liquidation the most 
obsolete and commercially uncompetitive units and foster the country’s 
manufacturing capacities around the most performant and productive ones.  
Indeed, in all of the sectors studied, it was shown that deindustrialisation 
consistently involved both the erosion industrial capacities and the 
expansion of others and that the state played a detrimental role in 
determining this process. For instance, in the T&C sector selective 
disengagement took the form of an unequal distribution of funds towards 
the most competitive and export-oriented industries of the sector.  The 
smaller and less advanced firms were increasingly eliminated by way of 
exposure to foreign competition. In the steel industry, selective 
disengagement targeted the disinvestment from long product facilities 
mainly located in Lorraine and the re-orientation of steel production towards 
the most profitable flat products. It equally involved the devaluation of 
activities relying on Lorraine's iron ore and the expansion of more modern 
electrical-steel making processes. Finally, the consecutive governments 
under the Giscard D’Estaing and Mitterrand presidency by way of regional 
development premiums and other forms of aids to modernisation favoured 
the progressive disengagement of production from Parisian region and their 
replacement by automated units in the provincial areas of Northern and to 
an extent Eastern France. 
Paradoxically, the increased competitiveness in manufacturing also 
demands the elimination of certain industrial capacities; the growing 
productive potential of capital oddly brings about the ‘enforced destruction 




contradictory process is aptly captured in the dialogue between Minister of 
Industrial Affairs Laurent Fabius and a representative of the CGT in 1984 in 
the context of the restructuring of the steel industry and the elimination of its 
obsolete excess capacities. As Fabius argued: ‘With regards to the CGT’s 
question on whether we are going to sanction the decline of the steel 
industry, I respond clearly not. We want to defend a strong and modern steel 
industry.’320 The incomprehension between the trade unionist and Fabius 
reflects the contradictory nature of deindustrialisation as the former laid 
emphasis on the visible decline of a number of steel plants, while Fabius’ 
claim acknowledged that such measures were necessary for the steel’s 
competitive survival. The modernisation of industry also contained the 
decline of certain of its most feeble production units and along with it the 
jobs and regions formerly depended on them. The conceptualisation of 
deindustrialisation as ‘selective disengagement’ allows to encompass both 
the double-sided nature of deindustrialisation (i.e. as both increased 
prosperity and decline) as well as to conceptualise the role of the state in 
mediating the distribution of losses and gains across and within sectors by 
allocating resources or adapting industrial policy to the benefit of 
strategically selected activities.  
The thesis’ reconceptualization of deindustrialisation is particularly salient 
in light of the renewed interest in industrial policies promoting the 
renaissance of a strong manufacturing sector discussed in the introduction. 
Re-industrialisation and reversing industrial decline are increasingly seen 
as key policy-objectives for the sustainable maintenance of 
competitiveness, economic growth and total social welfare (Aiginger 2014; 
Salazar-Xirinachs et al. 2014; Mazzucato 2015). However, in accordance 
with the thesis’ findings any industrial policy aiming at rejuvenating the 
industrial sector is paradoxically bound to increase the rate of the 
economy’s deindustrialisation both in employment and share of value-
added terms (Rowthorn and Coutts 2013; Peneder and Streicher 2016). The 
                                                          




competitiveness of industry is indeed associated with its capacity to produce 
a growing output on the basis of a shrinking workforce and continuously 
decrease its relative prices through productivity increases which ultimately 
accelerates its apparent hollowing out.          
THE LIMITS OF THE STATE AND THE CAPITALIST FORM OF WEALTH 
To shed light to the double-sided character of deindustrialisation and the 
role of the state in mediating it, this thesis, drawing from the Open Marxist 
current’s radical re-interpretation of Marx, has proposed to ground this 
phenomenon in the crisis-ridden development of capitalist social relations. 
Such a theoretical approach has important ramifications for the 
understanding of state-market relations.  
Both within and beyond the IPE literature, it is often the case that the state 
and the market are conceptualised as two independent and conflicting 
social spheres caught in a ‘tug of war’ which in different periods sees one 
sphere holding more sway than the other (Clift 2014: 32). This is particularly 
striking in studies of the process of globalisation that imply that state 
authority has been increasingly transferred to global markets and 
transnational institutions. For certain accounts the structural context of 
liberalised financial and trade flows has transformed and redefined the 
functions of the state. The latter becomes more concerned with 
accommodating its policies to the volatile movement of global capital and 
creating a business-friendly environment rather than prioritising welfare-
enhancing policies that encumber competitiveness (Amin 1997; Cerny et al 
2005; Fougner 2006). The post-Bretton Woods global regulatory framework 
and diffused powers of transnational institutions such as the European 
Union are equally said to have narrowed the spectrum of policies available 
for states to manage the domestic economy (Leibfried and Pierson 1995; 
Scholte 1997; Held 2000; Jacobsson 2006).  
Within this context, the experiment of Mitterrand’s presidency to implement 




eventual U-turn towards a more austere form of economic management 
entered ‘debates about heightened capital mobility and policy autonomy as 
a test case’ (Clift 2016: 519). In all the thesis’ case studies, the Socialists’ 
initial pledge to remedy industrial decline and resist the ‘fatality’ of the IDL 
by grounding industrial production on the growing absorptive capacity of 
domestic demand fell through and was supplanted by a policy ‘pragmatism’ 
that endorsed the logic of industrial rationalisation, downsizing and 
defunding. This policy break has often been attributed to a trade-off between 
the pursuit of expansionary Keynesian policies and compliance with the 
policy constraints imposed by European institutions and/or of the changing 
international economic environment (see Hall 1986; Loriaux 1991; Daley 
1996a; Hayward 1998). According to such views thus, Mitterrand’s socialist 
experiment was terminated by external forces. 
Instead it was argued here that the purpose of state policies is not defined 
by external developments but by the state’s innate dependency upon 
successful accumulation. It was argued that the state and the market are 
better captured as different facets or guises of capitalist social relations for 
which the primary purpose of productive activity is the perennial valorisation 
of capital. Put simply, under capitalist conditions production is geared 
towards increasing profitability rather than creating use values. Capitalist 
wealth, or value, is defined by the capacity of the domestic economy to 
ceaselessly realise an ever-growing sum of profits by increasing its 
productivity levels relative to the social productivity of labour at a global level 
rather than by virtue of the economy’s total material output. Individual 
producers become entrapped in the valorisation cycle through the 
competitive pressures that they mutually exercise upon each other in the 
world market.  
The capitalist organisation of production and exchange relations gives rise 
to a particular form of authority in the global economy which is concentrated 
neither in the hands of the market nor in those of the state. Rather, the drive 




become autonomous’ (Marx 1973: 197). As such, the interaction and 
competition between market agents participating in capitalist exchange 
appears as an alien, compelling force to increase profitability. Similarly, the 
capitalist form of the state entangles the latter within the world market 
imperative to accumulate wealth. The impersonal power of value is asserted 
upon state managers as the rates of labour productivity of different nations 
are constantly commensurated in international trade (Marx 1976a: Ch.22). 
Such constraints, which can take the form of growing balance of payments 
deficits, compel policy-makers to deploy policies that will raise the 
competitiveness of domestically operating capital and conform national 
conditions of production to or above the average productivity levels 
established at the international level.  In this vein, authority in the world 
market is located neither in the market nor the political sphere as the agents 
in both spheres unknowingly reproduce their own subjection to capital’s self-
valorising motion. Rather than an arena of struggle between states and 
markets, the world economy is one dominated by the impersonal force of 
value. 
At the same time, the antagonistic nature of capitalist social relations 
generates a tension between the material aspirations of labour and the 
reproduction of the conditions conductive to the profitable accumulation of 
capital on a world scale. This tension is reproduced within the state 
apparatus. In fact, economic and industrial policy is neither structurally 
determined by the dictates of the market nor simply subject to the 
autonomous volitions of state managers. Rather, they are determined by 
the pragmatic necessity to manage the underlying tension between labour’s 
material needs and capital’s profitability in a context of cutthroat 
international competition. This tension was reflected throughout the case 
studies analysed. Both Barre’s successive centre-right and Mauroy’s 
consecutive socialist governments were constantly torn between the 
necessity to favour the growing competitiveness of different industries and 




threatened by industrial decline. The limitations posed by capitalist form of 
production on the management of this tension is adequately captured by 
Minister André Giraud who, in response to the intense pressures of trade 
unionists to channel further funds into the steel industry to safeguard jobs, 
argued: 
Is it only today that you realise that our situation is not comfortable 
economically? It is not the moment to distribute wealth, we do not have 
any! Any government would like to decrease working time, augment 
salaries, employ more people, etc. It would be wonderful to be able to 
say yes, unfortunately it is not possible!321 
This statement clearly illustrates the policy quandary in which policy-makers 
find themselves as legitimation imperatives urges them to meet the 
subsistence needs of civil society while market conditions might prevent 
them to do so. The state is in other words not inherently predisposed to 
favour capital over labour, rather it is the form of capitalist wealth itself that 
poses objective limits on the state’s capacity to manage social antagonism. 
Back to Mitterand’s experiment, the French socialists did not encounter ‘the 
limits of social democracy’ in the face of powerful markets but ‘the limits of 
the capitalist state form itself’ (Burnham 2008: 62). Equally, the industrial 
strategies of selective disengagement of the Socialist government were 
actually aided and abetted by the European Commission’s regulations on 
state aid rather than operating as a mere constraint on domestic policy-
making capacities. As demonstrated in the case studies the industrial 
reforms pursued by the Socialists aimed at achieving state objectives for 
trade competitiveness, commercial surpluses or budgetary restraint rather 
than merely abiding to external constraints. In a sense, the Socialists’ pre-
electoral ambitions encountered the barriers intrinsic to the state’s 
reproduction. It was the realisation of the dysfunctionalities in the form of 
industrial management that they initially proposed and its difficulties in 
                                                          





combining social pacification with the promotion of high-tech activities that 
led to its abandonment (Levy 2008: 421-422). Ultimately, it is the condition 
of the state’s existence as the political form of capital valorisation that 
prevented an across-the-board rescue of lame duck sectors that were 
unable to be productive in value terms. No matter how much the Socialists 
were convinced that they could resist the decline of industrial employment, 
their U-turn in industrial policy was inevitable once they faced the dilemma: 
increased productivity with job cuts or large-scale industrial bankruptcy with 
even more job losses. Both the legitimation and accumulation imperatives 
weighing upon them would have been ultimately compromised without a U-
turn. Their pre-electoral pledges encountered the socially constituted limits 
of a world in which social wealth is measured by labour productivity. 
The limitations posed by the necessity to produce capitalist wealth on the 
range of policy options that state managers are willing to deploy might often 
lead to different degrees of politicisation or depoliticisation of (industrial) 
policy-making as it was demonstrated in this thesis. Indeed, depending on 
the urgency and economic pressures to undertake certain competitiveness-
inducing industrial policies with severe consequences on employment, state 
managers might either for politicised and/or depoliticised forms of industrial 
management. Through the politicisation of aspects of industrial policy-
making state elites might assume the political responsibility for certain 
socially negotiated policies in order to channel civil society’s interests into 
institutional forms that do not inhibit the overall objectives for market reform 
such as the generous social compensations distributed to redundant 
workers in the steel and automobile industries through the GPS and FNE 
procedures accordingly.  
However, if the demands on the state are too strong and unmanageable 
state managers might depoliticise industrial policy-making, by transferring 
the formal responsibilities over certain aspects of decision-making to 
institutions lying beyond the governmental sphere while maintaining arm’s 




decrease their accountability over the implementation of certain unpopular 
policy-preferences thereby shielding themselves from domestic political 
backlash. In particular, depoliticisation strategies can be carried through 
supranational media such as the European Union giving rise to a process 
of transnational depoliticisation. Such processes allow state managers to 
pursue their own industrial policy ambitions through their compliance with 
the disciplinary mechanisms and rules of transnational institutions. At the 
same time, they allow governments to sidestep the pressures of declining 
sectors for assistance by appealing to the restrictive regulations, such as 
the EC’s state aid controls, imposed to them externally by supranational 
bodies. 
In the textile sector there was often a tendency to politicise the management 
of restructuring as in 1980 president when president Giscard d’Estaing 
declared it as strategic importance while under the first years of Mitterrand 
the state assumed the management of the sector through a comprehensive 
plan of social contributions relief. In automobiles, the severe conflict 
between PSA’s management and workers in 1983 led too to the 
politicisation of industrial policy as the workers’ upheaval took national 
dimensions and forced the state to hold tripartite negotiations.  
Depoliticisation was particularly pronounced in steel. Indeed, following the 
1978 riots in Longwy the French successive governments strenuously 
supported the delegation over the responsibility of steel restructuring 
measures to the European Commission by approving the latter’s plan to 
impose a European-wide plan to cut-down the industry’s excess capacities. 
Equally, in the textile sector after 1984 the EC’s rules on state aids facilitated 
the implementation Ministry of the Economy’s recommendations for an 
unassisted market-led adjustment of the sector to global competition. In a 
socially tense climate, political authorities were increasingly reluctant to 
publicly assume the responsibility of their selective disengagement strategy 




In automobiles, in response to the workers’ growing pressures weighing 
upon Mauroy’s government, the latter commissioned an expert group to 
craft the blueprints for the sector’s exit from the crisis. The Dalle’s 
Committee recommendation for a yearly 5% increase in productivity and the 
elimination of 80,000 jobs by 1988 became the rules guiding policy towards 
the sector. The ostensibly objective and non-political character of Dalle’s 
conclusions, allowed the government to signal the sector’s workers that the 
committee’s expert report tied its hands thereby allowing the unfolding of 
the selective disengagement strategy with minimal political opposition. 
Ultimately, the legitimation and accumulation pressures weighing upon the 
state can be brought back to the contradiction between capital’s capacity to 
produce an abundance of material wealth (i.e. use values) and the capitalist 
form of wealth, namely the ceaseless expansion of value. It is this 
fundamental contradiction that explains the aforementioned ostensible 
incomprehension between Fabius and the CGT representative or Giraud’s 
contention that despite its willingness to do so the government could not 
aimlessly distribute wealth to labour. The growing material output of capital 
can coexist with the pauperisation of society in terms of value (Postone 
1993: 194). Indeed, the augmentation of capital by way of productivity 
increases is often built on the impoverishment of society. As Marx (1976a: 
798) argues:  
the higher the productivity of labour, the greater is the pressure of the 
workers on the means of employment, the more precarious therefore 
becomes the condition for their existence, namely the sale of their own 
labour-power for the increase of alien wealth, or in other words the self-
valorization of capital. 
The growing difficulties of state managers to both strengthen their 
competitive position and respond to labour’s material aspirations stems from 
the struggle to integrate the existing productive capacities and labour-force 
of society into capital’s valorisation cycle. French state managers pursued 




paradoxically increase the wealth-generating capacity of the country in the 
face of cutthroat international competition.  
In their classic The Deindustrialisation of America Bluestone and Harrison 
(1982:21) asked ‘how can we go about the business of constructing a 
productive economy which produces livelihoods without destroying lives?’ 
Again, this question is particularly salient in light of the contemporary 
resurgence of calls for active state-led industrial policies discussed in the 
thesis’ introduction. This thesis’ task was not to provide a definite answer to 
Bluestone and Harrison’s judicious question, however its theoretical and 
empirical findings do suggest that the pacific coexistence of a productive 
economy and the defence of livelihoods necessitates a reconceptualisation 
of the social form of wealth in a manner that human needs do not figure as 
a mere appendix to capital’s uncompromising race for profit but as the end-
goal of productive activity. This observation stems directly from the study of 
deindustrialisation presented here. Indeed, the regional and social 
pauperisation that have accompanied the deindustrialisation process did 
not stem from the failure of domestic industry to produce large volumes of 
material wealth apt to decently sustain livelihoods but, from industry’s 
growing difficulty and efforts undertaken to be productive in value terms. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR A FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA 
By analysing the historical unfolding of deindustrialisation in France during 
the tumultuous 1974-1984 decade, the findings presented here are limited 
by the geographical and temporal delineations of the thesis’s empirical 
investigation. 
On the one hand, this thesis has essentially focused on the mechanisms of 
deindustrialisation as applied to industrially developed economies, that is to 
countries who might be said to have experienced deindustrialisation as a 
consequence of the maturation of their industrial sector (Rowthorn and 
Wells 1987: 213). However, at the same time there has been a growing 




economies (Jalilian and Weiss 2000; Shafaeddin 2005; Dasgupta and Singh 
2006; Rasiah 2011; Rodrik 2016; Tregenna 2015, 2016b). In contrast to 
popular understandings of deindustrialisation this process is not peculiar to 
OECD economies but has a more global reach and affects also sub-
Saharan African, Latin American and Asian developing countries. Thus, 
future research into deindustrialisation should direct efforts at 
understanding this phenomenon at a more global level in order to also 
capture the politics of deindustrialisation in industrially less developed 
economies.  
The value-form approach presented here does pave the way for such an 
understanding. Indeed, as it was noted the central contradiction of capital 
accumulation is to at the same time grow its productive capacities but also 
undermine the sources of its growth. That is the tendency to minimise as 
much as possible the necessary labour time for the production of goods 
thereby rendering (industrial) labour increasingly superfluous but at the 
same time posing labour time as the fundamental source of wealth (Marx 
1993: 706) as it is the capacity of individual capital’s to produce in 
accordance with the global levels of social productivity that guarantees their 
profitability. Thus, premature deindustrialisation in developing countries 
might be a manifestation of the global limitations of the manufacturing sector 
to act as an employment provider given its globally constantly rising 
productivity levels (Felipe, Mehta and Rhee 2014). Even in an industrially 
fast-growing economy like China the manufacturing sector has since 2012 
been replaced by the tertiary sector as the main engine of employment 
creation while research indicates that the country might be nearing a stage  
of industrial employment stagnation despite growths in output (Ernst 2016; 
Hou, Gelb and Calabrese 2017). 
On the other hand, deindustrialiation is not a onetime phenomenon onset in 
the 1970s. Historical investigations of the industrial trajectories of European 
and American regions in the 19th and early 20th century suggest that 




moments of their history (Hau and Nunez 1998; Daumalin and Mioche 2013; 
Daumalin 2013; Marty 2013; Koistinen 2014). Furthermore, France has 
gone several waves of deindustrialisation since the decade studied in this 
thesis. Indeed, it has been argued that after the end of the first wave in 1985, 
France has since the beginning of the 21st century entered a new era of 
deindustrialisation which in employment terms was as significant as the first 
one (Le Monde 2008; Virard and Artus 2011: Ch.1). Thus, the process of 
deindustrialisation is not delimited by the timeframe set by this thesis but 
has taken place both before and after it.  
Future research should shed further light on how deindustrialisation 
continues to occur currently and study the forms that it might take into the 
future. The findings and claims of this thesis point out to 
‘deindustrialisation’s deep and universal character as an essential element 
in the functioning of capitalism’ (Johnson 2002: 29). Indeed, the inherent 
tendency of capitalist production to increase its output regardless of the 
absorptive limits of the market necessarily brings about the devaluation of 
the excess industrial capital that fails to be valorised in exchange as recently 
exemplified by the accelerated deindustrialisation of advanced economies 
following the 2008 financial crisis (Cozzi et al. 2016; Fontagné and Harrison 
2017). Deindustrialisation is likely to constitute a recurrent phenomenon that 
accelerates or decelerates in accordance with the economic conjuncture, 
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